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The dynamics on networks and the dynamics of networks are usually entangled with
each other in many highly connected systems, where the former means the evolution
of state and the latter means the adaptation of structure. In this thesis, we will study
the coupled dynamics through analytical and computational approaches, where the
adaptive networks are driven by learning of various complexities.
Firstly, we investigate information diffusion on networks through an adaptive voter
model, where two opinions are competing for the dominance. Two types of dynamics
facilitate the agreement between neighbours: one is pairwise imitation and the other is
link rewiring. As the rewiring strength increases, the network of voters will transform
from consensus to fragmentation. By exploring various strategies for structure adapta-
tion and state evolution, our results suggest that network configuration is highly influ-
enced by range-based rewiring and biased imitation. In particular, some approximation
techniques are proposed to capture the dynamics analytically through moment-closure
differential equations.
Secondly, we study an evolutionary model under the framework of natural selec-
tion. In a structured community made up of cooperators and cheaters (or defectors), a
new-born player will adopt a strategy and reorganise its neighbourhood based on social
inheritance. Starting from a cooperative population, an invading cheater may spread
in the population occasionally leading to the collapse of cooperation. Such a collapse
unfolds rapidly with the change of external conditions, bearing the traits of a critical
transition. In order to detect the risk of invasions, some indicators based on population
composition and network structure are proposed to signal the fragility of communities.
Through the analyses of consistency and accuracy, our results suggest possible avenues
for detecting the loss of cooperation in evolving networks.
Lastly, we incorporate distributed learning into adaptive agents coordination, which
emerges as a consequence of rational individual behaviours. A generic framework of
work-learn-adapt (WLA) is proposed to foster the success of agents organisation. To
gain higher organisation performance, the division of labour is achieved by a series of
events of state evolution and structure adaptation. Importantly, agents are able to adjust
their states and structures through quantitative information obtained from distributed
learning. The adaptive networks driven by explicit learning pave the way for a better
understanding of intelligent organisations in real world.
i
Lay Summary
This thesis focuses on the interplay between state evolution and structure adaptation
in adaptive networks. In real world, the adaptive dynamics drives the formation of
complex topologies in social, biological, and technical systems. Generally speaking,
the nodes connected with each other by various edges can change their states and
structures locally in a distributed manner. With different levels of learning, individual
behaviours give rise to a rich landscape in adaptive networks. The aim of this study is
to explore various macroscopic emergence out of microscopic behaviours, where three
types of learning methods are adopted to drive the adaptive dynamics.
To investigate the diffusion of information over networks, an adaptive voter model
is proposed by means of some basic social learning strategies. For example, individuals
holding different opinions may imitate or repel each other. This model can be used to
reveal the transition from network consensus to fragmentation by varying some exter-
nal parameters. Both numerical simulations and analytical calculations are developed
in our study to analyse the system-level phenomena. We also try to adapt natural se-
lection into adaptive networks, where the individual holding higher fitness would be
more likely to reproduce. This family of models usually encompass a variety of games
in networks, which are used to characterize the fitness of an individual. In particular,
the collapse of cooperation attracts more and more attention in the fields of ecology,
biology and even sociology, where some early-warning indicators are required to de-
tect the coming risks. Furthermore, when the individuals are capable of learning, their
behaviours of state evolution and structure adaptation should facilitate higher organi-
sation performance. As no one is in global control, each individual aggregates local
and historical information in the process of learning. A self-organising framework is
proposed in our study to incorporate distributed learning into adaptive networks.
To conclude, we illustrate adaptive networks in information network, biological
population, and technical system. By exploring various levels of learning, we gain
deeper insights into the emergence, fragmentation, self-organisation, etc. More impor-
tantly, our research is helpful to (1) analyse the diffusion of information over networks;
(2) detect the collapse of cooperation in an evolutionary population; (3) develop a sys-
tem with autonomy, robustness and adaptability.
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In the past decades, a large variety of networks are illustrated in abstract or concrete
ways (Strogatz, 2001; Albert and Barabási, 2002) to model complex systems in the
highly connected world. Since the end of last century, complex networks have been
widely noted by Refs. (Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2002; Newman, 2003; Boccaletti
et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2008; Barrat et al., 2008) from the perspectives of topo-
logical structures, statistical properties, dynamical evolution, etc. As is known, a large
number of realistic systems are present in the form of information networks (Albert
et al., 1999), social networks (Redner, 1998; Newman, 2001), economic networks
(Easley and Kleinberg, 2010), biological networks (Jeong et al., 2000) and ecologi-
cal networks (Dunne et al., 2002).
Complex networks in real world have very different origins, while all of them can
be demonstrated in the form of nodes connected by edges. To gain a deep insight
into the interplay between structure and function, Newman et al. (Newman, 2003)
have studied a variety of complex networks from both microscopic perspective and
macroscopic perspective, where the former relates to local actions and the latter to
global patterns. It is clear that, the interacting individuals change their behaviours lo-
cally, which will foster the emergence of some global phenomena. To understand the
dynamical processes on complex networks, Barrat et al. (Barrat et al., 2008) have illus-
trated a large number of collective properties (synchronization, criticality, emergence,
self-organisation, etc. ) led by individual behaviours.
Complex adaptive theory (Holland, 1992; Miller and Page, 2009) has been proven
to be a generic and fundamental framework for studying complex dynamical systems,
where network theory, statistics, and self-organisation are involved. In general, com-
plex adaptive systems can be characterized by three properties: individual components,
1
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localised interactions and autonomous reactions (Levin, 2003). Well-known examples
of adaptive systems have been observed from tissues to species and societies, which are
“systems that have a large numbers of components, often called agents, that interact
and adapt or learn”(Holland, 2006).
The main purpose of our study is to shed light upon the interrelationships be-
tween local behaviours and collective patterns in adaptive networks (Gross and Bla-
sius, 2008), which are entangled by state evolution (i.e. changes of nodes’ states) and
structure adaptation (i.e. changes of network topology). In particular, we will explore
different dynamics in adaptive networks driven by learning of various complexities,
and then provide effective methods in inference and prediction.
1.1 Adaptive Networks
Recently, numerous studies have characterized the dynamical structures of complex
systems by means of node (or link) creation, node (or link) deletion, link rewiring, etc.
These dynamical structures are widely observed in the generation of various complex
networks, for example the formation of scale-free networks based on preferential at-
tachment (Barabási and Albert, 1999). More interestingly, for a network with a given
structure, some dynamical processes may occur on top of it. In this case, the state of
a node, which may be a discrete or continuous variable, is not static, but will change
over time. In general, the changes of nodes’ states are dependent on the underlying
topology and neighbourhood configuration. We can easily find this kind of dynamical
process from information cascade to opinion formation and epidemic spreading. How-
ever, the above two types of dynamics (dynamical structure and dynamical process)
are addressed almost separately in many researches, ignoring the intrinsic interplay
between each other.
From complex networks to adaptive networks (Gross and Blasius, 2008; Blasius
and Gross, 2009; Zschaler, 2012), people will gain a deeper insight into the complex-
ity in biological, social or technical systems, where both the states of nodes and the
structure of network are dynamical. As illustrated in Ref. (Sayama et al., 2013), many
real-world complex systems are entangled by the “dynamics on networks” and the “dy-
namics of networks” as shown in Figure 1.1. In the former, we focus on the evolution
of nodes’ states in a network with a given structure; while in the latter, we are more
interested in the adaptation of network structure.
It is natural to couple the two types of dynamics, especially when we need to op-







Figure 1.1: Adaptive mechanism in an example of voter model (Durrett et al., 2012),
where the dynamics is driven by a bunch of specific rules of state evolution (i.e. imita-
tion) and structure adaptation (i.e. repelling).
timize or build some networks with changing states and structures. In many realistic
cases (Myers and Leskovec, 2014; Weng et al., 2013), the two types of dynamics are
interdependent on each other. As shown in Figure 1.1, the structure of network usu-
ally influences the evolution of node’s state, which in turn will affect the adaptation
of neighbourhood. The formed feedback loop between state evolution and structure
adaptation would drive the system from chaos to order or the other way around. For
example, in Twitter networks, the process of tweets posting and sharing will let some
users far away be visible and followed, so that the network structure is changed. On
the other hand, the evolving structure will influence the propagation of information in
the network.
Adopting some local actions and reactions, the adaptive dynamics can draw a spec-
tacular picture to reveal various system-level phenomena, such as complex topology
formation, critical phase transition, and robust self-organisation. As reviewed in Refs.
(Gross and Blasius, 2008; Sayama et al., 2013), many researches have started explor-
ing adaptive networks from different directions, ranging from information to biology,
chemistry, sociology, ecology, etc. In particular, understanding the dynamics in adap-
tive networks mainly involves two aspects: (1) what individual behaviours are effec-
tive to direct the system towards desired outcomes; (2) how do the collective properties
emerge out of individual behaviours. In this thesis, we will shed light upon the above
issues through analytical and computational approaches, where the dynamics origi-
nates from learning of various complexities.
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1.2 Learning in Adaptive Networks
In many real-world adaptive networks, individual behaviours have a great influence
on global properties, which relate to collective benefit or organisation performance.
Therefore, how to foster effective individual behaviours is key to the evolution of state
and the adaptation of structure. As individuals in complex networks usually just pos-
sess local and historical information (of external environment, neighbourhood config-
uration, past experience etc. ), some learning techniques implemented in a distributed
manner are required for themselves to behave rationally.
As is known, learning is the ability to acquire, aggregate and analyse informa-
tion (such as training data, past experience, interactions) used to guide future actions
(Conte and Paolucci, 2001; Sen and Weiss, 1999). Some well-known learning methods
are observation, imitation, advice-taking, reinforcement learning, etc. In a structured
community, each individual can play as a learner, and its behaviour is a consequence
of learning. Based on the complexities in the process of learning, we will focus on the
following three types:
• pairwise imitation (Miller and Dollard, 1941; Sen and Weiss, 1999) is a typical
form of social learning, where an individual would like to imitate the strategy of
her/his neighbours. In this case, state evolution and structure adaptation would
be implemented instantaneously without considering the historical interactions.
• natural selection (Darwin and Bynum, 2009; Hinton and Nowlan, 1987) is im-
plemented based on the principles of Darwinian mechanism to shape the config-
uration of a community, where individuals with higher fitness are more likely to
be promoted. In essential, natural selection is a kind of global imitation based
on fitness.
• distributed learning (Sayed, 2014; Abdallah and Lesser, 2007; Gaston, 2005)
allows each individual to make use of local and historical information in the
process of decision-making, as a consequence the system can be reconfigured
through a series of local actions. In a dynamical environment caused by changing
tasks and neighbours, reinforcement learning (Barto, 1998) is widely adopted to
make decisions.
In most of the existing researches (Zschaler, 2012), the coupled dynamics is usually
driven by imitation. Here, we will integrate the above learning methods into three
adaptive network models respectively, so that a more broad view can be obtained.
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1.3 Primary Contributions
The main purpose of our work is to develop analytical and computational approaches
for a better understanding of the dynamics in adaptive networks. The common frame-
work is based on various social and physical dynamical processes on top of dynamical
networks, which are driven by different forms of learning. The primary contributions
are some adaptive network models and generalised methods.
1.3.1 Models
On the basis of existing researches, three typical complex adaptive systems are studied
in this thesis. At first, an adaptive voter model (Chapter 3) focuses on the diffusion
of information on networks, which are driven by a series of pairwise imitation and link
rewiring. Secondly, an evolutionary population model (Chapter 4) is investigated
based on the Darwinian mechanisms, where the dynamics of population is dependent
on natural selection. Finally, adaptive agents coordination (Chapter 5) incorporates
distributed learning into adaptive networks, so that state evolution and structure adap-
tation can be implemented under quantitative guidance to achieve higher performance.
Essentially, these adaptive network models are just particular cases of graph transfor-
mation system (GTS) with colours for nodes (Danos et al., 2014).
1.3.1.1 Adaptive Voter Model
Information diffusion or spreading on networks is a fundamental topic in network sci-
ence. In particular, the voter model (Holley and Liggett, 1975; Sznajd-Weron and Sz-
najd, 2000) describes a stochastic process for two or more competing opinions, which
are held by the interacting voters and can be transmitted through the network. When
the network structure is changing at the same time, an adaptive voter model (Holme
and Newman, 2006) is present to highlight the coupled dynamics. In detail, state evo-
lution indicates the process that the opinion of a voter is imitated by one of her/his
neighbours, and structure adaptation results from the disconnection of those discor-
dant edges (connecting two voters with different opinions).
Adaptive voter models are usually driven by two simple rules in social learning:
pairwise imitation and link rewiring. In general, this family of models can exemplify
well the adaptive nature through a rich landscape of behaviours from opinion consensus
to network fragmentation. Based on the work (Durrett et al., 2012), some extensions
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are developed in our study (Chapter 3). First, we discuss the influence of various
adaptation strategies on the system-level behaviours, where an early fragmentation is
obtained through rewire-to-foaf (here foaf is short for friend of a friend). Afterwards,
we explore a more natural strategy for state evolution through approximate majority
approach, where a neutral state will be created when two discordant voters meet. When
taking neighbourhood information into consideration, a weight is assigned to the node
as a measure for biased imitation. All these extensions foster a variety of collective
dynamics, contributing to a better understanding of adaptive networks.
1.3.1.2 Evolutionary Population Model
The dynamics of evolutionary population focuses on the changing frequencies of indi-
viduals holding a certain state in an evolving community. In most cases, the state of
an individual acts as a strategy, which is adopted by that individual to interact with all
the neighbours. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Smith and Price, 1973) incorporates
game theory into the evolving populations, where each individual holds a strategy of ei-
ther cooperation or defection. The population usually evolves following the principles
of natural selection, which is dependent on the fitness of individuals. An individual
with higher fitness is more likely to be selected to reproduce offsprings, who would
inherit the strategy from the parent unless mutation arises.
Based on the model discussed in Ref. (Cavaliere et al., 2012), we study the evo-
lution of cooperation in dynamical networks (Chapter 4). Under the framework of
evolutionary game theory, a birth-death update rule (Jiang et al., 2013) based on the
Moran process (Moran, 1958) is adopted to depict the dynamics on networks, where
the frequencies of cooperators and defectors (or cheaters) are varying as time goes by.
Considering the dynamics of networks, we let the new-born individual to reconstruct
its local neighbourhood by connecting to its parent and the friends of parent. This idea
is rooted in social science, where the fresh person would like to form links with the
friends of a friend. This model reveals the coupled dynamics through state-structure
inheritance, which can be significantly helpful for the researches in ecology, biology
and even sociology.
1.3.1.3 Adaptive Agents Coordination
Complex adaptive networks may arise in multi-agent systems (MAS), where agents
interact with each other to solve some complicated tasks. As far as we are concerned,
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global organisation performance is highly dependent on the functionality of agents and
the interactions between each other. Combining self-organisation (Kohonen, 1988)
with adaptive networks, some multi-agent systems (MAS) are able to achieve better
performance in a distributed and adaptive manner (Gaston and desJardins, 2005; Kota
et al., 2012). Recent researches have witnessed the success of adaptive multi-agent sys-
tems in the fields of robotic group (Gaston and desJardins, 2005; Abdallah and Lesser,
2007), traffic systems (Guimerà et al., 2002; Guimera et al., 2005), gene networks
(Bornholdt and Rohlf, 2000; Bornholdt and Schuster, 2006), etc. In these applications,
a successful organisation is usually fostered by a series of effective evolution and adap-
tation strategies. But how to evolve the states and adjust the structure in a distributed
manner is not trivial.
In our study (Chapter 5), we investigate the adaptive dynamics in the field of agents
coordination, where agents work and interact locally to achieve some global targets.
As before, the adaptation of structure indicates the change of network topology and
the evolution of state means the change of agent’s functionality. In this family of
models, both the dynamics of structure and the dynamics of state can influence the
organisation performance and be influenced by it. Interestingly, the adaptive dynamics
and agents coordination are entangled through a work-learn-adapt (WLA) framework.
This framework extends the traditional adaptive network model by allowing distributed
learning, through which both state evolution and structure adaptation can be performed
quantitatively to gain better organisation performance.
1.3.2 Methods
In practice, it is not easy to capture the adaptive dynamics accurately, especially when
the system size is large and the strategies for evolution and adaptation are complicated.
To the best of our knowledge, differential equations and agent-based numerical sim-
ulations (Barrat et al., 2008) are two main methods used for analysing the transient
processes and steady states in complex adaptive systems.
• Analytical Approach
Differential equations can characterize the dynamics by providing a cruder picture in a
more efficient and simpler way, but more work is required to derive them. Through this
analytical approach, some quantitative estimations are obtained to capture the equilib-
rium of some interesting observables. Let’s define p(Gi)(t) as the probability that
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the network state (including the states of nodes and the interactions between them)
is Gi ∈ ΩG at time t, and we have ∑Gi p(Gi)(t) = 1. Based on the general theory of
Markov chains (Norris, 1998), we can write the forward equation for the vector p,
which indicates the probability distribution of network states:
d
dt
pT = pT Q (1.1)
where pT is the transpose of p and Q is the rate matrix whose element q(Gi,G j) rep-
resents the jump rate from network Gi to G j. This function can be derived further to
calculate some quantities of interest. Let’s define an observable f , which is a function
of RΩG , and then the differential equation for Ep( f ) can be written as:
d
dt
Ep( f ) = pT Q( f ) (1.2)
where Q( f ) is a vector with Q( f )(Gi) as the mean rate of change of f at Gi, and
Q( f )(Gi) = ∑
G j
q(Gi,G j)[ f (G j)− f (Gi)] (1.3)
where f (Gi) means the observable f at Gi.
• Computational Approach
Considering the difficulty in building and solving the fine-grained differential equa-
tions, some studies turn to the computational approach. Agent-based numerical sim-
ulations are usually adopted to verify the accuracy of analytical approach, where all
detailed information can be obtained. By observing the state of any node at any time,
we can capture the transient process precisely but costly. In addition, this method has
been proven to be a powerful tool in dealing with some complicated adaptive pro-
cesses, when it is hard to derive the coupled dynamics through differential equations.
Notably, a single agent-based simulation may lead to inevitable noises or stochastic
fluctuations, thus a large number of identical and independent trials are required to
obtain the average observables and statistical distributions. Of course, the computa-
tion cost for agent-based simulations is usually expensive, especially for large-scale
adaptive systems.
With a unified framework entangled by state evolution and structure adaptation, we
adopt both analytical and computational methods to study these adaptive network mod-
els. In particular, three main points are focused respectively in the following Chapter
3, 4 and 5.
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1.3.2.1 Approximation Techniques
When we are writing the differential equations for adaptive systems, some approxi-
mation techniques are required to make the equations solvable. In order to capture the
dynamics of a certain observable under a series of rules γ∈R , for example the average
number of a motif [g], we can obtain the differential equation as:
d
dt [g] = p
T Q(g)
= ∑γ∈R kγ([g]+γ − [g]−γ )
(1.4)
where kγ is the rate of the rule γ, [g]+γ means the average number of gain contributions
under the rule γ and [g]−γ means the average number of loss contributions. Notably, the
calculations for [g]+γ and [g]
−
γ usually involve some bigger motifs. As a result, we need
to write more differential equations for those bigger motifs so as to keep the system of
equations closed (Danos et al., 2014).
As far as we are concerned, moments expansion will lead to a large number of
differential equations, which are usually costly to establish. For this reason, some
approximation techniques should be adopted to make the system of differential equa-
tions smaller and closed. In our study (Chapter 3), two approximation methods are
developed to truncate bigger motifs through smaller ones. One approximation is im-
proved from pair approximation (Ellner, 2001), where we take the relevant correla-
tions of the observables into consideration. As the rules usually occur in the interface,
we re-calculate the number of nodes located in the interface to avoid the overestima-
tion. This interface approximation is as cheap as pair approximation in cost but will
bring a higher accuracy. Another improvement is based on approximate master equa-
tion (Gleeson, 2011; Durrett et al., 2012), where neighbourhood configuration of a
node is represented by a star-structure observable, and neighbourhood configuration of
the neighbours is estimated through double stars approximation. This approximation
makes the performance better but at the expense of higher computation cost, which is
mainly caused by big variance in degree distribution. Nonetheless, through the study
for approximations, we can grasp the technology to estimate the equilibrium of dy-
namical systems in a very efficient way relative to the agent-based simulations.
1.3.2.2 Critical Transitions
The adaptive dynamics sometimes demonstrates many very interesting phase transi-
tions by varying a certain parameter gradually. This kind of phenomenon is extensively
observed in structured biological, social, economic and ecological communities, whose
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success is determined by the presence of evolutionary competition. Combining evo-
lutionary games with adaptive networks, we intend to reveal the influence of network
adaptation on the level of cooperation (Chapter 4). It is noted that a critical phase tran-
sition from the regime of cooperation to that of defection is obtained with the change
of an adaptation parameter.
Such a collapse of cooperation usually unfolds rapidly and unexpectedly, which is
crucial for the stability and sustainability of many evolutionary systems in real world.
In the co-evolution of population composition and network structure, we associate the
loss of cooperation with a number of generic indicators. Interestingly, some proposed
indicators reflecting the dynamical structural information can perform very well in the
tests of consistency and accuracy. Specifically, we adopt Kendall’s τ correlation (Abdi,
2007) and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) (Boettiger and Hastings, 2012) to
verify the performance of indicators in early-warnings. Both models and methods
discussed in this study provide a deeper insight into the critical transition in evolv-
ing communities, which are widely observed in ecology, biology and even sociology.
Some potential applications can be found in financial market prediction, ecological
system detection and cultural diversity protection, where the early-warning signals are
key to future catastrophes.
1.3.2.3 Distributed Learning
When it comes to the optimization problems on top of adaptive networks, the organ-
isation performance is highly dependent on the states of nodes and the structure how
they are organised. Considering the difficulty in communication, management and
synchronization, it is impractical to adopt centralised methods with global informa-
tion. In order to achieve a favourable organisation, the interacting agents should be
endowed with some learning abilities, based on which they can self-organise the state
and structure in a distributed manner (Chapter 5).
We study the adaptive dynamics in agents coordination, where the agents need to
complete the tasks cooperatively. In particular, a module of distributed learning is
performed by each agent in real time to acquire and aggregate feedbacks from external
environment. After a long time of continuous agent learning, useful information or
knowledge is obtained for quantitative state evolution and structure adaptation (Figure
1.2). Notably, the learning method in our study is adapted from reinforcement learning
(Barto, 1998), where the dynamics is controlled by the difference between desired
target and current case. In this way, we don’t need to consider a huge state-action
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Dynamics on network Dynamics of network
Dynamics in network
To be or ?
Connect or ?
Figure 1.2: A schematic framework to show the adaptive networks incorporated by state
evolution, structure adaptation and distributed learning.
As we can see, the adaptive network models are able to work in a more natural way
by considering the dynamics in networks as well as the dynamics on and of networks
(Figure 1.2). All types of dynamics are highly related to the organisation performance,
where the details for state evolution and structure adaptation are quantified by continu-
ous learning. In real world, this framework has a huge potential in the fields of robotic
groups, sensor networks, resource allocation, etc.
1.4 Thesis Structure
In this thesis, we focus on the coupled dynamics between state and structure on top
of complex adaptive networks, where the macroscopic phenomena emerge out of a
series of microscopic interactions. Three adaptive network models are discussed in
different research fields, namely adaptive voter model, evolutionary population model
and adaptive agents coordination. All these models are characterized by state evolution
and structure adaptation, but they are driven by different levels of learning as shown in
Figure 1.3.
In chapter 2, we introduce the background and related work for complex adaptive
networks. Some classic models and methods are reviewed for dynamical networks,
dynamical processes and coupled dynamics.
In chapter 3, we focus on an adaptive voter model, whose dynamics is triggered
by a series of pairwise imitation and link rewiring. In this chapter, we are going to










































































































Figure 1.3: The structure of thesis.
make some extensions to understand the influences of various evolution and adaptation
strategies on global patterns. Furthermore, the coupled dynamics is captured by some
approximate differential equations.
In chapter 41, we study the evolution of cooperation in a group of structured popu-
lation, where the dynamics originates from natural selection. A critical phase transition
from the regime of cooperation to that of defection is obtained with the change of a cer-
tain structure adaptation parameter. To detect the loss of cooperation, some indicators
are proposed to signal the resilience of communities.
In chapter 52, the adaptive networks are incorporated by state evolution, structure
adaptation and distributed learning. We explore adaptive agents coordination through a
work-learn-adapt (WLA) framework. Driven by organisation performance, the agents
are able to adapt their states and structures through some quantitative information ob-
tained from distributed learning.
Finally, we conclude our work in chapter 6, and discuss some possible directions
for future work.
1Some of the contents are from our paper Learning in Open Adaptive Networks, Scientific Reports,
2016.




Complex networks have been widely studied since the end of last century to reason
about the highly connected world, where a variety of natural and artificial systems of-
fer fascinating properties. As present in Ref. (Zschaler, 2012), this chapter will give
an overview of complex adaptive networks by providing a large number of models and
methods as the state of the art. In the beginning, we will introduce several well-known
network models as the first step towards complex adaptive systems, where the network
structures are dynamically formed. Statistical analysis acts as a useful mathematical
tool to understand the structure and function of these complex networks. We then
explore some dynamical processes on static networks, where the states of nodes will
change because of endogenous or exogenous factors. Interestingly, many global prop-
erties arise as a consequence of local behaviours (imitation, contagion, competition,
etc. ). When both structure and state are allowed to change, adaptive networks are
built to shed light upon the coupled dynamics. We study the adaptive networks by con-
sidering three typical applications: adaptive voter model, games in adaptive networks
and adaptive agents coordination, through which we can have a better understanding
of modern complex systems from different perspectives.
2.1 Dynamical Networks
The formation of complex networks usually comes along with the dynamics of struc-
tures. In this section, we introduce some dynamical networks on the basis of graph
theory and statistics, where different network models bring the differences in statis-
tical properties. In particular, three classic network models are reviewed in the fol-
lowing, which are random networks, small-world networks and scale-free networks
13
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respectively.
2.1.1 Random Networks
The random network model was studied originally by Erdős and Rényi in 1960s (Erdős
and Rényi, 1959, 1960), which is usually referred as ER or Poisson random graph. In
addition, we can find a variety of similar models in Refs. (Van Der Hofstad, 2009;
Bollobás et al., 2010).
In the ER model, there are N isolated nodes in the beginning, and then each pair
will be connected by an edge with probability p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1). Given an ER network
denoted as GN,p, when p = 0, the number of edges in the network is E = 0, namely a
totally isolated network; while p = 1, the number of edges is E = N(N−1)/2, namely
a complete network. Let’s set M = N(N− 1)/2, at a given p the expected number of
edges is 〈E〉= Mp, and the average degree is 〈k〉= (N−1)p≈ N p.
As for the degree distribution in an ER random network, we can compute the prob-










which is a Poisson distribution for the scaling N→ ∞ with a constant average degree.
In an ER random network, the clustering coefficient C is highly dependent on the
linking probability p. For any connected triplet, the probability that the two ends are
connected by an edge is p, so the network clustering coefficient is:
C = p (2.2)
Ignoring the loops, the number of nodes within a distance l can be estimated as
〈k〉l . When we have 〈k〉〈l〉 ≈ N, the average shortest path length can be obtained as
(Bollobás, 1981):




Network structures and statistical characteristics in ER random networks vary a
lot when changing p. There is a critical value pc = 1/N, which indicates the average
degree is 〈k〉c = 1. As discussed in Ref. (West et al., 2001), if p < pc then there are
many small isolated sub-graphs; otherwise if p > pc, then with a high probability there
is a single giant component in the network. In Ref. (Erdős and Rényi, 1961), it is
shown that if the linking probability is bigger than log(N)/N, then the ER network
will be connected with a probability approaching 1.
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Given a linking probability p, the probability of an event Iu that a node u is isolated
can be computed as:
p(Iu) = (1− p)N−1 ≤ e−p(N−1) (2.4)





The ER random model can be extended to various generalised forms (Bollobás,
2001; Molloy and Reed, 1995; Newman et al., 2001), where the configuration model
(Bender and Canfield, 1978) is a famous one. In the configuration model, a sequence of
degree [k1,k2, · · ·kN ] is assigned to nodes in the network, and then edges are assigned
uniformly at random to match the given degree distribution.
Let’s define ku as the degree of a node u and kv as that of a node v, the probability
of an edge between u and v can be computed as:
puv = kukv/2E = kukv/∑
w
kw
Furthermore, let’s define nuv as the number of common neighbours of u and v, and










As for the clustering coefficient, it can be calculated by (Newman, 2003):




















where we can find a strong relationship between the average degree 〈k〉 and the higher
moment 〈k2〉. When 〈k2〉 is much larger, the clustering coefficient in the configuration
model is bigger than that in an ER random model.
2.1.2 Small-world Networks
“Six degrees of separation” is a well-known story in social networks, as explained in
(Karinthy, 1929) “nobody from the group needed more than five links in the chain to
reach, just by using the method of acquaintance, any inhabitant of our Planet.”
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A notion of random network with a higher clustering coefficient and smaller av-
erage shortest path length than the ER model can be constructed as a “small-world”
network. These examples in real world have been observed in navigation networks
(Kleinberg, 2000), protein networks (Bork et al., 2004) and transcriptional networks
(Van Noort et al., 2004).
In 1998, Watts and Strogatz (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) proposed a WS model to
describe the collective dynamics in small-world networks. As shown in Figure 2.1,
we can obtain a series of small-world networks originated from a regular graph by
increasing the randomness parameter q (rewiring probability), which is the probability
that each edge connected to a right-hand side neighbour is rewired randomly.
q = 0 0< q < 1 q = 1
Figure 2.1: Increasing randomness will give rise to to some small-world networks at
0 < q < 1, and then a random network at q = 1. Starting from a regular ring lattice,
each edge on right-hand side is randomly rewired with probability q. The distant pairs
may be connected by some short-cuts in the generated small-world networks. Figure is
adapted from Ref. (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
As we can see, at q = 0 the network is regular with a quite large clustering coef-
ficient and a big average path length. After random rewirings in the range 0 < q < 1,
some distant pairs may be connected by short-cuts, which reduces the average path
length meanwhile keeps the clustering coefficient high. If all edges are rewired, a
random network with a smaller clustering coefficient and a quite shorter average path
length is obtained at q = 1. Notably, the number of edges is constant. More statistical
characteristics about the small-world networks can be found in Refs. (Barthélémy and
Amaral, 1999; Barrat and Weigt, 2000).
Specifically, the degree distribution of a WS small-world model can be computed
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where 〈k〉 is the average degree of the network and q is the rewiring probability. The





(1− q)nq〈k〉/2−n untouched edges from the left-hand side neighbours; (III)
(q〈k〉/2)k−n−〈k〉/2
(k−n−〈k〉/2)! e
−q〈k〉/2 rewired links towards the node itself. In addition, the minimum
degree in a WS network is 〈k〉/2, and the degree distribution has a smaller variance in
this case.





Barrat and Weight (Barrat and Weigt, 2000) measured the clustering coefficient
through some analytical calculations as follows. When q = 0, the network is a regular
graph, and we can have the clustering coefficient C = 3(〈k〉−2)4(〈k〉−1) , which tends to 3/4 as the
network average degree is quite large. When 0 < q < 1, the triangle remains connected




As the rewiring probability increases to q= 1, all edges are rewired and the network
turns into a random graph, so the clustering coefficient is C = 〈k〉/N.
When it comes to the average shortest path length, we can obtain 〈l〉 = N/(2〈k〉)
at q = 0, and 〈l〉= lnNln〈k〉 at q = 1. Interestingly, when 1/N < q 1, Refs. (Barthélémy
and Amaral, 1999; Barrat and Weigt, 2000) pointed out that the average shortest path
length decreases rapidly to a quite small value close to the one at q = 1, meanwhile the
clustering coefficient remains high. In this way, an evident small-world phenomenon
is obtained in the range of 1/N < q 1.
2.1.3 Scale-free Networks
Recently, more and more researches have illustrated that many realistic networks such
as Internet, biological networks and social networks demonstrate power-law degree
distributions. These networks are usually known as scale-free networks, whose degree
distribution follows a form like p(k) ∼ k−γ, where γ usually ranges from 2 to 3. The
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scale-free networks mainly focus on the dynamical growth process and the emergence
of non-trivial configurations, which present an obvious “heavy tail” in degree distri-
bution. There have been a large number of generation models explored in this field
since the late 1990s, and the mechanism proposed by Barabási and Albert (Barabási
and Albert, 1999) (known as the BA model) has attracted the most attention.
In the BA model (Barabási and Albert, 1999), two ingredients are required to con-
struct the scale-free network:
• Network growth: the size of network is not constant, and it will increase con-
tinuously by adding a certain number of new nodes and edges at each step. In
the beginning, we have a small connected component. Afterwards, one node and
m edges are added into the network at each step.
• Preferential attachment: the new edges are not assigned to the nodes at random
but prefer to connect to those nodes with higher degree. This principle is also
known as the phenomenon of “rich get richer” or Matthew effect (Merton, 1968),
which indicates the accumulated advantage (Perc, 2014).
As shown in Figure 2.2, we provide a schematic diagram to show the evolving
network from step t to t +1, where a new node and two new edges are added into the
graph.
t t +1
Figure 2.2: Network growth and preferential attachment in a scale-free network. The
new edge (blue one in the graph) is connected to an existing node with probability
proportional to its degree.
Now, let’s come to some analytical investigations for the dynamical process of the
BA model. The new node u connects to an old node v with probability puv at step t,
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Suppose we have m0 edges in the initial component, as m edges are added at each
step, there are mt +m0 edges in the network at step t. The evolution equation for the











where tu is the step at which u is added into the network, and the boundary condition
is ku(tu) = m.
Now, let’s see some statistical properties of the scale-free networks. The degree
distribution at time t → +∞ can be calculated as follows to obtain a power law form
(Barrat et al., 2008):






where δ(k− ku(t)) is the Dirac delta function. Similar results can be obtained through
master equations (Dorogovtsev et al., 2000) and rate equations (Krapivsky et al., 2000).
The clustering coefficient in the BA model has been calculated analytically in Refs.
(Klemm and Eguiluz, 2002b,a; Szabó et al., 2003), where a relatively higher clustering
coefficient can be obtained for those scale-free networks. In addition, the average
shortest path length in a BA network is smaller than that in an ER random network,
when both have same size (Albert and Barabási, 2002; Bollobás and Riordan, 2003).
2.2 Dynamical Processes
It is known that, some simple local strategies, for example neighbourhood imitations,
can affect individual state and then global properties. In order to analyse the dynamical
process in a mathematical way, approximate differential equations are usually adopted
to capture the microscopic processes and then the macroscopic phenomena. In addi-
tion, agent-based numerical simulations also play an important role in understanding
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the collective dynamics and statistical properties. Ref. (Porter and Gleeson, 2014)
gives several fascinating examples and generalised calculations for the study of dy-
namical systems on networks, and it is a great start point for those who are interested
in this topic. In this section, we will introduce two typical dynamical processes taking
place on static networks: one is opinion dynamics and the other is population dynam-
ics.
2.2.1 Opinion Dynamics
The family of voter models is widely used to characterize opinion dynamics or in-
formation diffusion on networks. In general, they can be described by a stochastic
process for two or more competing opinions. In voter models, the voters are repre-
sented by nodes, and the edges mean the interactions between each other. The state of
a node is the corresponding opinion held by itself, which may change due to the influ-
ence from neighbourhood. The first voter model was introduced in Ref. (Clifford and
Sudbury, 1973), where two species competed for territory within a spatial structure.
Afterwards, a wide variety of researches (Holley and Liggett, 1975; Sznajd-Weron and
Sznajd, 2000; Galam, 2002; Sood and Redner, 2005) have been launched to explore
the dynamics of opinions.
As we all know, the collective patterns, such as emergence, synchronization, bi-
furcation, are usually fostered by a series of local behaviours. We can find numerous
relevant examples in real world, like innovation cascade, rumour spreading and al-
liance formation. Recently, a variety of voter models (including link (or node)-centric
voter model (San Miguel et al., 2005), majority voter model (Galam, 2002; Krapivsky
and Redner, 2003), Sznajd model (Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd, 2000), threshold voter
model (Durrett et al., 1993), continuous voter model (Deffuant et al., 2000), etc. ) have
arisen to throw light upon the propagation of opinions. In addition, a large number
of variants (Colaiori and Castellano, 2015; Varghese and Durrett, 2013; Mellor et al.,
2015) are explored from different perspectives (public media, a third state, long-range
evolution, etc. ) to illustrate information diffusion on complex networks. For more
details on statistical physics of social dynamics, we can find a comprehensive review
in Ref. (Castellano et al., 2009).
Generally speaking, there are N voters in the system, and each of them has a state
si ∈ {A,B}, which indicates two different political choices or opinions. After that, the
state of a voter will change along with the interactions. Some rules are introduced to
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drive the evolution of state, which will converge to a frozen configuration when none
of the rules can be applied to the agents. In the following, we will give a brief overview
of some classic voter models mentioned above.
2.2.1.1 Node-centric Voter Model
In general, it is assumed that individuals are not self-confident and they may adopt the
states of their neighbours. The dynamical process in a node-centric voter model can
be shown as below:
(1) A voter i is selected at random.
(2) An arbitrary neighbour j ∈ NB(i) is selected as the imitation target.
(3) The voter i updates her/his state as: si = s j.
(4) Repeat step (1)− (3) until the opinion consensus is reached in the finite system.
This process follows a proportional rule as shown in Figure 2.3(a), where the focal
agent is more likely to imitate the state of the majority. In a finite connected system,
we have two absorbing states: all As and all Bs. This voter model is similar to the
Ising model when the temperature is decreased to a low level, and the system will
evolve from a chaotic one to an ordered one. As illustrated in the coarsening pro-
cess (Scheucher and Spohn, 1988) shown in Figure 2.3(b), some larger homogeneous





Figure 2.3: The evolution of voter model. (a) The flipping of state follows a proportional
rule. (b) The evolution of 2-dimensional voter model from a fully disordered lattice to a
coarsening structure. Figures are from Ref. (Dornic et al., 2001).
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When the voter model is embedded into various complex networks, we can acquire
a more interesting landscape. In detail, some statistical properties will be concerned in
the evolution of opinions, such as the number of a certain type of opinion holders ([A]
or [B]), the number of active links (connecting opposite opinions, i.e. [AB]), and the
expected consensus time.
Specifically, let’s consider a network with a degree distribution p(k), and then the
probability that a given neighbour has degree k can be approximated by kp(k)/〈k〉. Let
ρk be the density of voters holding A in the group constituted by nodes of degree k, and
then the probability that a voter A with degree k changes her/his state to B is:





Similarly, we can have pk(B→ A) as the probability that a voter B with degree k
changes to A:
















which leads to ρk = ∑k′
k′p(k′)
〈k〉 ρk′ at stationary state (Sood and Redner, 2005).
In addition, we can approximate the expected consensus time through a recursion
equation (Barrat et al., 2008; Sood et al., 2008), where a network with a heteroge-
neous structure (high variance in degree distribution) is more likely to reach consensus
(Castellano et al., 2003).
2.2.1.2 Link-centric Voter Model
The link-centric voter model (Suchecki et al., 2005) focuses on the changes of edges in
networks. The dynamical process is considered as follows: a random edge is selected
at each step, and then one node at a randomly chosen end imitates the state of the
node at the other end. In the node-centric model, the probability to pick an edge uv is
1/N(1/ku+1/kv), but here the probability to pick uv is 1/E. The differential equations
can be obtained as (see more details in Chapter 3):
d
dt [A] = [AB]− [BA]
d
dt [AB] =−[AB]+ [ABB]− [ABA]− [BA]+ [BAA]− [BAB]
(2.17)
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where [AB] = [BA] and [AA] is not discounted for symmetries. A schematic diagram is





















Figure 2.4: An example to show the link-centric voter model. (a) In the case of AB→
AA, the voter B changes her/his state to A and those edges connecting that original “B”
are affected as well. (b) Similarly, in the case of BA→ BB, the voter A changes her/his
state to B and the corresponding edges are changed as well.
As we can see, the differential equation for the average number of [A] or [B] equals
0, which means that the expected size of As or Bs is invariant. However, the differential
equations for edges contain some triple motifs (ABA, ABB, BAB, etc. ), resulting in an
unclosed system. To address this problem, some moment-closure approximations are
required as reviewed in Ref. (Demirel et al., 2014).
2.2.1.3 Majority Voter Model
Another interesting evolution mechanism for the voter model is based on the major-
ity rule (Galam, 2002; Chen and Redner, 2005), where a group of connected voters
(chains, cliques, circles, etc. ) are selected at each step, and then all of them adopt the
state of the majority in that group. This majority voter model is inspired by the social
influence as illustrated in the following example (Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: A schematic diagram to show the majority voter model. A group of selected
nodes in the red circle are updated by adopting the majority state.
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In particular, let’s consider a well-mixed network with N voters, where the initial
fraction of voters holding A is denoted by φ0. At each step, for example, 3 voters are
picked to update their states. The flipping to AAA occurs as: AAB→AAA, ABA→AAA,
and BAA→ AAA. The flipping to BBB occurs as: ABB→ BBB, BAB→ BBB, and




[A] = p(AAB)+ p(ABA)+ p(BAA)
−p(ABB)− p(BAB)− p(BBA) (2.18)
where the probability to pick two As and one B is p(AAB) = p(ABA) = p(BAA) =
[A]2[B]/N3, and the probability to pick one A and two Bs is p(ABB) = p(BAB) =
p(BBA) = [A][B]2/N3. When d[A]/dt = 0, we have [A] = 0,N/2,N at stationary state.













where Tn is the expected consensus time in the case of n voters holding A.
When it comes to a variety of realistic networks, the topology plays an important
role, where the mean field theory can’t work very well due to the heterogeneous neigh-
bourhood configurations and big variance in degree distribution. For this reason, we
need to consider various bigger motifs in the network, leading to a very complicated
problem. Nonetheless, some studies (Liggett, 2013) modified the above model like
that: a randomly selected voter would update its state by adopting the majority state
in the neighbourhood, which can be seen as a combination of node-centric rule and
majority rule.
2.2.1.4 Sznajd Model
In the Sznajd model (Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd, 2000; Sznajd-Weron, 2005), the dy-
namics follows “ United we Stand, Divided we Fall ”, where a voter will be convinced
by more than one neighbours. Two rules are introduced for a given chain of four nodes.
• Social validation: two neighbouring voters sharing same state will convince the
nearest neighbours to imitate their opinion: XAAY → AAAA or XBBY → BBBB,
where X ,Y ∈ {A,B}.
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• Discord destruction: two voters holding different opinions will cause the dis-
agreement from other neighbours: XABY → BABA or XBAY → ABAB, where
X ,Y ∈ {A,B}.
As shown in Figure 2.6, the evolution of voters’ states follows the above rules,
where a quadruplet chain is picked randomly to evolve at each step. Eventually, we




Figure 2.6: The Sznajd voter model. (a,b) Social validation occurs in the situation where
the neighbours imitate the connected pair sharing same state. (c) Discord destruction
arises when the selected nodes are holding different states, and then their neighbours
will argue with them by adopting an opposite state.
Moreover, some alternative recipes have been explored through different update
rules. For example, the alternating opinions led by discord destruction may change
to a partially ordered form by a rule in Ref. (Sánchez, 2004). In this model, if two
conflict nodes are connected by an edge, then they would turn to the other direction,
and imitate the states of those neighbours. This model enables the voters to stand
together with at least one neighbour. As a result, we can have the evolution of state
as XABY → XXYY or XBAY → XXYY , where X ,Y ∈ {A,B}. At stationary state, the
“ferromagnetic” configurations with all As or all Bs will be obtained.
2.2.1.5 Deffuant model
The family of bounded confidence models (Castellano et al., 2009) is usually adopted
to characterize continuous states in opinion dynamics. Initially, the state of a voter
is presented by a real number randomly picked from a certain range. After that,
two neighbouring voters are selected to update their states through some compromise
strategies if and only if the difference between their states is smaller than a tolerance ε.
Finally, several clusters are formed, each of which contains the voters sharing same or
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similar state. Here, we will focus on a typical bounded confidence model: the Deffuant
model (Deffuant et al., 2000).
The Deffuant model defines si(t) as the state of voter i at step t. At each step, a pair
of voters i and j are selected to update their states. If |si(t)− s j(t)| ≥ ε, then nothing
happens. Otherwise, if |si(t)− s j(t)|< ε, the states are updated as:
si(t +1) = si(t)+µ[s j(t)− si(t)]
s j(t +1) = s j(t)+µ[si(t)− s j(t)]
(2.20)
where µ ∈ [0,0.5] is the compromise rate. And we have si(t +1)+ s j(t +1) = si(t)+
s j(t), but the difference is shrinking |si(t +1)− s j(t +1)| ≤ |si(t)− s j(t)|, which indi-
cates the compromise after a debate.
The tolerance threshold ε affects the number of clusters at stationary state. Given
a uniform initial distribution where the state values are ranging from 0 to 1, there will
be more clusters formed at a smaller ε (Figure 2.7).
(b)   ε=0.2(a)   ε=0.5
Figure 2.7: The evolution of Deffuant mode at ε = 0.5 and ε = 0.2. Figures are from
Ref. (Deffuant et al., 2000).
For a given tolerance threshold ε, more clusters will be formed in a structured
community than in a well-mixed case (Castellano et al., 2009).This phenomenon is
caused by the structure restriction in space, where it is impossible for the distant voters
to make a compromise. As a result, many clusters are formed, each of which contains
the voters sharing similar states and are close in space.
2.2.1.6 Axelrod Model
As we can see, the above opinion dynamics considers a single variable as the state to
evolve on a static network. When the state of a node is defined as a vector of variables,
Chapter 2. Background 27
the dynamics would be much more complicated. The Axelrod model (Axelrod, 1997)
was proposed to study the dissemination of culture represented by a vector, where
both assimilation and diversity are possible at stationary state. Cultural assimilation
indicates the case where various culture traits converge to a single one; while cultural
diversity means the co-existence of different types of culture. The vectorial state of
culture in reality may involve language, art, science, etc.
In detail, we can describe the state of a node through a set of discrete values. For
example, let’s define the state by a set of features σ = {σ1,σ2, · · · ,σF}, each of which
has q traits to choose, namely σ f ∈ {t f1 , t
f
2 , · · · t
f
q }. For any two connected nodes, let’s
say i and j, we have σ(i) as the culture features for i and σ( j) for j. The similarity







δσ f (i),σ f ( j) (2.21)
where δ indicates the Kronecker’s delta function and δx,y = 1 if x = y, otherwise δx,y =
0. On the contrary, the difference between i and j can be obtained as di j = 1− si j.
A large number of studies (Axelrod, 1997; Castellano et al., 2009) for the Axelrod
model follows two principles (Castellano et al., 2000):
• similar agents are more likely to interact with each other;
• more interactions increase the similarity between the agents.
At each step, a pair of neighbouring agents i and j are selected uniformly at ran-
dom. With probability si j, an interaction happens between them, and an inconsistent
feature σ f (i) 6= σ f ( j) is set to be consistent σ f (i) = σ f ( j). The dynamics between
two neighbours stops at one of the steady states: all features are same (si j = 1) or none
of the feature is same (si j = 0). A network at steady state may contain one or several
frozen regions, each of which consists of nodes holding completely same state, but any
two adjacent regions don’t share any same feature.
Figure 2.8 describes a 3×3 lattice, where the state of a node contains two features
(namely F = 2) and each feature has two q = 2 traits to choose: (a) shows a frozen
situation where all nodes have same state (0,1) and (c) shows a frozen situation where
all nodes have same state (1,0). However, there are two frozen regions in (b): one is
all (0,1) and the other is all (1,0), the edges between the two regions are connecting
nodes without sharing any same feature.
Starting from a random distribution for the states in a finite size lattice with a size
L2, the above dynamical evolution will run until a frozen network is reached. Ref.











Figure 2.8: The frozen states in the Axelrod model. (a) All nodes are sharing same state
(0,1). (b) Two regions are separated by discordant edges . (c) All nodes are sharing
same state (1,0).
(Castellano et al., 2000) varied the parameters L, F and q to explore their influences
on steady states, where it is found that a smaller q and F would be more likely to bring
about large-size frozen regions and even global consensus.
2.2.2 Population Dynamics
In recent years, the evolutionary population (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) is attract-
ing more and more attention in the fields of biology, statistical physics and computer
science, where population composition changes in a dynamical community. Specifi-
cally, the dynamics in an evolutionary population focuses on the changing frequencies
of a certain type of individuals in a finite population. We can find this kind of dynamics
through natural selection, mutation and genetic drift (Masel, 2011). In the following,
some related models are introduced step by step to shed light upon the evolutionary
population.
2.2.2.1 Wright-Fisher Model
The Wright-Fisher model (Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1931) describes a typical stochastic
evolution in a group of individuals. In this model, the size of population is finite and
constant as N, and each individual is considered as a diploid with two alleles selected
from A and B. Therefore, any individual holds a state in a set {AA,AB,BA,BB}. In
this model, there are not overlapping agents between the previous generation and the
following generation, which means that all individuals have same and fixed lifespan.
Each allele in a new-born individual inherits the genetic information from the previous
generation uniformly and independently.
Chapter 2. Background 29
Let’s define [A]t as the number of alleles of A at step t and [B]t as the number of
alleles of B, and then we have [A]t + [B]t = 2N. The evolution of [A]t or [B]t in the
Wright-Fisher model will converge to two absorbing states: [A]t = 0 or [A]t = 2N.
Starting from an initial configuration with [A]0 and [B]0, the fixation probability for
[A]t = 2N is [A]0/2N. Specifically, given a previous state [A]t , the following state
[A]t+1 follows a binomial distribution, where any allele in the next generation has a
probability [A]t/2N to select A and a probability [B]t/2N to select B. In this way, the
expected size E([A]t+1) at t +1 is equal to [A]t .
Under this framework, some more complicated situations are explored further,
such as varying population size, dynamical interacting structures, and biased selec-
tion. More details can be found in Refs. (Hudson, 2002; Charlesworth, 2009).
2.2.2.2 Moran Process
The Moran process (Moran, 1958; Moran et al., 1962) can be seen as a slower Wright-
Fisher model, where overlapping generations are allowed. Instead of replacing all
individuals in the previous generation, the Moran process adopts a single birth-death
mechanism to update the composition of population, namely one new-born individual
and one old-removal at each step. In this way, the number of certain type of individuals
changes by −1,0,1 per step, which gives an easier mathematical calculation. But it
requires more rounds to update the states of all individuals.
Let’s consider a population of N individuals, and each individual has a state of
either A or B. Under neutral drift, a random individual is selected to reproduce and
then a random one is chosen to be removed at each step (see Figure 2.9), consequently
the size of the population is constant. The new-born individual adopts the parent’s
state in the case when no mutation arises, but adopts the opposite state in the case
when mutation arises. This model provides a generic framework for the evolutionary
population by means of reproduction, selection and mutation (Nowak, 2006a).
In a well-mixed population, let [A]t and [B]t be the number of individuals of A and
of B at step t. Here, we will discuss two typical cases, one is the mutation and the other
is selection.
• Mutation case
When the population is influenced by mutation, a parameter µ is defined as the
probability that a new-born individual adopts the state different from that of
her/his parent. Mutation is an effective route to promote the diversity of the
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Death
Birth with MutationBirth without Mutation
Death t t+1t+1
Figure 2.9: A schematic diagram is provided to show the evolution of Moran process in
a well-mixed population. The middle box indicates the previous population at t, and one
blue individual is chosen to reproduce and one red individual is chosen to be removed.
In the case when no mutation arises (left box), the new-born individual adopts a state
of blue, but in the case when mutation occurs (right box), a state of red is taken by the
new-born individual.
population, but there are not frozen states in this case. In a well-mixed popu-
lation, the transition probability pi, j from the case [A]t = i to [A]t+1 = j can be
written as:
pi, j = (1−µ)(N− i)i/N2 +µi2/N2 if 0 < i≤ N, j = i−1
pi, j = 1−2(N− i)i/N2−µ(N−2i)2/N2 if 0≤ i≤ N, j = i
pi, j = (1−µ)(N− i)i/N2 +µ(N− i)2/N2 if 0≤ i < N, j = i+1
(2.22)
• Selection case
When it comes to the situation of selection, we need to consider the fitness of
individuals. As is known, an individual with higher fitness is more likely to be
chosen to reproduce, but the death process is usually random. Let’s suppose
that the individuals holding A have same fitness fA and then the total fitness of
them is Ft(A) = [A]t fA; similarly for the individuals holding B, the total fitness
is Ft(B) = [B]t fB. In a well-mixed population under the circumstance where no
mutation arises, the probability that an individual of A is chosen to reproduce












On the contrary, the probability that the number of individuals of A decreases
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2.2.2.3 Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Smith and Price, 1973; Weibull, 1997; Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998) studies a mathematical framework combining game theory with
evolutionary population characterized by the Darwinian process. The strategies of the
previous generation can be inherited by their successors based on natural selection.
The competing strategies are formulated by the principles of game theory, where the
fitness of an individual is dependent on the interacting neighbours as well as the game
settings. For example, A and B are the two strategies in the population, and then a







where the payoff obtained by a player can be calculated by πi = ∑ j∈NB(i)Π(si,s j). In
a well-mixed population, the players holding same strategy have same payoffs.
Depending on the relative order of the four coefficients in the payoff matrix, four
main dilemmas (Macy and Flache, 2002) are widely investigated: Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) T > R > P > S, Stag-Hunt game (SH) R > T > P > S, Snowdrift Game (SG)
T >R> S>P, and Coordinate Game (CG) R'P> S' T . In particular, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) illustrates that the optimal individual decision should be defection but
the collective benefit reaches maximum in the regime of cooperation (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). In most cases, it is hard for cooperators to survive due to the disad-
vantageous fitness under natural selection. However, Nowak et al. (Nowak, 2006b)
pointed out that some specific mechanisms (such as indirect reciprocity, network adap-
tation, and group selection) can promote the cooperation effectively in an evolutionary
population.
When adapting game theory into evolutionary populations, the dynamics focuses
on the ability to survive among competing individuals. A successful strategy should be
the one dominating the population (Vincent and Brown, 2005). In general, population
dynamics can be described in a discrete way or a continuous way, where the fitter
individuals are more likely to be selected to reproduce offsprings. Specifically, the
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Moran process introduced above is a typical discrete form for evolutionary games. As
for the continuous update mechanism, replicator equations (Schuster and Sigmund,
1983) are often adopted by people, where the evolution of individuals can be written
as a differential equation:
ρ̇A = ρA[ fA− (ρA fA +ρB fB)] (2.26)
where ρA = [A]/N is the density of As and fA is the corresponding fitness of A. The
evolutionary stable state (ESS) is reached when the strategies in the population are
maintained around some stationary values.
A generic framework for the evolutionary game model can be shown as Figure
2.10, where the fitness is characterized by a series of game rules and the population is
updated through the replicator dynamics.






Figure 2.10: We have a schematic diagram for the evolutionary game model. The
population works under the rules of game, and different payoffs are obtained by these
individuals through payoff matrix. Based on the resulting fitness, the population will be
updated following the replicator dynamics. After a series of birth, death and mutation,
we obtain a new generation of population, who will continue the above process until a
stationary state is reached.
2.2.2.4 Evolutionary Population on Networks
When the population is located on a network, where the individuals only meet and
interact with their neighbours, we should take the underlying network structure into
consideration. In 1992, Nowak et al. (Nowak and May, 1992) demonstrated some
evolutionary games in a grid, where a co-existence of cooperators and defectors can be
obtained at stationary state. From then on, a large number of investigations have been
Chapter 2. Background 33
launched to reveal the evolutionary dynamics on networks (see more details in Refs.
(Nowak, 2012; Allen et al., 2013; Shakarian et al., 2012)).
For the evolutionary population on a static network, the payoff πi of an individual
i is dependent on the neighbourhood configuration and interaction matrix Π. Usually,
the fitness of an individual is a function of her/his payoff, for example fi = (1+ δ)πi ,
where δ means the strength of selection. When δ→ 0, it is under weak selection and
all individuals are selected uniformly to reproduce; when δ goes to a big value, an
individual with a higher payoff is more likely to be selected to reproduce.
The evolutionary population on static networks can be characterized by three types
of update rules (Jiang et al., 2013; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Nowak et al., 2010), which
are death-birth rule, birth-death rule and imitation rule. In the case of death-birth, a
random individual is removed from the graph with an empty site left, subsequently the
neighbours compete for that empty site with probability proportional to the fitness. The
birth-death rule is implemented as follows: an individual is chosen for reproduction
with probability proportional to her/his fitness, and the state of a random neighbour
will be replaced by the strategy of the chosen player. Under the rule based on imitation,
a pair of adjacent individuals will compete with each other. One can either remain the
current strategy with probability proportional to her/his fitness or adopt the strategy of
the neighbour with the complementary probability.
Specifically, we provide some examples on top of a static network to show the
evolution of population according to the above three rules respectively (Figure 2.11).












where C means the strategy of cooperation and D means the strategy of defection. In
addition, b is the benefit obtained from the altruistic behaviour with a cost of c. A de-
fector pays no cost for a complete benefit. Interestingly, Ohtsuki et al. (Ohtsuki et al.,
2006) proposed a simple rule for the evolution of cooperation. Through numerical
simulations in a variety of static structures (including rings, lattices, random graphs,
and scale-free networks), they found that the fixation probability of cooperation will
be higher when b/c > 〈k〉, where 〈k〉 is the average degree. This rule indicates the
influence of some underlying network properties on the evolution of cooperation.
Using the form of interaction matrix 2.27, Tarnita et al. (Tarnita et al., 2009) pro-
posed a generic structural coefficient σ to show the strategy of C would be dominant



















Figure 2.11: A schematic diagram is presented to illustrate the evolutionary dynamics.
We have 6 nodes in the population, interacting on a static graph. The individual has
a chance to reproduce proportional to the corresponding fitness, which is computed
through the payoff matrix and neighbourhood configuration. Figure (A) illustrates the
rule of death-birth, (B) explains the rule of birth-death and (C) shows the rule of pairwise
imitation.
under weak selection when:
σR+S > T +σP (2.28)
Furthermore, they also pointed out that σ = 〈[D][CC]〉/〈[D][CD]〉 can be computed
through a long-term numerical simulation, where that structural coefficient is highly
dependent on the structure of population. In Chapter 4, we will explore the indicator
based on σ in the detection of cooperation collapse.
2.3 Coupled dynamics
The above two sections illustrate the dynamical processes running much slower and
much faster than the dynamical structures respectively. Recently, more and more peo-
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ple pay attention to the coupled dynamics in adaptive networks (Gross and Sayama,
2009; Holme and Newman, 2006; Sayed, 2014; Kozma and Barrat, 2008), where both
the structure of network and the states of agents can change at comparable time scales.
As is known, the dynamics on networks focuses on the changes of individuals’ states;
however, the dynamics of networks relates to the topological changes through some
hard actions, such as rewiring, deleting, and adding. In real world, the coupled dynam-
ics are usually interdependent on each other, displaying a plethora of amazing phe-
nomena (Holme and Newman, 2006; Zimmermann et al., 2004; Durrett et al., 2012).
In this section, we will give a brief overview of the coupled dynamics in the fields of
adaptive voter model, games in adaptive networks and adaptive agents coordination.
2.3.1 Adaptive Voter Model
Let’s first start from a brief introduction for the opinion dynamics in adaptive networks.
The voter models reviewed before mainly consider the situation that the underlying net-
work is static and only the states of nodes change over time. However, in the adaptive
voter model (Holme and Newman, 2006), both the states of individuals and the struc-
ture of network are allowed to change, in which case the opinion dynamics is ranging
from consensus to diversity. This family of models couples the dynamics on networks
with the dynamics of networks tightly in a very natural manner. On the one hand, an
agent would like to imitate the states of neighbours or be influenced by social pressure,
where network topology affects the evolution of state profoundly. On the other hand,
the agent may get away from discordant neighbours and form new connections with
some others, where the states of agents have a big influence on the adaptation of struc-
ture. Driven by the adaptive dynamics, some mathematical and numerical approaches
have been applied into this field to reveal the critical transitions, stationary states and
some other statistical properties.
In the following, we will review some classic adaptive voter models from the
perspectives of node-centric rules and link-centric rules, to understand the entangled
relationship between state evolution and structure adaptation. In particular, rewire-
to-random and rewire-to-same are two major adaptation approaches for active links.
Furthermore, some approximation techniques are provided for analytical calculations
based on differential equations.
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2.3.1.1 Node-centric Models
The adaptive voter models based on node-centric rules are usually implemented by
picking a node at each step to change its state or adjust the neighbourhood. Originally,
this family of models originates from Ref. (Holme and Newman, 2006), where Holme
and Newman studied the phase transition from consensus to pluralism controlled by a
single rewiring parameter, let’s say α.
In general, the model runs on a network with fixed number of nodes (N) and edges
(E). There are m possible opinions with a uniform distribution over the network in the
beginning. Let’s denote the state of an individual i by si, which is one of the m possible
opinions. The adaptive voter model will be implemented as follows (Figure 2.12) at
each step until a frozen network is reached.
(1) a random voter i is selected.
(2) with probability α, i disconnects from a random neighbour j and connects to a
random node k who holds same opinion with i.
(3) with probability 1−α, i sets its state equal to the state of a random neighbour j,









Figure 2.12: An illustration of the adaptive voter model of (Holme and Newman, 2006),
where different colors mean different opinions. Figure (a) shows the adaptation of struc-
ture with probability α and (b) illustrates the evolution of state with 1−α.
It is the rewiring strength α that controls the competition between network consen-
sus and opinion diversity at stationary state. When α is bigger, the rewiring event oc-
curs frequently, and most of the opinions are conserved. However, when α is smaller,
the size of monochrome component sharing same state is bigger, but the number of
conserved opinions is smaller. When α→ 0 the size of monochrome component is
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close to N. More interestingly, a rich landscape is obtained by varying α. Let’s use
P(s) to describe the fraction of monochrome components with a size s at stationary
state, and we have the following numerical results at α= 0.04, α= 0.458 and α= 0.96




Figure 2.13: The distribution of the sizes of monochrome components at stationary
state. The number of nodes is N = 3200, and the number of edges is E = 6400. In
the beginning, m = 320 opinions are assigned to the network uniformly at random. A
qualitative transition from a giant component to numerous fragmented components is
observed with the increase of α. Figure is adapted from Ref. (Holme and Newman,
2006) and the values are binned logarithmic.
As we can see, the adaptive dynamics induced by a single parameter can lead to
a transition from a giant monochrome component to a broad view of opinions. This
phenomenon has attracted more and more attention in the fields of statistical physics,
computer science and social networks. In order to gain a deeper insight into the transi-
tion from consensus to fragmentation, Vazquez et al. (Vazquez et al., 2008; Vazquez,
2013) studied a binary voter model, where two opinions are in the adaptive network.
In their model, a node i is selected arbitrarily at each step and then a random neigh-
bour j: (1) if si = s j, then nothing happens; (2) if si 6= s j, then i redirects the link
from j to k such that sk = si with probability α, or i adopts j’s state with probability
1−α. Vazquez et al. (Vazquez et al., 2008) focused on the density of the active links
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where p(k) is the probability that a node has degree k, 〈k〉 means the average degree,
and Bn,k is the probability that a node with degree k has n active links, which is assumed
to be a binomial distribution. In particular, a critical αc can be obtained to predict the
critical transition from an active phase (corresponding to a connected network) to a
frozen phase (corresponding to a fragmented network) (Vazquez et al., 2008). Some
numerical results are obtained in Ref. (Vazquez et al., 2008), where the average size
of largest component dropped sharply around the critical point. Notably, this numer-
ical value is far from the analytical one obtained through the approximate differential
equation, which is due to the correlations among the links.
2.3.1.2 Link-centric Models
This part will review another common situation, where an edge instead of a node is
selected at each step to do state evolution and structure adaptation.
Durrett et al. (Durrett et al., 2012) explored the graph fission in an adaptive voter
model by dealing with the discordant links. As before, each agent holds one of the
two opinions A and B, and the initial fraction of As is φ0. Two rewiring strategies are
studied: rewire-to-same and rewire-to-random, where rewire-to-same means to make
a connection with an agent holding same opinion and rewire-to-random means to con-
nect a random agent in the network. The adaptive process at each step is implemented
as follows.
(1) a random active edge connecting i and j is selected, where si 6= s j;
(2) a node randomly selected from i and j adopts the state of the other with proba-
bility 1−α;
(3) otherwise with probability α, that selected node rewires to a new neighbour
based on rewire-to-same or rewire-to-random.
where α is the rewiring strength. With the increase of α, the system transforms from
network consensus (most of the nodes are sharing same state) to network fragmentation
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(disconnected monochrome communities are formed). Especially, when α = 0, the
system only does the flipping, and global consensus is obtained in the end. When
α= 1, the system only does the rewiring, and both opinions remain same as their initial
fractions but the network is fragmented. The average fraction of the final minority
(namely min{[A], [B]}/N at frozen state) is presented in Figure 2.14.
(b)   rewire-to-random(a)   rewire-to-same
Figure 2.14: The fraction of the minority opinion at stationary state. Figure (a) illustrates
the situation based on rewire-to-same, where a critical transition from consensus to
fragmentation occurs at αc ≈ 0.43 for varying φ0s. When α ≤ αc, the final fraction of
the minority is close to 0. When α > αc, the final fraction of the minority is same as
the initial fraction of the minority. Figure (b), however, presents a quite different result
based on rewire-to-random, where the critical rewiring value is dependent on the initial
fraction of the minority. Figures are from Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012).
In addition, Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012) also developed some approximation calcu-
lations (pair approximation and approximate master equations) to capture the adaptive
dynamics, which will be introduced in detail in Chapter 3.
Another interesting work is the adaptive voter model on directed networks (Zschaler
et al., 2012), where the agents have a fixed out-degree distribution, and the rewiring
would change the in-degree distribution. The adaptive voter model on directed net-
works is implemented as follows at each step:
(1) a random edge i→ j is selected;
(2) if si = s j, then nothing happens;
(3) if si 6= s j, with probability α, i rewires the edge i→ j to a random agent k sharing
the same state with i;
Chapter 2. Background 40
(4) otherwise with probability 1−α, i adopts the state of the j, so that si = s j.
To shed light upon the influence of directed networks on the adaptive dynamics,
Zschaler et al. compared the results from numerical simulations with the analytical
approximations (see details in Ref. (Zschaler et al., 2012)). Interestingly, if the net-
work presents a scale-free out-degree distribution, then the numerical critical point is
far below the estimated one. In addition, they also focused on the formation of self-
stabilizing network structure, which contains numerous smaller absorbing clusters with
few out-going edges.
2.3.1.3 Other Variants
As we can see, network consensus comes from the basic fact that the edges connecting
nodes with same state keep unchanged. We can find many situations by homophily
attachment, namely the agents are more likely to redirect links to those holding same
state. In reality, heterophily attachment is also important in many situations, for exam-
ple the establishment of weak ties used for the communication between distinct com-
munities. To understand the adaptive dynamics driven by different rewiring strategies,
Kimura (Kimura and Hayakawa, 2008) proposed an adaptive voter model allowing the
rewiring to different-opinion agents as well as same-opinion ones. This model in an
adaptive network is implemented as follows:
(1) a random voter i is selected and then a random neighbour j.
(2) with probability φ, i disconnects from j and rewires to k who holds the same
opinion as i.
(3) with probability ψ, i disconnects from j and rewires to l who holds a different
opinion from i.
(4) with probability 1−φ−ψ, i adopts the state of j, namely si = s j.
When ψ = 0, the above dynamical process is equivalent to the model in Ref.
(Holme and Newman, 2006), where the communities reach consensus at stationary
state. To investigate the case when ψ > 0, Ref.(Kimura and Hayakawa, 2008) car-
ried out the dynamical process interplayed by homophily attachment and heterophily
attachment. What should be noted is that even with a very small ψ, the heterophily
rewiring can bring a quite different result from the discovery in Ref. (Holme and New-
man, 2006). A small-world property (namely a bigger average clustering coefficient
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and a smaller average path length) can be obtained for a certain range of φ and ψ,
where the connected communities results from homophily attachment and the bridges
among communities are created by heterophily attachment.
In most cases, the dynamics of state is influenced by the configuration of neigh-
bourhood. For this reason, some researches (Benczik et al., 2008, 2009; Fu and Wang,
2008) allow the agent to adopt the majority state in its neighbourhood. Besides the
network consensus, a mixture configuration is also possible at steady state, where the
active links connecting different states may be conserved. In particular, Feng et al.
(Fu and Wang, 2008) studied the adaptive dynamics through a majority-preference and
minority-avoidance approach. This model presents a rich landscape from opinions di-
versity to global consensus by varying the rewiring parameters (more details in Ref.
(Fu and Wang, 2008)). Interestingly, a critical transition from a broad variety of opin-
ions coexistence to single opinion dominance arises around a critical value, which is
quite similar to the results obtained in Refs. (Holme and Newman, 2006; Vazquez
et al., 2008).
Recently, a large variety of models (Sood et al., 2008; Rogers and Gross, 2013;
Xie et al., 2011) have been highlighted to reveal the entangled dynamics in adaptive
voter models. Generally speaking, the main point lies in the following two aspects: (1)
the influence of local behaviours on global properties; (2) how to build approximate
calculations to estimate the equilibrium.
2.3.1.4 Approximation Techniques
In order to characterize the dynamical system analytically, a large number of moment-
closure approximations are applied into the differential equations (Demirel et al., 2014).
Here we will introduce three of the most popular methods.
• Mean field approximation (MFA) (Gleeson et al., 2012; Gleeson, 2011, 2013)
is usually derived under the following assumptions: absence of local clustering,
absence of modularity and absence of dynamical correlations (Gleeson et al.,
2012). The main idea of this approximation is to let the nodes with same state
to be equivalent, which are grouped into the same observational variable. This
approximation can match the simulation results very well if the system is well-
mixed and the correlations among the neighbourhood are negligible. However,
the above assumptions clearly violate the characteristics of many real-world net-
works. As shown in Ref. (Gleeson et al., 2012), the performance of mean field
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approximation is highly dependent on the degree distribution as well as the link
correlation in the network.
• Pair approximation (PA) (Durrett et al., 2012; Gleeson, 2011, 2013) focuses
on some more complicated motifs including various edges, triplets and chains.
This analytical method deals with the bigger observables based on smaller ones.
In order to make the differential system closed, pair approximation adapts the
Bayes’ theorem into graphs by estimating the bigger motifs through some exist-
ing smaller ones. For example, the number of triplet ABA can be calculated by:
[ABA] = [AB]× [AB]/[B]. However, this method ignores the distribution of some
certain motifs, which may be only located in specific regions. In particular, the
motifs in the intersection part may be easily overestimated.
• Approximate master equation (AME) (Durrett et al., 2012; Gleeson, 2011, 2013)
considers the states of nodes and their neighbours by building a large number
of master equations for the star-like motifs. This method puts the nodes with
same state as well as same neighbourhood configuration into the same group,
where the information regarding local structure can be captured correctly by
the observational variables. For example, [Am,n] means the number of agents
holding A with m neighbours of A and n neighbours of B. The system of AMEs
can capture the dynamics better by considering a large number of “stars”, but it
is at the expense of higher computation cost. Fortunately, the maximal degree of
a node kmax is a relatively small number compared with the size of network N,
thus the number of equations is not that large.
To conclude, the above approximation techniques can do analytical calculations for
adaptive networks in some simple cases, but it may fail to capture the dynamical pro-
cess on many complex realistic networks (Gleeson et al., 2012), which are large-scale
and highly correlated. Therefore, more work needs to be done for the development of
effective and accurate approximation techniques (see more details in Chapter 3).
2.3.2 Games in Adaptive Networks
When individuals are interacting in a structured community, each of them may have a
specific property (such as weight, payoff, fitness) to show its influence on others. In
this section, we intend to explore the coupled dynamics of individuals, who play games
with each other in adaptive networks.
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In particular, when the individuals are playing the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD), cooperation (C) and defection (D) are two strategies held by them. The payoff
matrix Π 2.27 in the PD has a sequential relation T > R > P > S, which leads the play-
ers to opt for defection as T > R and P > S. Consequently, the dominance of defection
is present as the Nash equilibrium at stationary state. However, it is the dominance of
cooperation that gives the optimal collective outcome (Figure 2.15). Therefore, how to
promote the cooperation in a population of self-interested individuals is a very inter-
esting topic.
DefectorsCooperators
Low  payoffHigh  payoff
Figure 2.15: The trade-off between optimal individual choice and optimal group choice
in the PD. Starting from a well-mixed community, the population will evolve from all
cooperators to all defectors under natural selection.
Recently, many researches have been launched to explore the evolution of coop-
eration in dynamical communities (Pacheco et al., 2006b). Combining state evolution
with structure adaptation, a large number of efforts have been made to promote the co-
operation by changing network structures. With adjustable topologies, the adaptation
based on preference enables the individuals to break up those “bad” links (connecting
to defectors) and redirect to some “good” ones (namely cooperators) (Zimmermann
and Eguı́luz, 2005), leading to the formation of cooperative components. Wu et al.
(Wu et al., 2010) modelled the evolution of cooperation in adaptive networks using
differential equations, and they pointed out that the fragile CD links and robust CC
links would increase the chances of cooperation. Santos et al. (Santos et al., 2012)
investigated numerous factors (such as rewiring strength (Santos et al., 2006), pre-play
signals (Santos et al., 2011) and selection pressure (Van Segbroeck et al., 2011)) that
could promote the cooperation by increasing the diversity of population. Fu et al. (Fu
et al., 2008) proposed a reputation-based adaptation strategy to enhance the coopera-
tion, where agents will reorganise the local structure by disconnecting lower-reputation
neighbours and connecting to higher-reputation ones. In addition, Poncela et al. (Pon-
cela et al., 2009) conducted a model of evolutionary games in a growing structured
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population, where they obtained a higher level of cooperation when increasing the size
of network. Szolnoki et al. (Szolnoki and Perc, 2008; Szolnoki et al., 2008) proposed
a teaching mechanism that allows the successful agents (whose states are imitated by
others) to make new connections, which is effective in promoting the cooperative be-
haviour.
In the following, we will review some game models in adaptive networks from the
perspectives of pairwise imitation and natural selection. In the case of pairwise imita-
tion, the states and structures are updated locally through direct neighbourhood inter-
actions, which is extended from the voter model with biased imitation and rewiring.
However, the case of natural selection is implemented under the Darwinian mechanism
(for example the Moran process), where the reproduction of an individual occurs with
probability proportional to the corresponding fitness.
2.3.2.1 Pairwise Imitation
Given an interacting population under the PD, it is assumed that the players are desig-
nated as either C or D with equal probability in the beginning. The tendency to imitate
a state is quantified by the payoffs πi and π j of two adjacent nodes i and j. As before,
the payoff of a player i is calculated as πi = ∑ j∈NB(i)Π(si,s j), where Π is the payoff
matrix and si ∈{C,D} is the state of i. Some deterministic and stochastic approaches to
implement state evolution have been explored in Ref. (Hofmann et al., 2011), such as
imitate-best-neighbour, imitate-best-strategy, win-stay-lose-shift and imitate-random-
neighbour.
Here, we focus on pairwise imitation by computing the imitation probability through
the corresponding payoffs. Let p(si→ s j) be the probability that a player i imitates the
strategy of j, and then we can compute this imitation probability based on the Fermi
function (Traulsen et al., 2006):




where β > 0 represents the selection strength. A smaller β means weaker selection, in-
dicating a stochastic imitation; while a larger β enforces the agent to select the strategy
with a higher payoff.
As for the adaptation of structure, a large number of papers have been reviewed
in Ref. (Perc and Szolnoki, 2010), where the spatial interactions, population growth,
teaching activity, mobility and ageing agents are the main factors affecting the evo-
lution of cooperation. In general, structure adaptation mainly focuses on how to deal
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with those links between the players. As we all know, the links of DD are usually
unstable, because defectors intend to rewire from other defectors to some cooperators.
The links of CD are more likely to be broken by cooperators while they will be pre-
served by defectors, thus they are unstable as well. However, the cooperative links of
CC yield mutual benefit to each other, which are quite stable between cooperators.
This family of models is similar to the adaptive voter model in mathematics and
simulations, and we can approximate them in same way. Notably, both the flipping
and flapping are biased by payoffs in the situation of games, which involves many
interesting stories in real life. For example, an individual with a higher payoff may
convince other people to follow her/his state easily, though the flipping of state may be
detrimental to herself/himself. In the following, we will present some relevant models
based on pairwise imitation to illustrate the influences of various structure adaptation
strategies on the level of cooperation.
Neighbourhood reorganisation to get away from the defective neighbours (Zimmer-
mann et al., 2004; Zimmermann and Eguı́luz, 2005) has been proven to be an effective
way to promote the cooperation in a structured population. One of the generic mod-
els was investigated in Refs. (Santos et al., 2006; Pacheco et al., 2007), which com-
bines pairwise imitation with neighbourhood reorganisation naturally. In that model,
the sizes of nodes and edges are constant, and initially a player is assigned to be a
cooperator or a defector with equal probability. The dynamics of state evolution is
implemented by pairwise imitation based on the Fermi function, while a link will be
rewired if at least one player is dissatisfied with that connection.
In detail, the event of state evolution occurs at each τe, when a random pair of
connecting nodes i and j are selected. According to Eq. 2.30, the node i imitates the
state of j with probability p(si→ s j), otherwise the node j imitates the state of i with
probability p(s j→ si).
The event of structure adaptation occurs at each τa, when a random edge connecting
i and j is selected to do neighbourhood reorganisation as follows:
• if si =C and s j =C, then nothing happens.
• if si =C and s j =D, then i rewires from j to a random node with probability pi =
1/(1+e−β(πi−π j)), otherwise with probability p j = 1− pi, i keeps the connection
with j.
• if si = D and s j = C, then i stays together with j with probability pi = 1/(1+
e−β(πi−π j)), otherwise with probability p j = 1− pi, j rewires from i to a random
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node.
• if si = D and s j = D, then i rewires from j to a random node with probability
pi = 1/(1+e−β(πi−π j)), otherwise with probability p j = 1− pi, j rewires from i
to a random node.
As we can see, the time scale ratio W = τe/τa measures the relative speed between
state evolution and structure adaptation, where a larger W means a prompt reaction to
adverse ties and a smaller W indicates a slowly changing network. Interestingly, with
the increase of W , the cooperation is enhanced due to the formation of cooperative
clusters (Figure 2.16).
Another important contribution is the active linking model (Pacheco et al., 2006a,b;
Van Segbroeck et al., 2009), which assigns different rates for the formation or discon-
nection of different links. The dynamics of state evolution is implemented as before,
which adopts pairwise imitation (based on Fermi function, see Eq. 2.30) to quantify
the imitation probability. However, the links are formed and disconnected continuously
according to the corresponding rates. The propensity to form a link for the player C is
defined as αC, similarly for the player D we have αD. A new edge is formed between
two unconnected players at a rate of αX αY , and a connected link XY is removed at a
rate of γXY , where X ,Y ∈ {C,D}. The links evolve based on an ordinary differential
equation as follows (Pacheco et al., 2006b):
d
dt
[XY ] = αX αY (MXY − [XY ])− γXY [XY ] (2.31)
where MXY is the maximum possible number of XY links. This differential equa-
tion has an equilibrium solution for the links as [XY ]? = MXY αX αY/(αX αY + γXY ) =
MXY φXY , where we define φXY = αX αY/(αX αY + γXY ).
Of course, state evolution and structure adaptation are also coupled by the time
scale ratio W = τe/τa. When W → +∞, the adaptation of structure runs much faster
than the evolution of state, and the average payoff of a certain type of player at station-
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Figure 2.16: For a given payoff matrix Π, we have R = 1 and P = 0, but vary S ∈ [−1,1]
and T ∈ [0,2]. The average fraction of cooperators at stationary state is obtained at
different Ws . For a lower value of W , the neighbourhood structure is modified slowly
and the defectors prevail because of the higher temptation to defect. When the value of
W is bigger, the adverse ties are removed promptly, and a heterogeneous structure is
formed to promote the cooperation. Figures are from Ref. (Santos et al., 2006).
Besides the above work, a large number of researches (Wu et al., 2010; Santos
et al., 2012; Van Segbroeck et al., 2008) have been launched to explore the success
of cooperators in adaptive networks, where the cooperation is enhanced by rewiring
from adverse ties and forging cooperative clusters. In particular, some heuristic strate-
gies, such as tit-for tat behaviour (Szolnoki et al., 2014), state-changing penalty (Jin
et al., 2012), reputation-based parter choice (Fu et al., 2008), imitating older friends
(Yang et al., 2014) and prompt neighbourhood reaction (Yang et al., 2015), have been
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proposed from different perspectives to enhance the cooperation.
2.3.2.2 Natural Selection
This part will introduce evolutionary models on networks derived from the basic Moran
process, where natural selection determines the composition of population and fitter
individuals are more likely to reproduce. We provide two typical models as below to
illustrate the dynamics of an evolutionary population in evolving networks, one is mul-
tilevel selection model (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006) and the other is social inheritance
model (Cavaliere et al., 2012).
Multilevel selection (also known as group selection) divides the population into
several groups, each of which consists of well-mixed players. As before, the individ-
uals play the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) in the group, and gain the payoff according to
the payoff matrix Π and population composition in the corresponding group. Notably,
each individual interacts with all other members in the same group, but is separated
from other groups. The individuals may reproduce and spread, where the new-born
players will be added to the same group together with their parents.
Traulsen et al. (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Traulsen et al., 2008) considered an
evolutionary population based on multilevel selection as follows. At each step,
(1) an individual i is selected to reproduce with probability proportional to her/his
fitness fi, which is a function of the corresponding payoff and selection strength;
(2) a new-born offspring is added to the same group as i;
(3) if the group size is bigger than n, then
(3-1) with probability q, that group is divided into two daughter groups uni-
formly, and then a group randomly picked from the population will be
removed;
(3-2) otherwise with probability 1−q, the group doesn’t divide but one random
member in that group is removed.
As we can see, the total number of groups is fixed as m, and each group has a
maximal size n. Therefore, the size of population is m ≤ N ≤ mn. The coupled dy-
namics can be demonstrated as Figure 2.17. It is clear that the defectors (red nodes) are
favoured in the well-mixed group under lower-level selection, but the defective groups






Figure 2.17: The evolution of population based on group selection is demonstrated by a
schematic diagram. There are two levels of selection: one is the lower-level competition
among the individuals, where a defective individual with higher fitness is more likely to
reproduce; the other is the higher-level competition among the groups, where a group
full of cooperative individuals splits more frequently.
are opposed by higher-level selection, where the groups full of cooperators are more
competitive (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Traulsen et al., 2008).
Let the payoff matrix be: R = b− c, S = −c, T = b and P = 0. When q = 0,
this model is a disjoint sum of Moran processes. When q→ 0, we have a hierarchy
of Moran processes. For the lower-level selection, the fixation probability of one co-
operator prevails in a group of defectors is approximated as pc. For the higher-level
selection, the fixation probability that a group of cooperators takes over the whole pop-
ulation is approximated as PC. Therefore, the fixation probability of a single cooperator
in the population of defectors is computed as φc = pcPC. The cooperation is favoured if
φC > 1/mn, which can be derived further as b/c > 1+n/(m−2) (see Refs. (Traulsen
and Nowak, 2006; Traulsen et al., 2008) for more details). In addition, some people
(Vural et al., 2015) also study the formation of bunches in an evolving interdependent
population, which can be seen as hierarchical competitions as well.
Under natural selection, the reproduction or removal in a structured population is
associated with network reorganisation. Cavaliere et al. (Cavaliere et al., 2012) pro-
posed a simple reproduction-mutation-reorganisation model to demonstrate the frag-
mentation and reformation of an evolutionary community. In the reproduction, not
only the state of the parent is inherited, but also the neighbourhood may be copied
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by the new-born player. This phenomenon of social inheritance is widely observed in
social networks, financial organisations and bacterial communities.
In the model of evolutionary population discussed in Ref. (Cavaliere et al., 2012),
each agent holds a state of either cooperation (C) or defection (D), and the payoff
obtained by a player is the accumulated payoff by interacting with all neighbours. The
fitness of an agent is computed as fi = (1+ δ)πi , where δ is a tunable intensity of
selection. At each step,
(1) a role-model is selected to reproduce with probability proportional to the fitness,
namely fi/∑ j f j;
(2) the new-born agent adopts the state of her/his parent with probability 1−µ and
mutates to an alternative state with probability µ;
(3) the new-born agent connects to her/his parent with probability p and connects to
each of her/his parent’s neighbours with probability q;
(4) a randomly selected agent is removed form the network.
This model follows the Moran process, but the network structure is dynamically
changed. When the mutation rate is µ→ 0, the evolution of cooperation performs
a series of transitions from all cooperators to all defectors. Interestingly, a highly
connected network is obtained in the case of all cooperators and a sparsely fragmented
network is observed in the case of all defectors.
Some very interesting results have been illustrated in Ref. (Cavaliere et al., 2012),
where they found a correlation between network stability and prosperity. In addition,
the embedding parameters p and q affect the persistence of cooperation as well as the
prosperity of population. The collapse of cooperation occurs when q reaches a high
value, which resembles a critical transition. This model combines evolutionary games
with adaptive networks in a quite natural manner, based on which we will investigate
more ingredients in the following Chapter 4.
2.3.3 Adaptive Agents Coordination
Multi-agent system (MAS) (Ferber, 1999) is composed of interacting agents, who
work in an organised manner to solve some complicated problems. Those agents can
work through methodic approach to achieve collective goals (Olfati-Saber et al., 2007),
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where network topology is crucial to the organisation performance. Networks organ-
ised by agents in real world can be used to model the dynamics in robotic group (Gas-
ton and desJardins, 2005; Abdallah and Lesser, 2007), traffic systems (Guimerà et al.,
2002; Guimera et al., 2005), gene networks (Bornholdt and Rohlf, 2000; Bornholdt
and Schuster, 2006), etc. where a core problem is agent coordination in solving tasks.
2.3.3.1 Organisation of Agents
In many real-world applications, individuals should be able to interact with each other
locally and implement tasks cooperatively. Here, we will give a brief overview of
the task model, the organisation model, the implementation method, and the adaptive
dynamics.
• Task model
The overall performance of a system of agents is measured by how successful the
agents are at solving tasks they pick up and at what rate they can pick these tasks
from the task-flow. The structure of the task-flow depends on various choices which
we detail below. These are the task composition or structure, the task advertisement
mechanism and the task allocation mechanism.
Task composition indicates how many subtasks are in the task and how those sub-
tasks are interdependent on each other. A subtask is atomic and requires a certain skill.
In addition, the subtasks can be implemented in parallel or in a sequential order (Kota
et al., 2012).
Task advertisement shows how a task is known to the agents (Glinton et al., 2008b).
Usually, tasks can be globally advertised or locally advertised to the agents. Some-
times, the task known by an agent may be advertised to the neighbours in a P2P way.
Task allocation tells us how tasks are allocated to one or more agents. When a task
arrives at an agent, it can be allocated to its neighbours randomly or with a preference.
Once the tasks are pushed into an agent, they will be served in an order of first in first
out (FIFO) or some other ways (Kota et al., 2012), depending on the structure of local
task queue.
• Organisation model
An organisation is usually made up of interacting agents, which are used to imple-
ment the tasks.
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Agents are represented by nodes in the network and are connected with each other
through various links. The agents can be homogeneous or heterogeneous in imple-
menting tasks, where the functionality of agents may differ from each other. For in-
stance, the agents may be equipped with different skills and agents with the same skill
may work at different service rates.
Interactions illustrate how the agents are connected in an organisation. The links
can be undirected or directed, indicating the information or task flow on them. In
addition, the links can be homogeneous or heterogeneous, where a weight is used to
show the affinity between adjacent agents.
Organisation performance is the benefit obtained by completing the tasks, which
can be measured by utilization rate, completion time, success rate, etc.
• Implementation method
When the models of task and organisation are provided, we can implement the
tasks within an organisation using the following two methods.
Centralised method needs a central control to guide the task implementation within
the whole organisation. This method can reach optimal solution at the expense of
high cost and low robustness. Many centralised algorithms in the field of operational
research exist to solve the tasks-agents assignment with polynomial complexity.
Recently, more and more studies consider to solve MAS optimization problems
(Gaston and desJardins, 2005; Kota et al., 2012) through some local interactions with-
out a central control. In general, a decentralised method enables the agents to imple-
ment tasks locally, and rational individual behaviours can foster high collective benefit.
Notably, the communication cost in this case is much lower than that in a centralised
way, meanwhile the system is more robust to random failures or attacks, thus enhanc-
ing the resilience of the organisation.
• Adaptive dynamics
Organisation performance in a decentralised system can be improved through adap-
tive dynamics, namely a series of effective state evolution and structure adaptation.
Learning is a kind of cognition capability used to transfer local and historical infor-
mation into a form of knowledge. Generally speaking, learning is a decision-making
process conducted by the agents in order to obtain an optimal policy for individual
behaviours in the future. As no one is in global control, agent learning in a distributed
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manner can only capture local information (task flow, information flow, policy, adver-
tisement, etc. ). Some common learning methods are observation-imitation, advice-
taking, reinforcement learning, etc. Interestingly, there have been some concrete learn-
ing approaches (Sen and Weiss, 1999) applied in agents coordination.
Adaptation is the individual behaviours used to modify the organisation of agents
based on the feedbacks (policy, guidance, reports, etc. ) obtained from learning. The
agents in an organisation may be self-interested or cooperative, which determines
whether the changes of state and structure will fulfil the individual interest or col-
lective benefit. In this thesis, we will only consider the simpler case where all agents
are cooperating. In general, task implementing and agent learning run faster than in-
dividual behaviours for adaptation, as it usually takes a long time to form an effective
and stable adaptation policy. But it is not always good to follow the data too closely,
which may cause overfitting. In addition, cost will arise along with the adjustments of
states and structures.
2.3.3.2 Network Adaptation in Organisations
Considering the uncertainty in realistic situations, multi-agent systems (MAS) should
be flexible enough to modify their underlying structures, which are supposed to be
robust to accidental faults. As far as we are concerned, the emergence of collective
coordination in real world is usually achieved by a series of individual behaviours of
evolution and adaptation.
Aiming at reaching higher organisation performance, many self-organisation ap-
proaches (Kohonen, 1988) have been adopted to solve agents coordination problems.
Unfortunately, there is still no unified theory to incorporate self-organisation into adap-
tive networks. In the following, we will review some examples in the realms of agents
team formation (Gaston and desJardins, 2005) and distributed task allocation (Abdal-
lah and Lesser, 2007). As will be shown, designing an effective adaptation strategy is
not trivial, and a key problem is how to foster favourable individual behaviours. What
should be noted is that the dynamics discussed in the existing references mainly lies in
the adaptation of structure by connecting, disconnecting, rewiring links, etc. However,
in many situations, the evolution of state (the changes of agents’ roles or functions) is
important as well and should be considered in the research for adaptive networks.
We consider the adaptation of network for agents team formation (Gaston, 2005),
where the tasks need to be implemented by teams of cooperative and connected agents.
In this family of models for team formation, the requirement of a task is a set of skills,
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and the agents with different skills are embedded in a network randomly in the begin-
ning. The agents should form teams in a distributed manner to implement those tasks
(Figure 2.18). In detail, each agent will do either of the following events at each step
to be involved in a team:
• Initialize a team with a probability (which is the ratio between the number of
uncommitted neighbours and that of total neighbours), if the team corresponding
to a task is empty and that agent holds a required skill;
• Join an existing team with a probability (which is the ratio of current team size
and actual task size), if a neighbour has been in the team and that agent holds a
required skill for the corresponding task;































Figure 2.18: The process of team formation. When an agent bids for a task, some
adjacent and uncommitted agents will join the team until all required skills are in the
team. Once an agent is committed to a team, it will stay there until the task is completed
or expired.
In general, the organisation performance (namely task success rate, defined by the
ratio between the number of successful teams and that of imported tasks) is highly de-
pendent on the underlying structure, which should be changed in real time. Here, we
will focus on the action of rewiring, which disconnects one neighbour and connects
to another one. The purpose of this research is to facilitate the formation of effective
teams through network adaptation, which can work well as environment changes. In
particular, a learning-based framework for network adaptation is proposed to address
the team formation problem (Gaston, 2005). This framework is performed in an agent-
organised network (AON), which is defined as “an organizational network structure,
or agent-to-agent interaction topology, that changes as a result of local network adap-
tation decisions made by the individual agents in a networked multi-agent system”
(Gaston, 2005). A major consideration for AON in agents team formation is when and
how the agents adapt their local structure. In detail, we need to answer:
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• when to adapt;
In Ref.(Gaston, 2005), a stateless Q-learning is adopted to decide whether it is neces-
sary for an agent to do rewiring. For an agent, its Q value is updated as:
Q(a)← Q(a)+α[Rt−Q(a)] (2.33)
where Rt is the change in local performance after taking a certain action a. Here, the
local performance of an agent is the ratio between the number of successful teams
joined and that of teams joined totally. In this way, an agent decides to adapt its struc-
ture if Q(rewiring) > Q(nothing). In their study, two αs are used to discriminate the
case where performance is increasing and the case where performance is decreasing.
• which connections to remove;
For each connection, a value is maintained to measure the benefit of that connection.
At each step, the value of a connection is updated as:
Vi j←Vi j +β[Wi j−Vi j] (2.34)
where Wi j = 1 if the connection is in a successful team; otherwise Wi j = 0. When an
agent decides to do rewiring, then it will remove the minimum-valued connection.
• where to make new connections.
In general, a push referral method is used to determine with whom to establish a new
connection, which can guarantee the connectivity of the organisation. Specifically, if
an agent i decides to rewire from a neighbour j, then j will refer its neighbour with
maximum performance to i.
The above AON strategy is Q/minNeighbor/pushMax, which can foster a huge suc-
cess in agents team formation and other similar applications. In addition, Gaston et
al. (Gaston and desJardins, 2005) also developed two rule-based network adaptation
strategies for dynamic multi-agent team formation. In the structure-based strategy,
the adaptation of network follows the principle of preferential attachment, where the
edges are rewired from lower-degree nodes to higher-degree ones. In the performance-
based strategy, agents are enabled to remove the connections from the neighbours with
lower performance and to establish new connections to the neighbour’s neighbours
with higher performance. Through their work, some interesting conclusions are ob-
tained: (1) the network topology plays an important role in the performance of team
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formation; (2) task success rate can be improved to a higher value using some adapta-
tion strategies.
In addition, Glinton et al. (Glinton et al., 2008b,a) empirically analysed the charac-
teristics of the above mentioned structure-based strategy, and proposed a token-based
adaptation method to rewire to some distant agents. Barton et al. (Barton and Allan,
2007a,b, 2008) explored some strategic methods for team formation, where an inter-
esting one is the strategy of diversity-based adaptation. In that model, an agent would
like to connect to someone who holds a quite different skill from those nearby. In this
way, a more robust team can be formed with diverse skills in the neighbourhood.
When it comes to the field of distributed task allocation, we focus on assigning
tasks to suitable agents. Refs.(Kota et al., 2012, 2009; Ye et al., 2012) explored a
decentralised approach in the organisation of agents, which comprises a set of struc-
tured and cooperative individuals. Interestingly, the cost for task completion (includ-
ing load, communication, reorganisation) can be reduced by allowing the adjustments
of network structure. In order to learn past experiences effectively, some researches
(Abdallah and Lesser, 2006, 2007) studied the interplay between task allocation and
self-organisation through multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In that model,
pi(s,a) is defined as the probability that action a is taken by agent i at state s, and is






where Qi(s,a) indicates the reward value by implementing a at s and the average re-
ward at s is calculated by Q̂i(s) = ∑a pi(s,a)Qi(s,a). Notably, they also applied the
Win or Lose Fast (WoLF) heuristic to recalculate the learning rate, which varies as
∆(a) = Qi(s,a)−Q̂i(s) changes. In this way, the agent associated with a bigger pi(s,a)
will be more likely to be connected; on the contrary the one associated with a smaller
pi(s,a) will be more likely to be disconnected. Notably, this learning method needs
to consider all the interacting information at each step, which leads to a quite large
state-action space and then high computation cost.
In many realistic situations, the operation of agents organisation is dependent on
the interacting functional agents, whose performance is recorded in the process of
distributed learning, which in turn determines the adjustments of states and structures.
Considering the trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency, a more explicit and
simpler mechanism incorporating state, structure and learning should be studied, and
we are going to explore that in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3
Network Consensus and
Fragmentation in Information Diffusion
Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012) studies an adaptive voter model on a complex network whose
nodes have one opinion from two options (A or B). Two types of dynamics facilitate the
agreement between neighbours: one is pairwise imitation with a tendency (1−α) and
the other is link rewiring with a tendency α. The adaptive dynamics stops at a frozen
state when there is no active link AB left in the network. For a null rewiring force,
α= 0, the agent graph is static and the opinions converge to a consensus (per connected
component). For null imitation, α = 1, opinions never change, and eventually, the
graph converges to a fragmented form where the two opinions are disconnected. For
values between 0 and 1, both dynamics coexist. As α increases, the system will change
from consensus to fragmentation.
The adaptive voter model studied above is driven by the dynamics of imitate-or-
repel, which is a kind of simple social learning. In this chapter, a rich landscape will
be revealed by varying the rewiring force α in the cases of various structure adaptation
strategies and state evolution mechanisms. In detail, we try to explore the adaptive net-
works by rewire-to-foaf (friend of a friend), approximate majority and weighted model.
Furthermore, moment-closure differential equations based on interface approximation
(IA) and double stars approximation (DSA) are derived to capture the adaptive dy-
namics analytically. The adaptive voter model can be used to shed light on real world
competitive phenomenologies among different groups (e.g. species, languages, cul-
tures and opinions), where the coupled dynamics has a significant impact on the group
fate.
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3.1 Introduction
Network consensus and fragmentation are two important trends for information dif-
fusion in adaptive networks. As reviewed before, the adaptive dynamics has been
explored extensively to reveal neural systems (Bornholdt and Rohlf, 2000), epidemics
spreading (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001; Gross et al., 2006; Guerra and Gómez-
Gardeñes, 2010), opinion formation (Holme and Newman, 2006; Zanette and Gil,
2006; Kozma and Barrat, 2008), etc. Typically, one may ask whether global transitions
can be triggered by small changes in the parameters of rules, and how these transitions
reflect on the underpinning graph structure. In this chapter, we will study the adaptive
voter model by exploring the entangled dynamics between pairwise imitation and link
rewiring.
The adaptive dynamics led by opinion spreading and social contacts was origi-
nally investigated by Holme et al. (Holme and Newman, 2006) in 2006, where the
discordant edges (i.e. active links connecting two nodes holding different states) are
eliminated by opinion imitation and link rewiring. Interestingly, they found a critical
phase transition from opinion uniformity to opinion diversity with the increase of the
rewiring strength. Afterwards, Fu et al. (Fu and Wang, 2008) studied the strategy
of majority-preference (MP, the agent imitates the majority opinion in the neighbour-
hood) and minority-avoidance (MA, the agent rewires the link from a neighbour in the
minority) to resolve the discord, where a variety of opinions are conserved when the
strength of rewiring is stronger. Durrett et al. (Durrett et al., 2012) discovered that
the fraction of nodes in minority state is highly dependent on the rewiring strength and
initial fraction. Under two different rewiring strategies: rewire-to-same and rewire-to-
random, the transitions from consensus to fragmentation are different dramatically. In
order to gain a deeper insight into the phase transition, Vazquez et al. (Vazquez et al.,
2008; Demirel et al., 2014) adopted some approximate differential equations to obtain
the statistical properties analytically, but the results are not accurate enough, which is
due to the correlations among links in the dynamical process.
Adaptive voter models entangle state evolution and structure adaptation naturally
in order to deal with the conflict (or discord) caused by discordant edges. As shown
in Figure 3.1, link rewiring and state imitation are two major ways to improve the
agreement between neighbours, where the rewiring force α (0≤ α≤ 1) indicates the
tendency to rewire from the current neighbour.
In this chapter, we base our work on an example in Ref.(Durrett et al., 2012) to












Figure 3.1: The discordant edges can be resolved by either rewiring an adjacent AB
edge (with probability α) or imitating the neighbour (with probability 1−α).
explore the adaptive voter model from the following perspectives:
• different rewiring strategies are used to uncover the influence of adaptation on
network fragmentation;
• an approximate majority method is adopted in state evolution to promote the
consensus of network;
• the voters are assigned with weights, and the model is extended to weighted voter
model;
• some approximation techniques are proposed to capture the adaptive dynamics
more accurately.
3.2 Adaptive Voter Model
A variety of adaptive voter models have been reviewed in Chapter 2. In this study, the
model discussed in Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012) is adopted in the following analytical
calculations and numerical simulations. This section is a re-exposition of the paper
(Durrett et al., 2012) with some simulations and remarks.
The adaptive voter model reflects the competition between two opinions: A and B,
and each voter holds a single opinion as its state si ∈ {A,B}. In the beginning, all the
voters are distributed uniformly in a random network with N nodes and E edges. We
Chapter 3. Network Consensus and Fragmentation in Information Diffusion 60
assume that the voters holding A has a fraction of φ0 initially, and φ0≤ 0.5 unless noted
otherwise. The adaptive dynamics between state and structure runs as follows. At
each step, an active link AB is picked at random for pairwise imitation or link rewiring.
With probability 1−α, a random voter from that selected AB adopts the opinion of the
other. Otherwise, with probability α that voter redirects the active link to other target
(depending on the rewiring strategy) in the network. The adaptive dynamics continues
until there is no active link left in the network.
This adaptive voter model is parametrized by the rewiring force α: when α = 0
the model always flips in a static graph, and when α = 1 the model always rewires to
form a few fragmented communities, otherwise the model is a mixture with a rate α to
rewire and 1−α to imitate. As the rewiring force α increases, network fragmentation
becomes more likely (Figure 3.2).
Consensus Fragmentation
10
Figure 3.2: A schematic diagram illustrates the transition from consensus to fragmen-
tation as α increases.
The macroscopic emergence is caused by various microscopic behaviours, such
as varying rewiring forces, state evolution rules and structure adaptation rules. In all
cases, the number of nodes N and the number of edges E are invariant.
3.2.1 Analytical Description
Clearly, the family of adaptive voter models can be represented as Markov chains
(Gilks, 2005), where the states are node-coloured graphs. The node set is invariant
(as said earlier) and so is the number of edges. We write ΩG for the finite set of graphs
with N nodes and E edges, which are reachable from a given initial node-coloured
graph G0 (with same set of nodes and edges). For convenience, we will set the dynam-
ics as a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) (Norris, 1998). This means that the
rewiring force α is construed as a rate rather than a probability. We will write p(t)(Gi)
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for the probability to be at Gi in ΩG at time t. Thus, p(t) can be seen as a vector (or
finite function) in the finite-dimensional real vector space RΩG .




pT = pT Q (3.1)
where pT is the transpose of p, and Q is the generator, or rate matrix, of our continuous-
time Markov chain (CTMC). This linear ordinary differential equation (ODE) system
defines the dynamics of p for a given initial condition. Whenever the state space is
finite (namely finite number of reachable networks), then there exists a unique solution
to the forward equation.
Consider an observable f , that is to say a function in RΩG . We define Ep( f ) := pT f
as the (time-dependent) value of f averaged over p, and sometimes we also write it as
E( f ). From the forward equation we can derive a rate equation for Ep( f ):
d
dt
Ep( f ) =
d
dt
pT f = pT Q( f ) = Ep(Q( f )) (3.2)
This differential equation specifies the evolution of the average of f . Concretely,
Q( f ) is a vector contains the following observables:
Q( f )(Gi) = ∑
G j
q(Gi,G j)[ f (G j)− f (Gi)] (3.3)
where q(Gi,G j) is the rate at which the system jumps from Gi to G j. That is to say,
Q( f ) is the mean rate of change of f under Q.
In the realm of graph transformation (Danos et al., 2015a), the rules and pattern
matching are essential to understand the CTMC. In general, a rule is defined as:
γ := (L→ R,kγ) (3.4)
which runs on a left-hand side L to obtain a right-hand side R with a certain rate kγ.
A match m : X → Y is a graph morphism from X to Y , which “preserves the graph
structure and is injective on nodes”(Danos et al., 2014). We say m(X) the image of m
in its codomain Y . For more details about graph transformation, we can find a good
review in Ref. (Heindel, 2010).
Before establishing the ODEs based on a series of rules, we need to introduce an
important ingredient, which is minimal glueings (Danos et al., 2014). A glueing µ of
two motifs g1 and g2 is pair of matches: µ1 : g1 → C and µ2 : g2 → C, to a common
codomain C. The glueing µ is minimal if the codomain of µ is same as µ1(g1)∪µ2(g2).
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Furthermore, we can write mg(g1,g2) as the set of minimal glueing motifs for g1 and
g2.
Given a motif g, we write [g] as the number of that motif, and the ODE for average
[g] can be generated based on the rules. For a rule γ∈R with left-hand side L and right-
hand side R, let mg(g,L) be the set of motifs corresponding to the minimal glueings
of g and L, which indicates the case of observable destructions. Similarly, mg(g,R) be
the set of motifs corresponding to the minimal glueings of g and R, which indicates
the case of observable constructions. Be careful, the counting for mg(g,R) should
be done in the generated graph instead of the current graph. In order to obtain the
number of generated motif g, we define mg¬(g,R) as the reverse set of mg(g,R), where
each element is obtained by applying the reverse rule to the corresponding element in
mg(g,R). Therefore, we can calculate the constructions of g by counting the number
of motifs in mg¬(g,R) at current state.
For example, suppose we have a rule AB→ AA and the observable is [g] = [AB],









Figure 3.3: An example shows the transition triggered by a rule AB → AA, where
mg(g,L) indicates the all possible destructions of g and mg¬(g,R) indicates all pos-
sible constructions of g. The dashed circle indicates the overlapping part.
Using the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) generation method proposed in
Ref. (Danos et al., 2015a,b), the ODE obtained to describe the dynamics of the average














where [g] indicates the observable, and kγ is the rate of rule γ. In fact, we write ddt [g]
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short for ddtE([g]) and all the observables in the ODEs are the average case, namely
[g] = E([g]).
Importantly, our convention is that motif counts are not discounted for symmetries.
In technical terms, we are counting the number of coloured graph morphisms that are
injective on nodes. For example, we have [AA] = 2N for a graph consisting of a ring
of N nodes of type A; whereas in a ring of N nodes where type alternates, we have
[AB] = [BA] = N.
As all these monomials themselves are motif observables, the linear subspace gen-
erated by motif observables is closed under rate matrices led by local graph rewriting
rules (see proof in Ref.(Danos et al., 2014)).
3.2.2 Pair Approximation
In adaptive voter models, we are interested in exploiting the differential equations to
study observables corresponding to small graph motifs such as the number of nodes
of type A, B, and the number of edges of type AB, AA and BB. In order to distinguish
between motifs and their observables, we will write respectively [A], [B], [AB] = [BA],
[AA] and [BB] for the motif observables above (and use similar notations for larger
motifs).
In terms of the simplest observable [A], we will construct its differential equa-
tion. Here, we need only to consider imitation steps as [A] is invariant under rewiring.
Among imitation steps, we can distinguish ones where A gets imitated, and hence [A]
gets incremented, and dual steps where B gets imitated, and [A] gets decremented. We
then get:
d
dt [A] = (1−α)∑AB∈G(kB→A− kA→B)
= (1−α)(kB→A− kA→B)[AB]
(3.6)
with kA→B means the rate a voter of A imitates the neighbouring state of B.
Let’s consider the strategy of rewire-to-random (Durrett et al., 2012), where the
opinions are equally persuasive and the discordant node redirects the active link to a
random one. The ordinary differential equations (ODEs) based on the above described
method in Eq. 3.5 are provided as follows to capture the dynamics of small-motif
observables.
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d
dt [A] = (1−α)×0× [AB]
d
dt [B] = (1−α)×0× [AB]
d

















What should be noted is that the right-hand sides of the equations involve some
triplet motifs (such as ABA, BAB, ABB, BAA). In order to make the set of equations
closed, the following two options are available: (1) write more equations for those big-
ger motifs, which may be infinite for large-scale complex networks; (2) truncate those
bigger motifs based on some approximation approaches. Many researches reviewed in
Ref. (Demirel et al., 2014) have focused on moment-closure approximate differential
equations, and the most widely-used one is pair approximation (PA) (Ellner, 2001).
Pair approximation adapts the Bayes’ theorem into the graphs by estimating the big-
ger motifs through some smaller ones. In detail, we can write following approximate
equation to decompose the triplet:
[XY Z]' [XY ][Y Z]
[Y ]
(3.8)
where X ,Y,Z ∈ {A,B}. In this way, we can have following approximations for the in-









3.2.3 Higher Order Moments
Besides the first order moment, it is also very interesting to explore the expressions
and differential equations for some higher order ones. Before doing that, let’s recall
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the minimal glueings explained earlier, based on which we will study the minimal
glueings of more than two motifs. For a higher order moment [X ]n, we can write it as:
[X ]n = ∑
µ∈mg(X ,X ,··· ,X)
[µ] (3.10)
where mg(X ,X , · · · ,X) indicates the set of minimal glueing motifs for n Xs.
In particular, the second order items are widely used, which can be used to estimate
the variance. For the second order observable [X ]2, we can express it using the disjoint
parts and joint parts. For two motifs of X , the case without any intersection can be
written in the way X +X . The number of this kind of disjoint pairs can be calculated
as:
[X +X ] = [X ][X ]− ∑
µ∈mg(X ,X)\{X+X}
[µ] (3.11)
where mg(X ,X) is the set of minimal glueing motifs for the two Xs.
If the motif X means a certain kind of node, then we can have:
[X ]n = [X ][X ] · · · [X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
= ([X ]+ [X +X ]) [X ][X ] · · · [X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-2




= an,1[X ]+an,2[X +X ]+ · · ·+an,n−1 [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-1
+an,n [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
Given a nth-order [X ]n as above, we can write the (n+1)th-order [X ]n+1 by using a
recurrence relation:
[X ]n+1 = an+1,1[X ]+an+1,2[X +X ]+ · · ·
+an+1,i [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
+ · · ·
+an+1,n [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
+an+1,n+1 [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
= an,1[X ]+ (an,1 +2an,2)[X +X ]+ · · · (3.13)
+(an,i−1 + ian,i) [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
+ · · ·
+(an,n−1 +nan,n) [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
+an,n [X + · · ·+X ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
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where an,i is the Stirling number (Sharp, 1968). We have the recurrence relation as







Return to the above described adaptive voter model, the average number of a certain
type of nodes (e.g. A) is imitation relevant and rewiring free, and we can have that
d
dt [A] = 0. Thus, the average number of As at stationary state should be fixed as [A] =
φ0N. However, the distribution of the final fraction of As is non-trivial with the change
of rewiring force α (see more details in following section). Therefore, we can estimate
the distribution of final As through its variance: V([A]) = E([A]2)−E([A])2. The ODE



















Furthermore, let’s see the second order of the average number of active links AB,
which can be written as: [AB]2 = [AB+AB]+ [ABA]+ [BAB]+ [AB]. Here [AB+AB]
means the totally disjoint items, [ABA] means the two motifs with a common B, [BAB]
means the two motifs with a common A, and [AB] means the completely overlapping
















3.2.4 From Consensus to Fragmentation
Driven by the coupled dynamics, the system will eventually reaches one or more
monochrome components due to the finite network size. The paper (Durrett et al.,
2012) discussed the graph fission in the adaptive voter model, where they pointed out
that the active links AB would converge to a quasi-stationary distribution (Collet et al.,
2012) quickly, and stay there for a long time until a frozen network is reached. That
is to say the edges and nodes have stationary distributions conditional on [AB] > 0.
Starting from a random network with φ0 = 0.4 as the initial fraction of As, the quasi-
stationary distributions for the edges and nodes are illustrated in Figure 3.4.
More interestingly, the evolving system will approaches a parabola of meta-stable
state for a long time and drifts along the curve until the frozen state is reached. Given
a certain α = 0.5, Figure 3.5 illustrates the evolutionary trajectories for the fraction of
As and that of ABs under different φ0s, where an evident quadratic curve is obtained.
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Figure 3.4: Quasi-stationary distributions for the edges and nodes at α = 0.5. Starting
from φ0 = 0.4, we plot the distributions for the fraction of ABs, As and Bs in the evolving
process before [AB] = 0. It is clear that the fraction of As and Bs have a mean of φ0
and 1−φ0 respectively, while the fraction of ABs moves around 0.2.
φ
0φC(α)
Figure 3.5: The evolutionary trajectories of the pairs: the fraction of ABs versus the
fraction of As by rewire-to-random at α = 0.5. Starting from φ0 = 0.1,0.2, · · ·0.9, we
plot the pairs every 1000 time steps, finally a symmetric “arch” is presented. A critical
fraction φC indicates the final minority. Figure is adapted from Ref. Durrett et al. (2012).
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A critical fraction of As corresponding to the point where the fraction of ABs drops
to 0 exactly along the quadratic curve. In above example, the critical fraction is around
0.125 and 0.875, which means the average final minority and majority. Let’s define
φC(α) as the smaller critical fraction (namely the minority), and if φ0 < φC(α), then
the fraction of ABs goes straight down to 0 rapidly and the average fraction of final
minority is φ0. Otherwise, if φ0 ≥ φC(α), the average fraction of final minority is
φC(α). Therefore, the estimation for the final minority relies on the quasi-stationary
distributions of ABs and As.
Besides the initial fraction φ0, the rewiring force α is another important factor for
the network configurations at stationary state. As we can see in Ref. (Vazquez et al.,
2008; Durrett et al., 2012), the network will transform from consensus to fragmentation
when the rewiring force α gets stronger. A simulation is conducted as a verification
shown in Figure 3.6, where voters of A are the initial minority with a fraction of φ0. We
can find that voters holding A may become the majority when α is smaller, but remain
as the minority when α is bigger.
























Figure 3.6: Simulation results display the distributions for the final fraction of As based
on rewire-to-random strategy. Opinions are uniformly assigned into a random network
with N = 1000, E = 2000, and 1000 independent simulations are conducted to get the
distribution. The initial fraction of As is φ0 = 0.3. Two different rewiring forces α = 0.2
and α = 0.8 are adopted, where we can find an obvious shift from bimodal distribution
at a smaller α to a unimodal distribution at a bigger α.
When we solve the above ODEs (Eq. 3.7) based on pair approximation (PA), the
average number of various types of nodes and edges can be obtained. There are two
situations for the quasi-stationary number of active links: one is [AB] > 0, where the
initial minority has chance to be the final majority; the other one is [AB] = 0, where
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the initial minority is always the final minority. Therefore, for a given φ0, when the
rewiring force α is increased from 0 to 1, we have a critical rewiring force αC to
distinguish the two situations:
• if α < αC, then [AB]> 0 at quasi-stationary state and the distribution for the final
fraction of As is bimodal.
• if α≥ αC, then [AB] = 0 at quasi-stationary state and the distribution for the final
fraction of As is unimodal.
As explained in Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012), the ODEs 3.7 at stationary state have
d
dt [AA] = 0 and
d
dt [BB] = 0, which can be rewritten as:














where the transition point from consensus to fragmentation is dependent on both the
initial fraction φ0 and the network connectivity (aka average degree) 2E/N.
With the change the rewiring force α as well as the initial fraction φ0, we can obtain
the “arch” ([AB] versus [A]) and the “heat-map” in Figure 3.7, by solving Eq. 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: The quasi-stationary fraction of ABs obtained from the solutions of PA-
based ODEs under rewire-to-random. When the initial fraction φ0 and rewiring force
α are varying from 0 to 1, a quite amazing landscape for the fraction of AB links at
stationary state is illustrated. For a given φ0, the critical rewiring force αC is the point at
which the stationary [AB] just reaches 0.
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3.3 Range-based Rewiring
In this section, we will explore a very interesting rewiring strategy: rewire-to-foaf (foaf
is short for friend of a friend), based on which an early fragmentation will be obtained.
In addition, we also try to understand the trade-off between minority survival and win-
ning under various rewiring strategies. Both numerical simulations and approximate
analyses are provided to illustrate the transitions from consensus to fragmentation.
3.3.1 Rewire-to-foaf
The rewiring strategy determines how to change the structure of network, and rewire-
to-random and rewire-to-same are two popular methods which have been discussed in
Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012). In detail, rewire-to-random means one of the voters con-
nected by AB will redirect the active link AB to a random node in the network, whereas
rewire-to-same means that one will disconnect from the neighbour he disagrees and
make a new connection to someone holding the same opinion.
In this section, we are going to propose a new strategy: rewire-to-foaf (shown in
Figure 3.8), where the voter breaks AB and rewires to his friend of a friend (foaf). A
quite different point for the rewire-to-foaf is that it can reorganise the structure accord-






Figure 3.8: The schematic processes for (a) rewire-to-random, (b) rewire-to-same and
(c) rewire-to-foaf, which reveal various social phenomena regarding how to reconstruct
the local neighbourhood in real life.
The strategy of rewire-to-foaf originates from social science, where the friend of a
friend is more likely to become a friend (Wasserman, 1994). As is known, the cluster-
ing coefficient is a measure to show the transitivity of a network, which is computed by
the number of closed triplets (“4”) and the number of connected triplets (“∨”). In so-
cial networks, we can interpret this transitivity by the probability that two individuals
with a common friend also are friends.
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From a global perspective, the clustering coefficient measures the density of closed





From a local perspective, we need to measure the clustering coefficient for a single
node u according to Ref. Watts and Strogatz (1998):
Cu = |{(v,w) : v,w ∈ NB(u)∧ evw = 1}|/ku(ku−1) (3.18)
which means the local density of the triangles connecting node u.
In this way, the average clustering coefficient in the network can be computed
through C = ∑uCu/N. It is clear that a short-range rewiring can help the formation of





























Figure 3.9: The clustering coefficient evolves with the change of time at α = 0.2 and
0.8. The strategy of rewire-to-foaf brings a bigger clustering coefficient than the other
two. We run the simulation in a random network with N = 1000 and E = 2000. The
initial fraction of As is φ0 = 0.4, which are distributed within the network uniformly in the
beginning.
3.3.2 Approximate Differential Equations
According to the descriptions presented above, we intend to explore some analytical
calculations for this short-range rewiring, namely rewire-to-foaf. As before, we define
[A], [B], [AB], [AA] and [BB] as the average number of various types of nodes and edges.
It is known that [A]+ [B] = N and [AA]+2[AB]+ [BB] = 2E.
As the number of nodes is rewiring free, we can have same ODEs as Eq. 3.7 for [A]
and [B]. In the process of rewire-to-foaf, the voter A from an active link AB will rewire
Chapter 3. Network Consensus and Fragmentation in Information Diffusion 72
to another voter A with probability [A?A][A??] approximately, where [A?A] = [AAA]+ [ABA]
and [A??] = [AAA]+ [AAB]+ [ABA]+ [ABB]. Similarly, the voter B from an active link
AB will rewire to another voter B with probability [B?B][B??] , where [B?B] = [BBB]+ [BAB]
and [B??] = [BAA] + [BAB] + [BBA] + [BBB]. In this situation, a node with a bigger
degree will more likely to be redirected. We then arrive at the following differential
equations under the strategy of rewire-to-foaf.
d

















To handle the bigger motifs on the right-hand side, we adopt pair approximation
(PA) to truncate the triplets into pairs. And this kind of moment-closure approximation
is confluent and obtains a unique normal form.
3.3.3 Examples
Starting from an Erdös-Rényi (ER) random network, we have N = 1000 nodes and
E = 2000 edges. In the beginning, the initial fraction of voters holding A is φ0, which
are distributed within the network uniformly.
3.3.3.1 The Fraction of the Final Minority
An early fragmentation means that the network can be fragmented even at a smaller
rewiring force α. In general, the fragmentation of network can be illustrated by the
final fraction of nodes in minority state. Figure 3.10 presents the average fraction of
the final minority for varying rewiring force αs under different strategies.
As mentioned before, at a bigger rewiring force α, the network is fragmented; while
at a smaller rewiring force most of the agents would reach consensus. The fraction of
final minority increases from 0 to φ0 with the increase of α, and the minority is better
conserved under rewire-to-foaf. In addition, the strategy of rewire-to-same brings a
sharp transition at a fixed αC, which is independent of its initial fraction (see more
details in Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012)).
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Figure 3.10: Simulation results (left column) and ODEs solutions (right column) for
the average fraction of the final minority under rewire-to-random, rewire-to-same and
rewire-to-foaf. Opinions are randomly assigned within the network and the initial fraction
of As is φ0 = 0.2,0.3 and 0.4 respectively. We run 1000 independent simulations to get
the average. With the increase of α, the final fraction in minority state reaches φ0.
Notably, an early fragmentation is obtained under the strategy of rewire-to-foaf.
Furthermore, we also explore the analytical results obtained through PA-based
ODEs, which are a little bit far from the numerical simulation results (see Figure 3.10
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). The inaccuracy may be caused by following two aspects: (1) the number of ODEs is
too small and more moment-closure ODEs should be created to capture the dynamics
of bigger motifs; (2) pair approximation (PA) used to decompose the triplet [XY Z] is
not appropriate.
3.3.3.2 Survival and Winning
Voters holding opinion A are the minority in the beginning, but it is possible that they
become the majority in the end. Here, we define two situations:
• survival means the case that the final fraction of As is not smaller than a certain
proportion of its initial level ρφ0, where 0 < ρ≤ 1 is a tolerance coefficient.
• winning means the case that the final fraction of As is bigger than 0.5, namely
the minority becomes the majority in the end.
In Figure 3.11, we can clearly see that higher survivability is available when the
rewiring force α is bigger. Interestingly, during a range of α ∈ [0.4,0.6], the strat-
egy of rewire-to-random enables the voters holding A to survive better if they have a
smaller φ0. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that network fragmentation
is earlier for a smaller φ0 (Figure 3.10), which leads to relatively higher survivability
during that range of αs. A sharp transition at the critical point αC is obtained un-
der rewire-to-same. Notably, the strategy of rewire-to-foaf brings higher survivability
even when α is smaller, which is associated with the early fragmentation shown be-
fore. In addition, Figure 3.11 also illustrates that a higher winning chance is obtained
at a smaller rewiring force, and when α is 0, the chance to win is around φ0. When the
rewiring force is stronger, it is less likely for the minority to win. In detail, the strategy
of rewire-to-foaf has a smaller winning chance than the strategy of rewire-to-random,
and a sharp transition is obtained under rewire-to-same.
As we can see, a rich landscape is led by varying the rewiring force α. In this
section, the adaptive voter model could reach an early fragmentation under rewire-to-
foaf, which gives rise to many smaller monochrome communities. In addition, it is a
trade-off between the survival and winning: a smaller α promotes the winning for the
minority but hinders the survivability; vice versa for a higher α, the survivability of
the minority is better but they will never win. It is inevitable to observe a transition
from consensus to fragmentation when α changes from 0 to 1, but different rewiring
strategies really can lead to different patterns of transition.
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Figure 3.11: Simulation results of the survival (left column) and winning chances (right
column) for the initial minority As under different rewiring strategies. Starting from a
random network, 1000 independent simulations are run to get the average. The initial
fraction of As is φ0 = 0.2,0.3 and 0.4 respectively.
3.4 Approximate Majority Model
In most of adaptive voter models, the strategy of direct competition is used for state
evolution. Under this strategy, two decided voters (A and B) meet each other and
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deal with the discordant edge quickly by imitating the state of the other, for example
AB→ AA and BA→ BB, which are implemented at the same rate.
In many real-world situations, however, the discordant agents are more likely to
adopt a neutral (or undecided) state to make a compromise (Vazquez et al., 2003;
Castelló et al., 2006; Colaiori et al., 2015; Colaiori and Castellano, 2015). In particu-
lar, approximate majority model has been explored from evolving cell cycles (Cardelli
and Csikász-Nagy, 2012) to population dynamics (Angluin et al., 2008; Aspnes and
Ruppert, 2009), where a neutral state is used as an interim agreement between two
discordant states.
3.4.1 A Neutral State
In this study, we will adopt approximate majority approach in the process of state
evolution, where a neutral node with a type of C arises when a pair of connected nodes
A and B interact. Based on the properties of approximate majority, one node at the
end of AB will turn to be undecided, namely: AB→ AC or BA→ BC. Moreover,
the undecided voters will be convinced by any decided voter they meet, which can be
shown as: AC→ AA or BC→ BB. Notably, some flipping actions like CA→ CC or
CB→CC are not allowed in the evolution of state, because these actions will form a
two-way communication which may lead to the loss of last decided voters (i.e. [C] =





Figure 3.12: State transition graph based on approximate majority model. For any
active link AB, a neutral state C is obtained when the two decided nodes A and B
interact with each other. And the nodes holding the state of C will be assimilated when
the links of AC or BC are in the network.
Many studies (Cardelli and Csikász-Nagy, 2012) have revealed that, under the strat-
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egy of direct competition, the convergence is very slow as a random walk and the
system is also fragile under a slight perturbation. However, under the strategy of ap-
proximate majority, the system will converge to a stationary state quickly, at which
the majority turns into the totality. In the following, we will explore the influences of
the two state evolution strategies (direct competition and approximate majority) on the
adaptive dynamics.
3.4.2 Approximate Differential Equations
Here, we consider an adaptive voter model based on approximate majority like what
follows. At each step, a random edge connecting X and Y is picked from the network,
and the event of state evolution is implemented with probability 1−α:
• if X = Y , then nothing happens;
• if X 6= Y ∧X 6=C∧Y 6=C, then XY → XC or Y X → YC;
• if X 6= Y ∧Y =C, then XY → XX .
Otherwise with probability α, the strategy of rewire-to-random is adopted to do the
structure adaptation:
• if X = Y , then nothing happens;
• if X 6= Y ∧X 6=C∧Y 6=C, then (XY,Z)→ (XZ,Y ) or (Y X ,Z)→ (Y Z,X);
• if X 6= Y ∧Y =C, then nothing happens.
where Z is a random node in the network. The above dynamical process continues
until all the connecting voters have same state.
In the following, let’s derive the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) for the
adaptive voter model based on approximate majority. Define [A], [B], [C] as the average
numbers of different voters, and [AA], [AB], [AC], [BA], [BB], [BC], [CC] are the average
numbers of various edges. The differential equations for voters of A, B and C can be
written as Eq. 3.20.
d
dt [A] = (1−α)([AC]− [BA])
d
dt [B] = (1−α)([BC]− [AB])
d
dt [C] = (1−α)([AB]+ [BA]− [AC]− [BC])
(3.20)
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In particular, when α = 0 and the voters are interacting in a well-mixed structure,
we can obtain following equations:
d
dt [A] = [A][C]− [B][A]
d
dt [B] = [B][C]− [A][B]
d
dt [C] = 2[A][B]− [A][C]− [B][C]
(3.21)
Let’s define a 3-tuple ([A], [B], [C]) to describe the state of this particular dynamical
system, and clearly [A]+[B]+[C] =N. When the rewiring force is α= 0 and the initial
state is (φ0N,(1−φ0)N,0), the system converges to (0,N,0) when φ0 < 0.5; while it
converges to (N/3,N/3,N/3) when φ0 = 0.5 (Figure 3.13).
































































































Figure 3.13: Starting from a state with [C] = 0, the initial minority with a fraction φ0 will
disappear and the majority will turn into the totality. If the two opinions are equal in the
beginning, namely φ0 = 0.5, then we will come to a steady state with [A] = [B] = [C] =
N/3.
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Clearly, four steady states are available for this specified situation: (N,0,0), (0,N,0),
(0,0,N), and (N/3,N/3,N/3). However, these steady states (or fixed points) have dif-
ferent stabilities. That is to say if we start from a value close to a certain steady state,
then it may drive the development away from that state. For instance (0,0,N), it is
an unstable steady state. In addition, the state of (N/3,N/3,N/3) is not stable either,
unless we start from an initial state with [A]0 = [B]0 = N/2. In detail, a stream plot
(Figure 3.14) is provided to illustrate the directions of the velocity vectors at different
points, which can be used to demonstrate the overall dynamics of the system. It is clear
that the majority will turn into the totality in the case of null link-rewiring (α = 0) and
asymmetric initial fractions (φ0 6= 0.5).
Figure 3.14: We have the directions of evolution presented to show the dynamical pro-
cess at different points. The red points are the four steady states and the green dashed
line indicates the boundary between the basin of all As and that of all Bs.
When the network structure is taken into consideration, we need to write more
differential equations to describe the evolution of more detailed motifs. Eq. 3.22 is
provided to illustrate the dynamics of various edges in the adaptive voter model based
on approximate majority. As we can see, the constructions (or destructions) of a cer-
tain type of edges are consequences of local behaviours (namely state evolution and
structure adaptation). Notably, some bigger motifs may arise due to the glueings dis-
cussed before. In order to make the equations closed, pair approximation (PA) will be
adopted to decompose those larger motifs into smaller ones as Eq. 3.9. Implementing
the moment-closure ODEs, we can easily obtain the stationary network configurations
for varying αs and φ0s.








dt [AB] = (1−α)(−[AB]− [ABA]+ [ACB]− [BA]− [BAB]+ [BCA])


















dt [CC] = (1−α)(−[CCA]+ [CBA]− [CCB]+ [CAB])
(3.22)
3.4.3 Examples
We start from a random graph with the number of nodes N and the number of edges E
to implement a series of simulations. There is not any neutral voter C in the beginning,
and the voters holding A are the initial minority with a fraction of φ0. All the nodes are
uniformly distributed within the network. Under the strategy of approximate majority,
the voters holding C will come into the system due to the disagreement between A
and B, but they will be eliminated eventually according to the rules described before
(namely AC→ AA and BC→ BB). Meanwhile, the C-relevant links are rewiring free,
which leads to [C] = 0 at frozen state. In the following, different initial fraction φ0s
and rewiring force αs are explored to illustrate some global properties.
3.4.3.1 The Dominance of Majority
First, let’s see the final fraction of voters holding A based on direct competition and
approximate majority in Figure 3.15, where the initial fraction of As is φ0 = 0.2,0.3
and 0.4 respectively. When the rewiring force α is close to 1, the two strategies have
similar results with the final fraction of As around the initial fraction φ0. However,
when α is smaller, the voters holding A under approximate majority drop to a much
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lower level. While the average fraction of As under direct competition is still around
its initial fraction φ0.
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Figure 3.15: The final fraction of As is obtained from the numerical simulations (left col-
umn) and ODEs (right column). Given a random network with N = 1000 and E = 2000,
1000 identical and independent simulations are run to get the average. The stationary
fraction of As is presented based on direct competition (upper row) and approximate
majority (lower row). Interestingly, when the rewiring force is weaker, the minority be-
comes extinct under the strategy of approximate majority and the majority turns into the
totality at α = 0.
Intuitively, for an active link AB, both A and B may turn to C, but the number of
generated BC is bigger that of AC due to the bigger fraction of Bs in the beginning. In
this way, more nodes will be assimilated by Bs. When α gets smaller, the evolution
of state runs quickly, and it is easier for the majority to convince most of the voters,
leading to the dominance of majority.
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3.4.3.2 Survival and Winning
Let’s use the definitions for winning and survival described before, and a group of
voters holding A are the minority in the beginning with an initial fraction of φ0. As
shown in Figure 3.16, under the strategy of approximate majority (lower row), the
initial minority has no chance to win and the chance to survive drops to 0 at smaller
αs. The undecided voter C is more likely to meet a voter with majority preference,
which leads to a bigger pressure moving towards the majority state. Therefore, the
introduction of a neutral state C in a binary network facilitates the dominance of the
majority; on the other hand, it brings about the difficulty for the minority to win and
even survive.
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Figure 3.16: The chances of survival (left column) and winning (right column) are pre-
sented for the minority (namely As), whose initial fraction is φ0 = 0.2,0.3 and 0.4 re-
spectively. The strategy of direct competition (upper row) and approximate majority
(lower row) give rise to quite different results for the fate of the minority.
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3.5 Weighted Voter Model
The evolution of state discussed before (Durrett et al., 2012; Holme and Newman,
2006) lets all agents have equal weights, which are independent of their neighbourhood
configurations. In this section, the original model in Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012) is
generalized so that the imitation step is modulated by a local linear signal sent by each
agent and which summarises their neighbourhoods.
3.5.1 Weighted Nodes and Biased Imitation
As before, each agent can be of one of two states (or colors, types): A or B. We write si
for the state of agent i, and NB(i) for the set of neighbours of i, who are the agents i can
directly interact with. Here, we introduce the notion of weight of a node to indicate the
fitness of the voter in the system, just like the games in adaptive networks (see more
details (Zimmermann et al., 2004; Santos et al., 2006; Zschaler, 2012) in Chapter 2).
Suppose given a 2×2 matrix Π with real coefficients, the weight of a node, in a given











The relative weights of neighbours (of different states) are used to determine which
is more likely to imitate which. The higher the weight ratio between i and j is, the
likelier is j to imitate i.
Depending on how one sets up the interaction matrix Π, different types of propa-
gation can be obtained. If Π = I, then the weight πi measures the number of “same”
in i’s neighbourhood. Of two opposing neighbours, the one with most neighbours of
the same type will dominate the imitation game. This effect is self-reinforcing, where
imitation will tend to increase the dominant node’s weight. On the contrary, one can
set Π so that weights measure the number of “different” and obtain a negative feedback
leading to homeostatic behaviours.
Given an interaction matrix Π, we can obtain the weights of two neighbouring
agents: πi and π j, and then the probability that i adopts the state of j is defined as
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p(si → s j), which can be calculated based on the Fermi distribution (Traulsen et al.,
2006):




where β ≥ 0 is a parameter indicating the selection strength. If we think of πi as
(minus) the energy of a node, then β can be seen as the inverse of a temperature. The
smaller β, the weaker the bias towards higher weights. For β = 0, we find again the
original voter model from Ref.(Durrett et al., 2012). On the other hand, if β→+∞, the
agent with a higher weight always wins and the imitation mechanism becomes directed
(unless both nodes have the same weight).
In contrast to state evolution, the structure rewiring is unbiased in that when an
active link is set to rewire with probability α, a random node is redirected by that link.
The structure adaptation is a kind of dynamical spatial selection, where the weight of
an agent will change with the adjustment of its local neighbourhood. While imitation
promotes consensus, the rewiring facilitates the assortment of same-color nodes which
leads to network fragmentation.
As we can see, the main difference in the weighted voter model is the biased state
evolution, which will bring about a quite different result from that in Ref. (Durrett
et al., 2012).
3.5.2 Approximate Differential Equations
There are correlations between AB, AA and BB motifs which one might need to take
into account. To do this, we use triplet motifs, such as AAA, AAB, ABA, BBA, BAB,












Figure 3.17: The approximate neighbourhood configurations: we assume agents of
A with an active link AB have [BAA]/[AB] neighbours of type A and 1+ [BAB]/[AB]
neighbours of type B; similarly for B agents.
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Thus, we get refined approximations for the mean weights and imitation probabil-
ities of agents connected by an edge of AB as follows.
πA = R[BAA]/[AB]+S(1+[BAB]/[AB]) p(A→ B) = 11+e−β(πB−πA)
πB = T (1+[ABA]/[AB])+P[ABB]/[AB] p(B→ A) = 11+e−β(πA−πB)
(3.26)
Putting things together, we get the ODEs for the weighted voter model as follows.
d
dt [A] = (1−α)[AB]
(
p(B→ A)− p(A→ B)
)
d
dt [B] = (1−α)[AB]
(
p(A→ B)− p(B→ A)
)
d









dt [AA] = (1−α)
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dt [BB] = (1−α)
(







As we can see, it remains to close the above equations, and break our triplet observ-
ables into smaller ones. Here we adopt pair approximation (PA) to do that as discussed
before.
3.5.3 Examples
We build an ER random network with N nodes and E edges to investigate our weighted
voter model numerically and compare the approximations with simulations. The initial
fraction of As is written by φ0, and opinions are assigned uniformly at random once
φ0 is given. In particular, we will explore the dynamics by varying rewiring force α,
network connectivity (namely average degree) 〈k〉 = 2E/N and selection strength β.
The evolution stops when the simulation converges to a frozen state [AB] = 0, and 30
independent simulations are run to compute an empirical average.
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3.5.3.1 Simulations and Approximations
Now, let’s come to the asymmetric imitation where the selection strength is set as
β = 10, and the weight parameters are: R = 1.0, S =−1.0, T = 2.0 and P = 0.0. This
choice implies that flipping from A to B always results in an increase of one’s rate
while, paradoxically, the aggregate weight decreases. We focus again on the long-term
behaviour, especially the average fraction of As, for different αs. The simulation is led
in a random network with N = 1000 and E = 2000. The initial fraction of As ranges
in {0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9}. Figure 3.18 displays the results of average fraction of As at
stationary state.


























































Figure 3.18: The final fraction of As under different rewiring force αs and initial fraction
φ0s. The numerical simulations (left panel) and PA-based ODEs (right panel) are carried
out in a random network.
Under asymmetric imitation one can see that it is impossible for As to win over a
consensus state. However, As are better conserved with higher αs where the network
is more likely to be fragmented into several monochrome communities. At any rate,
the final fraction of As is always less than its initial one φ0. When α > 0 the final
fraction of As increases with α to reach the initial value φ0 only when α = 1.0. This
phenomenon is quite different from symmetric imitation, where the average fraction
of As is constant with the increase of α (see Figure 3.15). In the case of φ0 > 0.5, the
initial majority will become extinct at a smaller α, which is due to the weighted agents
and biased imitation. On the contrary, the initial minority with quite high weights
will take over the population. This weighted voter model reflects rich behaviours in
social networks, where a small fraction of “powerful” people are able to convince the
majority to follow their opinions.
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3.5.3.2 Network Connectivity
Ref. (Ranjbar-Sahraei et al., 2014) studies the influence of network connectivity on
the consensus formation in static networks. We see similarities in the adaptive case.
We take a set of weight parameters: R = 1.0, S = −1.0, T = 2.0 and P = 0.0, and
the selection strength is β = 10. Figure 3.19 shows the final fraction of As using a
sparser random network with 〈k〉 = 2E/N = 4 and a denser random network with
〈k〉= 2E/N = 10. Of course, the two networks have same size N = 1000.


























































Figure 3.19: The final fraction of As under different rewiring force αs and initial fraction
φ0s. Figure (a) shows the results in a sparser network with 〈k〉= 4, and figure (b) shows
the results in a denser network with 〈k〉= 10. Both networks have a size of N = 1000.
For this specific setting, we find that the higher network connectivity decreases
the chance of fragmentation when α < 1, meanwhile the final fraction of As decreases.
The intuitive reason why a higher average degree inhibits the propagation of As (for our
specific choices of Π parameters), is that Bs will get higher weights (T 〈k〉/2+P〈k〉/2),
but As cannot increase theirs (R〈k〉/2+ S〈k〉/2). Essentially, network consensus is
promoted due to Bs becoming stronger. When α = 1, unsurprisingly, both A and B
remain.
3.5.3.3 Selection Strength
Besides the rewiring force and network connectivity, another important factor is the
selection strength β, which determines the imitation bias. As discussed earlier, the
selection strength can be seen as the inverse of a temperature, where a high β brings
deterministic imitation (namely a voter with a higher payoff will always win). Let’s
start from a random network with N = 1000, E = 2000 and 〈k〉 = 4, and we have a
Chapter 3. Network Consensus and Fragmentation in Information Diffusion 88
certain rewiring force α = 0.5. A set of weight parameters are: R = 1.0, S = −1.0,
T = 2.0 and P = 0.0. With the initial fraction of As in {0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9}, we
provide their final fraction in Figure 3.20 with the selection strength varying from 0 to
10.



































Figure 3.20: The final fraction of As under different selection strength βs ranging in
[0,10] for various initial fraction φ0s. The simulation is carried out in a network with
N = 1000, E = 2000 and 〈k〉= 4, and the rewiring force is α = 0.5.
Given a fixed α, the final fraction of As changes from φ0 to a quite lower fraction
with the increase of selection strength β. When β is smaller, the nodes of A fare better
thanks to the randomness in imitation. This is especially true when β = 0, where the
average final fraction of As is equal to its initial fraction φ0. When β is just a little bit
bigger, the selection gets stronger and the imitation becomes asymmetric, leading to
the progressive demise of As.
3.6 Approximation Techniques
As mentioned before, the differential equation associated with a motif g generally
involves bigger motifs led by overlapping g and the left-hand sides of various rules.
For example, in Figure 3.21, a transition AB→ AA leads to the changes of ABA→ AAA
and ABB→ AAB, which will influence the number of AB links. Specifically, besides
the decrease of the focal AB, ABA→ AAA will cause an additional decrease of AB,
while ABB→ AAB will bring an additional increase of AB.
In principle, one could iterate Eq. 3.5 to obtain a system of ODEs for the evolution
of the observables of interest. But in general such a development will be infinite,
especially when the size of network is quite large and network patterns are diverse.


















Figure 3.21: An example shows the coupled motifs under the rule AB→ AA, where the
dynamics of motif observable [AB] involves bigger motifs ABA and ABB.
Therefore, some methods to truncate the expansions and obtain a manageable finite
approximate differential equations should be studied.
3.6.1 From Pair Approximation to Interface Approximation
Pair approximation (PA) (Ellner, 2001) is widely used to truncate and express the big-
ger motif as a function of smaller ones. Let g = g1∪g2 and h = g1∩g2, and then we




which is based on an assumption of conditional independence. In pair approximation,
it is assumed that the edges are uniformly distributed within the network, where each
smaller motif g1 is associated with [g2]/[h] bigger motif g. However, this approxima-
tion usually underestimates the observable [g] by adopting an inaccurate denominator
[h], which contains some negative applicable cases. Therefore, some approaches are
required to exclude those “special” hs.
In the voter model, the ODEs presented before involve many triplet observables
[AAB], [ABA], [BAB], etc. which are decomposed by pairs [AA], [AB], [BB] and single
nodes [A] and [B]. Nevertheless, this approximation ignores correlations among edges
of type AB, AA and BB. This is particularly consequential for fragmentable systems,
as the distribution of AB links is (very) far from uniform. Specifically, the long-ranged
motifs involving the active links, such as ABA and BAB, show a strong correlation close
to the fragmentation.
To handle this problem, we distinguish agents of A which see no Bs and those who
do (Figure 3.22). We write [AI] for the observable counting those interfacial agents.
The idea is that only agents in the interface should be used to approximate active
triplet motifs. In PA, we suppose that AA and AB links are uniformly distributed among
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BA
Pure B Interface Pure A
......
......
Figure 3.22: Decomposition of the network structure: agents of type A are either con-
nected by active links in which case they belong to the interface, or all of their neigh-
bours are of the same type, and they are in the pure A subset. Similarly for B agents.
all As, and each of them has [AA]/[A] neighbours of type A and [AB]/[A] neighbours of
type B. But it is inaccurate to take some “special” As (connected only by the neighbours
holding A) into the interface, where the voter A should have [AB]/[AI] neighbours of
type B in average. Therefore, to obtain a better approximation, we need to estimate
[AI], the number of As in the interface.
Starting from a random network, the random rewiring strategy doesn’t affect the
degree distribution of the network. Therefore, we make two assumptions as follows to
illustrate the distribution of the degree as well as the configurations of the neighbour-
hood. For the nodes holding a state A, we have:
• the degree of node A follows a Poisson distribution with average degree kA =
([AA]+ [AB])/[A];
• the neighbourhood configuration of an A follows a binomial distribution, namely
any one of its neighbours will be the state of A with probability pAA = [AA]/([AA]+
[AB]) and be the state of B with probability pAB = [AB]/([AA]+ [AB]) .
Similar method can be used for B, and we have kB = ([AB] + [BB])/[B], pBB =
[BB]/([BB]+ [AB]), and pBA = [AB]/([BB]+ [AB]).
As a result, the interfacial agents can be approximated as:



















where f (k,kA) =
kkAe
kA
k! indicates the probability an agent of A has a degree k under the
Poisson distribution.
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This approximation computes the number of triplets associated with active links
as:
[BAB]' [AB][AB][AI ] >
[AB][AB]
[A]




The above approximation is called interface approximation (IA), which distin-
guishes the agents in the interface from the whole population. The differential equa-
tions are same as the case based on pair approximation, which means IA is equally
cheap as PA in terms of computation cost.
3.6.1.1 Examples
Now, let’s come to an example of adaptive voter model under rewire-to-random, where
a random active link AB is selected at each step to do the evolution of state with prob-
ability 1−α and to do the adaptation of structure with probability α. We capture the
final fraction of the minority for different αs. As before, the simulation is led in a
random network with N = 1000, E = 2000. The initial fraction of As is φ0 = 0.2,0.3
and 0.4 respectively. Figure 3.23 displays the simulation results as well as the approx-
imations (Eq. 3.7) based on PA and IA. Notably, the triplets truncations are different,
where PA is implemented as Eq. 3.9 and IA is implemented as Eq. 3.30.





























































































Figure 3.23: The final fraction of the minority under rewire-to-random with the increase
of rewiring force α. The initial fraction of As is φ0 = 0.2 (left), 0.3 (middle) and 0.4
(right) respectively. We present the results from numerical simulation, PA-based ODEs
and IA-based ODEs in different colors.
We also implement the weighted voter model to observe the performance of these
approximation methods. In detail, we take a set of weight parameters T > R > P >
S to build a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) interaction payoff matrix. As for the coupled
dynamics, the evolution of state occurs with probability 1−α, where a biased imitation
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based on Fermi distribution (see Eq. 3.25) is introduced to enhance the success of an
agent with a higher weight. The structure rewiring is implemented by adopting the
strategy of rewire-to-random. Figure 3.24 presents the results of numerical simulations
and analytical calculations based on PA and IA .


































Figure 3.24: The final fraction of different types of nodes and edges under different
rewiring force αs in the weighted voter model. With an initial fraction φ0 = 0.5, the
numerical simulation, PA-based ODEs and IA-based ODEs are undertaken in a random
network with N = 1000, E = 2000 and 〈k〉 = 4, and the selection strength is β = 0.1.
The weight parameters are R = 1.0, S =−1.0, T = 2.0 and P = 0.0.
When we change the weight parameters to the case of coordination game with
R'P> S' T , we come to another example of weighted voter model. In this situation,
two adjacent nodes sharing same state benefit mutually. Figure 3.25 demonstrates the
results of numerical simulations and analytical calculations based on PA and IA.
As we can see in Figure 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25, the interface approximation (IA)
method has promoted the accuracy to a relatively higher level than pair approximation
(PA), but is same in computation cost.
3.6.2 From Approximate Master Equations to Double Stars Approx-
imation
In this section, we intend to capture the adaptive dynamics through a series of master
equations of more detailed motifs (Gleeson, 2011, 2013; Durrett et al., 2012). The
motif observables are various star-like structures as shown in Figure 3.26.
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Figure 3.25: The final fraction of different types of nodes and edges under different
rewiring force αs in the weighted voter model. With an initial fraction φ0 = 0.3, the
numerical simulation, PA-based ODEs and IA-based ODEs are undertaken in a random
network with N = 1000, E = 2000 and 〈k〉 = 4, and the selection strength is β = 0.1.



























Figure 3.26: The star structure Am,n means a focal agent holding a state A has m
neighbours of A and n neighbours of B. Similarly, for Bm,n, it means a focal agent
holding a state of B has m neighbours of A and n neighbours of B.
3.6.2.1 Approximate Master Equations
Approximate master equations (AME) for adaptive voter models were studied in Ref.
(Durrett et al., 2012), where people investigated to construct a system of closed star-
like motifs. To capture the dynamics of the stars, we need to consider the following 5
types of dynamics, which are demonstrated through an motif Am,n.
• the state flipping of the focal agent, where Am,n→ Bm,n leads to the decrease of
Am,n, but the reverse action Bm,n→ Am,n leads to the increase of Am,n.
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• the state flipping of the neighbours, where Am,n→ Am−1,n+1 (a neighbour hold-
ing A changes to B) and Am,n→ Am+1,n−1 (a neighbour holding B changes to A)
will lead to the decrease of Am,n, but the reverse actions will lead to the increase
of Am,n.
• the addition of edges, where Am,n→ Am+1,n (adding a new neighbour holding A)
and Am,n→ Am,n+1 (adding a new neighbour holding B) will lead to the decrease
of Am,n, but Am−1,n→ Am,n and Am,n−1→ Am,n will lead to the increase of Am,n.
• the removal of edges, where Am,n→ Am−1,n (removing a neighbour holding A)
and Am,n→ Am,n−1 (removing a neighbour holding B) will lead to the decrease
of Am,n, but Am+1,n→ Am,n and Am,n+1→ Am,n will lead to the increase of Am,n.
• the swapping of edges, where Am,n→ Am−1,n+1 (swapping a neighbour holding
A to other one holding B) and Am,n→ Am+1,n−1 (swapping a neighbour holding
B to other one holding A) will lead to the decrease of Am,n, but the reverse actions
Am−1,n+1→ Am,n and Am+1,n−1→ Am,n will lead to the increase of Am,n.
/  dt  =























Figure 3.27: The dynamics of a star motif Am,n are illustrated by a series of flipping
and swapping actions. The differential equation for Am,n involves the ones with the
configurations of Bm,n, Am±1,n, Am,n±1 and Am±1,n±1.
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As illustrated in Figure 3.27, we obtain the master equation for Am,n to describe the
adaptive dynamics. Similarly, we can also write the master equations for Bm,n. Let’s
suppose the maximal degree of a voter is kmax, and the size of AME system is 2k2max,
which is much bigger than the size of ODEs based on PA or IA.
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where λA→BAm,n indicates the rate for the transition Am,n→ Bm,n; λ
A→B
u indicates the rate
that a neighbouring agent u ∈ NB(Am,n)∧ su = A changes its state from A to B; µ−AAm,n
indicates the rate to remove a neighbour holding A from Am,n; µ+AAm,n indicates the rate
to add a new neighbour holding A to Am,n; and µ−A+BAm,n indicates the rate for Am,n to
disconnect a neighbour holding A but connect to a new one holding B.
Here, we should notice that the neighbourhood configurations of the neighbours are
not mentioned. In Ref. (Durrett et al., 2012), for a star motif Am,n, it is supposed that
all the neighbours holding A are indifferent with a configuration A1+[AAA]/[AA],[AAB]/[AA];
and all the neighbours holding B have a configuration B1+[ABA]/[AB],[ABB]/[AB]. As for
the star motif Bm,n, we can draw similar approximations. Figure 3.28 provides the











































Figure 3.28: The approximate neighbourhood configurations of star motifs Am,n and
Bm,n in AME.
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As for the number of various nodes, pairs and triplets, all of them can be approxi-
mated through those star motifs, for example the number of active triplets ABA can be
calculated as [ABA] = ∑m,n m(m−1)[Bm,n].
3.6.2.2 Double Stars Approximation
Based on the previous AME, we intend to approximate the neighbourhood configura-
tions more precisely. We can group two stars connected by an edge i j with isomorphic
neighbourhood pairs in 〈NB(i),NB( j)〉, in this way a motif of “double stars” is ob-
tained. Only finitely many of these monomials are not zero, so the above sum is finite.
In double stars approximation (DSA), the doublet defined as Am,nBp,q means the mo-
tif of two connected stars, where one star Am,n has m neighbours holding A and n
neighbours holding B, the other star Bp,q has p neighbours holding A and q neighbours



















Figure 3.29: Double stars Am,nBp,q.
When we adapt DSA into the voter models, the rates for state evolution between
neighbours (e.g. AB→ AA) can be calculated through the double stars observables. In
detail, the following master equation can be obtained to capture the dynamics of Am,n:
d





−∑p,q λB→ABp,q [Am,nBp,q]+∑p,q λ
B→A
Bp,q [Am−1,n+1Bp,q]

























where λA→BAm,n indicates the rate for the flipping Am,n → Bm,n; λ
B→A
Bp,q indicates the rate
for the transition Bp,q→ Ap,q; µ−AAm,n indicates the rate to remove a neighbour holding
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A from Am,n; µ+AAm,n indicates the rate to add a new neighbour holding A to Am,n; and
µ−A+BAm,n indicates the rate for Am,n to disconnect a neighbour holding A but connect to a
new one holding B.
Notably, DSA captures the neighbourhood configurations by extending the observ-
able from single star to double stars, which can obtain a more precise flipping rate for
adjacent agents. In order to make the set of equations closed, we have following ap-
proximations (Figure 3.29) to decompose those double stars into stars. So the size of














where [AB] = ∑m,n ∑p,q[Am,nBp,q] and [AA] = ∑m,n ∑p,q[Am,nAp,q].
3.6.2.3 Examples
(1) Linear rate
Let’s first look back to the original adaptive voter model in Ref. (Durrett et al.,
2012), where the flipping rate of an agent is linearly proportional to the number of
neighbours holding a different state.
In AME, the rate to flip the state of a focal agent is calculated as: λA→BAm,n = n
and λB→ABm,n = m. While for the flipping of the neighbours of the focal agent, it is ap-
proximated through an aggregate then compute (ATC) method, which means that it
will first estimate the “mean” neighbourhood configuration by aggregating all possible
cases and then compute the rate based on that “mean” configuration.
For example, for a focal agent Am,n, a neighbour u holding a state of A can be
approximated as A1+[AAA]/[AA],[AAB]/[AA], who has a flipping rate λA→Bu = [AAB]/[AA].
Considering that Am,n has m this kind of neighbours, and the sum of them means the





u [Am,n] = [Am,n]×m× [AAB]/[AA] (3.34)
Finally, we can write approximate master equations (AME) for the adaptive voter
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model under rewire-to-random as:
d






When it comes to DSA in adaptive voter models, the flipping rate for the focal
agent is same as AME, namely λA→BAm,n = n and λ
B→A
Bm,n = m. However, the flipping of
the neighbours of the focal agent is approximated through a compute then aggregate
(CTA) method, which means that it will first compute the flipping rate for a certain
doublet configuration and then obtain a “mean” rate by aggregating all possible con-
figurations of doublets.
For example, λA→BAp,q = q is the flipping rate from a doublet Am,nAp,q to Am,nBp,q.
Aggregating the possible configurations of doublets connecting Am,n, we can have:
∑p,q λ
A→B











As we can see, in the case of linear imitation, the flipping rate based on AME (Eq.
3.34) is same as that based on DSA (Eq. 3.36). In this way, we can also write the
master equations using DSA as:
d






Figure 3.30 illustrates the results obtained through numerical simulations and an-
alytical approximations. Interestingly, the master equations based on AME and DSA
present same results in this case of linear imitation, whose accuracy is much higher
than approximations based on PA and IA introduced before (see Figure 3.23).
(2) Non-linear rate
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Figure 3.30: The final fraction of the minority under the strategy of rewire-to-random for
varying rewiring force αs, and the initial fraction is φ0 = 0.2,0.3 and 0.4 respectively.
The numerical simulation, AME and DSA approximations are run in a random network
with N = 1000, E = 2000 and 〈k〉= 4.
Now, let’s consider a more complicated case where the flipping rate for state evo-
lution is non-linear as we discussed in the weighted voter model. In this situation, the
weight of a node is dependent on its state as well as the neighbourhood configuration.
In the case of AME, the state imitation is based on the aggregate then compute
(ATC) method, namely we need to estimate the “mean” neighbourhood configuration
first, and then compute the flipping rate. For an agent Am,n, whose weight is computed
as πAm,n = R×m+S×n. The number of neighbours holding B is n, each of which can
be approximated as B[ABA]/[AB]+1,[ABB]/[AB], indicating that the “mean” B in the neigh-
bourhood of Am,n has [ABA]/[AB]+ 1 neighbours of A and [ABB]/[AB] neighbours of
B. Therefore, the weight of this kind of “mean” neighbouring B is approximated as:


























When it comes to DSA, the imitation rate is computed based on the compute then
aggregate (CTA) method, where we need to compute the rate separately for each dou-
blet, and then aggregate all those cases. Given a doublet Am,nBp,q, the flipping rate
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from Am,nBp,q to Bm,nBp,q is computed as:
p(Am,nBp,q→ Bm,nBp,q) = [Am,nBp,q]×
1
1+ e−β(πBp,q−πAm,n)
Aggregating all the cases of Bp,q in Am,nBp,q, we can have the flipping rate for the












As we can see, in the case of non-linear imitation, the flipping rate shown in Eq.
3.38 based on AME is different from that Eq. 3.39 based on DSA. In general, let’s
define f (x) as the flipping rate computed by:
f (x) = 1/(1+ e−β(x−c)) (3.40)
In this case, the flipping rate based on AME is proportional to f (E[x]), while the
flipping rate based on DSA is proportional to E[ f (x)].
Taking the weighted voter model as an example, we implement the above two
approximation methods (AME and DSA) to characterize the adaptive dynamics. First,
we take a set of weight parameters T > R > P > S to build a prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) interaction payoff matrix. Figure 3.31 presents the performance of the analytical
approximations based on AME and DSA relative to the numerical simulations.
When we change the weight parameters to a coordination game with R' P > S'
T , we come to another example of weighted voter model. Figure 3.32 presents the per-
formance of the two analytical approximations relative to the numerical simulations.
As we can see, AME and DSA have same approximation results in the case of
linear imitation, but DSA performs a little bit better than AME in the case of non-
linear imitation. Notably, the approximation performance obtained from AME and
DSA (see Figure 3.31 and 3.32) is much better than that obtained from PA and IA (see
Figure 3.24 and 3.25). Of course, the computation cost of ODEs based on AME and
DSA is quite higher than that using PA and IA.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has explored the dynamics of adaptive voter models on the basis of pair-
wise imitation and link rewiring, where a transition from network consensus to frag-
mentation is obtained as the rewiring force gets stronger. As the connecting nodes are
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Figure 3.31: The final fraction of different types of nodes and edges under different
rewiring force αs in the weighted voter model. With an initial fraction φ0 = 0.5, the
numerical simulation, AME and DSA approximations are run in a random network with
N = 1000, E = 2000 and 〈k〉 = 4, and the selection strength is β = 0.1. The weight
parameters are R = 1.0, S =−1.0, T = 2.0 and P = 0.0 .









































Figure 3.32: The final fraction of different types of nodes and edges under different
rewiring force αs in the weighted voter model. With an initial fraction φ0 = 0.3, the
numerical simulation, AME and DSA approximations are run in a random network with
N = 1000, E = 2000 and 〈k〉 = 4, and the selection strength is β = 0.1. The weight
parameters are R = 1.0, S = 0.0, T = 0.0 and P = 1.0 .
equally persuasive under direct competition, the average fraction of a certain type of
nodes remains same as the initial fraction. First, we investigate a feasible rewiring
strategy based on rewire-to-foaf numerically and analytically, where an early fragmen-
tation can be observed. When a neutral state based on approximate majority is intro-
duced, the system will converge to the consensus easily, and the initial minority loses
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the chance to win. Besides the unbiased state imitation, we also enable the agents
to hold weights which are dependent on their neighbourhood configurations, so that
the evolution of state is biased by the weights in a form of Fermi distribution. In this
weighted voter model, the network is more likely to reach consensus, where a small
fraction of “powerful” voters are going to take over the whole population.
Some accurate and tractable approximation techniques are developed to estimate
the evolution of the average basic observables. With same computation cost, the ODEs
based on interface approximation (IA) performs much better than that based on pair
approximation (PA). In addition, double stars approximation (DSA) has higher perfor-
mance than approximate master equation (AME) in some special cases, where the rate
for state evolution is non-linear.
Notably, information diffusion or opinion spreading in real world (Leskovec et al.,
2008) is far more complicated than the situations discussed in this chapter, and some
data mining methods are indispensable in revealing the dynamics of large-scale net-
works like Facebook or Twitter. It will be a promising direction to study adaptive
networks by using the real data, and a large number of researches (Gomez Rodriguez
et al., 2010; Cheng et al., 2014) have been launched to do that.
Chapter 4
Detecting the Loss of Cooperation in
Evolving Communities
As we all know, the success and sustainability of structured biological, social, eco-
nomic and ecological communities are often determined by the presence of evolu-
tionary conflicts between cooperative individuals (cooperators) and defective individ-
uals (cheaters). Cooperators are those paying cost for the success of population, but
cheaters avoid the cost of contributing to the community. This chapter mainly investi-
gates the rise and down of cooperation in an evolutionary population proposed by Ref.
(Cavaliere et al., 2012), where state evolution and structure adaptation are implemented
according to the principles of natural selection.
Starting from a cooperative population, an invading cheater may spread in the pop-
ulation occasionally leading to the collapse of cooperation. Such a collapse usually
unfolds rapidly and unexpectedly bearing the traits of a critical transition (Scheffer
et al., 2009). Although several factors can facilitate the spread of cheaters, it is an
open question whether one can detect the rising risk of invasions by cheaters and loss
of cooperation in an evolving community. Here, we combine evolutionary games with
adaptive networks to study the abrupt loss of cooperation from the perspective of crit-
ical transitions. We follow the dynamics of the community upon the appearance of a
single cheater and estimate the risk of invasion, leading to the collapse of cooperation.
We associate this risk with a number of indicators based on network structure and pop-
ulation composition. Interestingly, some specific patterns in the indicators can signal
the increasing risk of cooperation collapse, which highlights that it is possible to detect
the community fragility even in such a complex adaptive system.
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4.1 Introduction
The sustainability of many biological, social, economic, and ecological communities
is determined by the interplays between individual actions and collective dynamics
(Levin, 1999). The successful performance of a community is often based on the
cooperative attitude of individuals that pay a personal cost to distribute general benefits
(Nowak, 2006b). Nonetheless, although cooperation favours in general the success of
a community, it can also facilitate the appearance of cheaters who take advantage of
cooperators and spread in the community, and may even cause its collapse (Levin,
1999).
The failure of cooperation in the presence of cheaters has been observed in many
systems at different scales (Rainey and Rainey, 2003; Popat et al., 2012; Travisano and
Velicer, 2004; Haldane et al., 2009). In all these systems, a long-standing question has
been to understand the mechanisms that allow cooperators to resist the reproductive ad-
vantage of selfish cheating individuals (Nowak, 2006b). Among the many theoretical
and experimental studies on the maintenance of cooperation (Nowak, 2006b; Ohtsuki
et al., 2006), scenarios where strategies co-evolve with population structure (Perc and
Szolnoki, 2010) are of particular interest as they show how structural properties in the
population can affect the evolution of cooperation (Perc and Szolnoki, 2010; Wardil
and Hauert, 2014; Rand et al., 2011; Sanchez and Gore, 2013). For instance, it has
been shown that not only the number of cheaters in the community is important, but
also how and to whom they are connected (Cavaliere et al., 2012). The interplays
between the population evolution and structure adaptation endogenously determine ei-
ther the formation or the sudden collapse of cooperative communities (Levin, 1999).
Despite our relatively good understanding of the conditions that promote the failure of
cooperation in a community, in most scenarios, it is still difficult to predict whether the
appearance of a cheater will actually lead to its spreading and to the eventual loss of
cooperation (Ostrom, 2009; Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Thus, it is crucial to develop
some indicators for detecting the risks of the collapse of cooperation in an evolving
community.
Critical transitions (Scheffer et al., 2009) illustrate the abrupt shift triggered by
gradually changing conditions. Recent work has suggested that the proximity to un-
expected transitions can be announced by generic indicators based on the dynamical
properties of the system. These indicators are generic in the sense that they do not
depend on the particular system in question. On the contrary, they are solely deter-
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mined by the mathematical phenomenon of critical slowing down (CSD) that occurs
prior to the bifurcation point (Strogatz, 2014; Wissel, 1984). A bifurcation point repre-
sents a threshold where a qualitative change in the equilibrium of a system takes place:
the iconic case is the shift between two alternative equilibria at a crossing of a fold
bifurcation driven by gradual changes in external conditions. Close to the fold bifur-
cation, CSD means that the system takes longer to recover back to equilibrium after a
disturbance (Scheffer et al., 2009; Van Nes and Scheffer, 2007). Direct consequence
of a slow responsive system is that its dynamics become more variable (Carpenter and
Brock, 2006) and more autocorrelated (Held and Kleinen, 2004) close to the transition.
In other words, rising variance and autocorrelation can be used as generic indicators
for the approaching critical transition (Scheffer et al., 2009; Dakos et al., 2012).
Here, for the first time to our knowledge, we combine evolutionary game theory
with adaptive networks to detect the collapse of cooperation in an evolving commu-
nity. To do this, we adopt a previously investigated model (Cavaliere et al., 2012) that
displays recurrent cooperation collapses as a consequence of invasions by cheaters.
The dynamical nature of the population is driven by the appearance and disappearance
of cheaters and cooperators in dynamical networks, resulting from state inheritance
(newcomers imitate the strategies of the parents) and network reorganisation (new-
comers reconstruct the neighbourhood). The two features lead to recurrent collapses
and recoveries of cooperation that are associated with dramatic changes in network
topology. Interestingly, the chances that a newcomer imitates the social network of
the selected role-model are controlled by some embedding parameters, that ultimately
control the success of cooperation (Cavaliere et al., 2012). The embedding parameters
reflect the increasing ability of newcomers to connect to a higher number of individuals
already present in the network. Increasing such ability can generate higher prosperity
in a network of cooperators, as it allows more interactions to take place, but it also
facilitates the success of cheaters as they can profit from more cooperators.
In this chapter, we will highlight that the embedding parameters directly affect
the resilience of cooperative networks by controlling the chances that a single cheater
can invade a network full of cooperators. In particular, we modulate the resilience of
a community by changing the embedding parameters, where the loss of cooperation
resembles a critical transition. To detect the increasing fragility of cooperation, we
propose a series of structural and non-structural indicators in the following. The results
show that these indicators can be used as early-warning signals, but their detecting
performance depends on the mechanism of evolution, the nature of each indicator and
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the level of selection. Our contribution is two-fold. First, it demonstrates how the
loss of cooperation in evolving communities bears the features of a critical transition.
Second, it offers a set of indicators for detecting the approaching transitions.
4.2 Evolutionary Population Model
Adapting game theory into evolutionary population, we reach the field of evolutionary
game theory (EGT) as shown in Figure 4.1. In general, the states of individuals co-





Figure 4.1: The generalised framework for the dynamics of evolutionary population.
The game rules determine the payoffs of the individuals, based on which some nodes
are allowed to reproduce and some are removed. Meanwhile, the structure of network
is adjusted along with the appearance and disappearance of the players.
A rich landscape in Ref. (Cavaliere et al., 2012) has been illustrated to show the
competing players in a structured community, and we will focus on the co-evolution
of population and network based on that model. In detail, we will consider a network
with a fixed number of nodes but with a non-fixed number of links: to whom and to
how many neighbours an agent is connected varies during the evolution of the system.
Each agent in the network adopts one of the two strategies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD). A cooperator (C) pays a cost c to provide a benefit b to each of its neighbours,
where b > c > 0; however, the cheaters (or defectors, D) pay no cost and distribute
no benefit. Specifically, if a cooperator has m cooperative neighbours and n cheating
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neighbours, its payoff is m(b−c)−nc. However, a cheater in the same neighbourhood












Evolutionary dynamics for a system can be defined by a discrete sequence of update
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Figure 4.2: Evolutionary dynamics in a structured population. Each update step of the
network follows these actions: (i) A role-model is selected to reproduce proportional
to its effective payoff. (ii) The newcomer connects to the role-model with probability p
(dashed line), connects to each of its neighbours with probability q (dotted lines) and
emulates its strategy with probability 1−µ. p and q are called embedding parameters.
(iii) A randomly selected node and all its connections are removed from the network.
At each update step, a node i is selected as a role-model to reproduce with proba-
bility proportional to its effective payoff, namely the fitness fi:
fi = (1+δ)πi (4.2)
where δ ≥ 0 specifies the strength of selection and πi is the sum of payoffs through
pairwise interactions to each neighbour. For δ = 0 the selection probability is the same
for all nodes, while increasing δ makes it more likely that a node with a higher payoff
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is selected to reproduce. In addition, a randomly chosen existing node is removed from
the population, so that the number of nodes is constant.
We assume that the newcomer adopts the strategy of the chosen role-model with
probability 1− µ, otherwise adopts the alternative strategy with probability µ, where
1 µ ≥ 0 is a very tiny real number indicating the mutation rate. In the process of
network reorganisation, the newcomer connects to the role-model with probability p
as well as to each of the role-model’s neighbours with probability q. The parameters
p and q are called embedding parameters, as they explicitly determine the ability of
the newcomer to copy the role-model’s social network (Cavaliere et al., 2012).
4.2.1 Evolution Without Games
When δ = 0, we have fi = 1 for any individual in the network, where the evolution is
independent of the game parameters and graph structure. In this special case, we can
have the transitions from a state ([C]t , [D]t) to:














• ([C]t , [D]t) with probability 1− p+− p−.
Now, let’s derive the ordinary differential equation (ODE) for the average number of

























It is easy to see that the average number of cooperators and detectors will be E([C]) =
E([D]) = N/2 at stationary state. Specifically, the analytical solution for the evolution
of [C] in a large-scale population can be obtained as:
[C]t = Ae−2µt/N +N/2 (4.4)
where A is given by the formula A = [C]0−N/2. If we start from a network with all
cooperators [C]0 = N, then A = N/2; otherwise if we start from a network with all









































Figure 4.3: The evolution of analytical solutions for the average fraction of cooperators
at δ = 0. Various mutation rate µs are illustrated, where a smaller µ gives rise to slower
convergence.
cheaters [C]0 = 0, then A =−N/2. As we can see in Figure 4.3, the convergence rate
decays with the decrease of µ exponentially.
Even though the average fraction of cooperators eventually will converge to 0.5,
the system still can keep a good stability at [C]t → N when the mutation rate is quite
small. Interestingly, the system alternates between [C] = 0 and [C] = N at a smaller µ,
which leads to a phenomenon of bi-stability. But when the mutation rate is bigger, the
system keeps stable around [C] = N/2 illustrating a situation of uni-stability (Figure
4.4).


































































Figure 4.4: Numerical simulation for the fraction of cooperators at δ = 0 and N = 100
under different mutation rates: µ = 0.0001 (left), µ = 0.01 (middle) and µ = 0.5 (right).
With the increase of mutation rate µ, the distributions for the fraction of cooperators
are illustrated in Figure 4.5, where a shift from bi-stability to uni-stability is obtained.

















































































































Figure 4.5: The distributions for the fraction of cooperators under varying µs at δ = 0.
For each µ, the evolution process lasts for tmax = 108 steps. Each simulation starts from
a population of N = 100 cooperators.
When the mutation rate µ is increasing, the distribution for the fraction of cooper-
ators transforms from a bimodal one to a unimodal one. At a bigger µ, the newcomer
would like to adopt the state different from that of the role-model, and the system
converges to the uni-stability case around half cooperators and half cheaters.
4.2.2 Long-term Evolution
Now, let’s introduce the PD game into the evolutionary population with b/c = 3 and
the selection strength is δ = 0.01. Considering the fact that the mutation rate is usually
a very small number, we set µ = 0.0001. The dynamics of evolutionary population
is illustrated like Figure 4.6 with a given p = 0.6, where three embedding parameters
q = 0.8, q = 0.9 and q = 0.95 are presented respectively.
Interestingly, we can observe recurrent collapses and recoveries of cooperation, a
network full of cooperators appears highly connected while a network full of cheaters
appears mostly fragmented when the embedding parameter q is not large enough.
As for the reason, the cooperative newcomers provide positive feedbacks to the role-
models, and the payoffs of the cooperators will increase. However, the invading cheater
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Figure 4.6: Long-term evolution with endogenous mutation at µ = 0.0001 and selection
δ= 0.01. A schematic illustration shows the evolution of dynamical networks at different
embedding parameters q = 0.8, q = 0.9 and q = 0.95. We consider a network with
N = 100 individuals, interacting in the PD game with b/c = 3. Specifically, we can
identify four typical stages: CC (a, e and i), CD(b, f and j), DD (c, g and k) and DC
(d, h and l). A mutant appears with a strategy different from the rest of the population,
followed by a recovery to its initial state or a full invasion. For instance in the upper
row, starting from a community of only cooperators in a, the cheaters invade until an
entire collapse (from b to c), and the system ultimately returns to its original state in
d. Notably, the number of transitions from the state of only Cs to the state of only Ds
follows a non-monotonous curve: first increases and then decreases as q gets bigger.
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will diminish the payoffs of the neighbours, which acts as negative feedbacks for the
reproduction (see Ref. (Cavaliere et al., 2012) for more details), as a result the network
becomes less connected.
Here, it should be noted that the embedding parameters p and q determine the
reconstruction of network structure, which will influence population compositions in
turn. In Figure 4.6, we can find that the invasion by cheaters is easier with the increase
of q, but cooperation recovery gets harder and harder. In the following part, a variety
of collective dynamics will be presented by varying the embedding parameters.
4.2.3 The Collapse of Cooperation
The embedding parameters influence the network structure locally, which in turn af-
fects some global properties, such as the average fraction of cooperators, network con-
nectivity and the number of transitions (Figure 4.7). In particular, the embedding pa-
rameter q used to connect the neighbours of the role-model is quite crucial for the dy-
namics of population, where a great loss of cooperation is obtained when q is reaching
a big value. Let t0 and tmax be the starting and ending time of the long-term evolution,
and then some measurements for the evolutionary system are provided.







where [C]t is the number of cooperators in the network at step t.






where 〈k〉t is the network average degree at step t.
• the number of transitions indicates the total number of transitions from all-
cooperators case ([C] =N) to all-cheaters case ([C] = 0) or from all-cheaters case
to all-cooperators case. Here the frequency of transitions shows the stability of
the system.
As we can see in Figure 4.7, a single parameter q can lead to a complex dynamics
for the structure and population. With the increase of q, the long-term network con-
nectivity increases up to a peak, where the fraction of cooperators is close to 1. At a
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Figure 4.7: The long-term cooperation and network structure for varying embedding
parameter qs. With a given p = 0.6, we start from a random network with N = 100
players to capture the dynamical properties. The benefit to cost ratio is b/c = 3, the
selection strength is δ = 0.01 and the mutation rate is µ = 0.0001. At each q, we
consider a simulation of 108 steps to obtain the illustrated properties.
relatively bigger q, the network is highly connected and the cheating newcomer would
exploit the cooperators heavily, which leads to an invasion by cheaters and then a rapid
decline of network connectivity. At the same time, the transitions between cooperation
regime and defection regime are frequent. When q is close to 1, even the defectors
can form highly-connected components, leading to the failure of cooperation recovery.
In this way, the number of transitions decreases to a low value again. As shown in
Figure 4.7, a stable cooperation is obtained at smaller qs, at the price of low connec-
tivity. The network connectivity is non-monotonous with the increase of q, and the
decline of connectivity from q = 0.85 to q = 0.9 is caused by the fragmented clusters
of cheaters. The fraction of cooperators alone is not enough to capture the coupled
dynamics, which also covers the interplay between connectivity and stability.
Another factor should be considered is the selection strength δ, which controls
the fitness of a player as fi = (1+ δ)πi . Figure 4.8 illustrates the average fraction of
cooperators under different selection strengths.
When the selection is weak, the average fraction of cooperators is non-monotonous:
it increases at smaller qs and reaches the maximal at intermediate levels of q, followed
by a collapse as q gets larger. This non-monotonicity is caused by the relatively even
distribution of fitness in a sparse network when q is sufficiently low, where the chance
that a mutant cheater invades a community of cooperators is same as that a mutant
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Figure 4.8: The average fraction of cooperators in the long-term evolution. The benefit
to cost ratio is b/c = 3 and the mutation rate is µ = 0.0001. With a given embedding
parameter p = 0.6 and varying q ∈ [0,1], the evolution starts from a random network
with N = 100 players. At each q, we consider a simulation of 108 steps to obtain the
average fraction of cooperators. When the selection strength is changing from weak to
strong, the loss of cooperators is increasingly deteriorated. A non-monotonous trend is
obtained when the selection strength is weak.
cooperator invades a community of cheaters. When q is increasing but not that large,
the network is a little more connected, and the cooperation level is increased due to
the fragmented structure caused by imitating the invading cheaters. Under this cir-
cumstance, the component of cooperators will get more and more connected, which
contributes to relatively higher fitness through mutual benefit and then better persis-
tence of cooperation. However, when q goes on increasing, the invading cheaters will
be highly connected and the cooperators are intensively exploited, which leads to the
collapse of cooperation. In a highly connected group of cheaters, a restoring cooper-
ator can’t get rid of the lower fitness, and the recovery of cooperation is doomed to
fail.
When the selection is strong, the average fraction of cooperators changes in a
monotonous way with the increase of q. Even at a smaller q, the big value of δ brings
high fitness to the invading cheaters in the beginning, followed by the fragmented net-
works. In this way, some cooperators may be maintained, which are separated from
the cheaters. And then those cooperators will get clustered to promote the cooperation.
The collapse of cooperation is triggered when the embedding parameter q increases to
a large value, where the invading cheaters exploit heavily due to the higher connec-
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tivity and stronger selection. As a result, the growth of cheaters is enhanced and the
population turns into the regime of defection.
As we can see, even some simple parameters can give rise to a rich landscape for the
evolutionary population. Here, we are very interested in the collapse of cooperation
as the embedding parameter q increases, which is quite crucial in many real-world
applications.
4.3 The Loss of Cooperation in Perturbation Experiments
At a critical transition, a system is radically changing from one equilibrium to an al-
ternative contrasting one at the crossing of a threshold in external conditions (Scheffer
et al., 2001, 2009). In the vicinity of such a critical transition, the probability that a
small disturbance induces a shift from one equilibrium to another increases, in other
words the resilience of the system becomes low (Holling, 1973). As we are concerned,
many realistic situations bear the traits of a critical transition.
4.3.1 Perturbation Experiments
In an evolving community, the regime of cooperation may collapse depending on the
way a cheater invades the population. When cooperators and cheaters spontaneously
appear due to endogenous mutations, such loss of cooperation has been shown to be a
transient behaviour that can occur rapidly, and the collapse is usually followed by the
restoration. As it is difficult to analytically track the behaviour of such kind of evolving
networks and establish the existence of a critical transition in long-term evolution, we
follow an alternative numerical approach. Here, we will study the progressive loss of
the resilience of cooperation by performing a series of perturbation experiments at the
equilibrium of a dominant strategy.
A perturbation consists of the introduction of a mutant in a network where all
agents are holding the opposite strategy. We initially evaluate the resilience of coop-
eration under that disturbance, and the mutation rate then is set to µ = 0, which means
that the population composition is only dependent on the fitness-based selection. More
specifically, the network is updated for a large number of steps to remove transients and
to establish a stable network topology. We then perturb the network by introducing a
mutant newcomer (for instance, a cheater comes into a network of only cooperators)
and the system is updated until one of the two outcomes is reached: either a recovery,
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the mutant fails to invade and the system returns to the original state, or a transition,
the mutant invades successfully and the original state collapses. In the case of collapse,
we say the perturbation is successful. Starting from a cooperative community invaded
by cheaters, we illustrate the two outcomes in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Perturbations lead to the recoveries and transitions. Recovery and collapse
of cooperation following the addition of a single mutant in a network with agents of the
opposite strategy. We show the two possible outcomes from a perturbation obtained by
adding a cheater in a network of only cooperators. The first row shows the typical case
of an unsuccessful perturbation where cooperators resist while the bottom row shows
the typical case of a successful perturbation where cheaters invade gradually, and in
both cases p = 0.6, q = 0.8 and δ = 0.01.
4.3.2 Persistence and Restoration of Cooperation
In the following, we will evaluate the fraction of perturbations that are successful for
increasing embedding parameter q at different selection strengths. This fraction of
transitions represents the probability that a mutant will overturn the original regime
(i.e. the probability for the mutants to dominate). For a given p, q and δ, the fraction
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where we define φ(C→ D) as the fraction of transitions by adding a cheater in a net-
work of only cooperators, and similarly φ(D→C) means the fraction of transitions by
adding a cooperator in a network of only cheaters.
Starting from a community full of cooperators, we evaluate the persistence of
cooperation as the ratio between the number of unsuccessful perturbations by cheaters
and the total number of perturbations. This ratio indicates the probability that a system
recovers from a cheater’s perturbation to the regime of cooperation ([C] = N), which
can be computed as 1−φ(C→ D).
On the other hand, the restoration of cooperation in a community full of cheaters
can be measured by the ratio between the number of successful perturbations by coop-
erators and the total number of perturbations. This ratio indicates the probability that
a system returns from the regime of defection ([D] = N) to the regime of cooperation
([C] = N), which can be computed as φ(D→C).
From the perspective of cooperation, we find that the probability that a single
cheater can invade and destroy the cooperation rapidly once the embedding param-
eter q crosses a threshold (Figure 4.10(A)). The exact value of the threshold depends
on the selection strength δ. After this threshold, even a slight disturbance will lead to
a successful invasion by cheaters, which implies the extinction of cooperators. This
pattern of cooperation collapse resembles a critical transition as the external condition
changes gradually .
For a single perturbation, there must exist a maximal number of mutants during the
process of evolution. In detail, the max-size of mutants in a perturbation starting from
t0 to tend can be calculated as:
max-size = max{[M]t | t0 ≤ t ≤ tend} (4.8)
where [M]t is the number of mutants at step t. In the case of a perturbation to a network
of cooperators, the mutants are cheaters, and [M]t = [D]t . When a perturbation leads
to a transition, the max-size is N.
For a given embedding parameter p = 0.6 and the selection strength is δ = 0.01,
we have the distributions for the max-size of cheaters at some embedding parameters
from q = 0.75 to q = 1.0 (Figure 4.11). With the increase of q, the max-size distribu-
tions shift from right-skewed to left-skewed, which indicates the deterioration of the
resilience of cooperation.
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Figure 4.10: Persistence and restoration of cooperation. (A) The persistence of co-
operation is present as a function of the embedding parameter q for various selection
strength δs. Note the non-monotonicity of the curves: for low selection the persistence
of cooperation reaches a maximum before collapsing (the non-monotonicity is visible
more clearly in the inset panel that zooms in the relevant part). In the case of strong se-
lection, however, the persistence of cooperation is decreasing monotonically. (B) The
restoration of cooperation is present as a function of the embedding parameter q for
various selection strength δs, which is computed as the fraction of successful perturba-
tions. For a given δ and q, we consider 20000 perturbations, each of which is carried
out by updating a network for a long time until the addition of a mutant at t0 in a network
of (A) only cooperators or (B) only cheaters. All results are shown under the embedding
parameter p = 0.6 and another parameter q ∈ [0,1].
Furthermore, we also reverse the conditions and study the probability of restoring
cooperation in a network of only cheaters. In Figure 4.10(B), the probability that a sin-
gle cooperator restores a network of cheaters successfully increases when decreasing
the embedding parameter q, but it never reaches a large value. This means that once
cooperation is lost it is difficult to be recovered: on the route to restoration there is no
critical transition. We find no hysteresis in this case, indicating that the dominance of
cheaters is much more resilient than the dominance of cooperators. Restoring coopera-
tion would only be possible by a strong perturbation, in fact a successful recovery from
the community of cheaters will be possible only when the cooperators have reached a
certain mass.
This asymmetry in the resilience of cooperators and cheaters is caused by the char-
acteristics of the dynamical network structure, the way newcomers are embedded in
the community and the payoff setups of the game. When q is sufficiently low, the
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Figure 4.11: The distributions for the max-size of cheaters at different qs. At each q,
we consider 20000 cheater’s perturbations in a network of only cooperators with a size
N = 100, and each perturbation is updated for a long time until the addition of a cheater
at t0.
network of cooperators is sparsely connected. Only a few connections are present and
all nodes get similar payoffs (especially when δ is small enough, namely weak selec-
tion), therefore the chance that a single cheater invades is exclusive to neutral drift.
As q increases the network becomes a little bit connected and the invading cheater
will acquire some links to the cooperators, but those cheaters will become fragmented
gradually due to the deterioration of fitness caused by DD links. However, the coop-
erators far away from the cheaters may be favoured by getting together, which results
in a higher chance for the cooperator to be selected as a role-model. This gives rise
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to a decrease in the chances of invasions by cheaters, consequently the intermediate
increase in cooperation persistence (highlighted in the inset panel red curve in Figure
4.10(A)). Only as q increases to a large value, the invading cheaters become highly
connected in the network and a large number of links to cooperators provide a tremen-
dous advantage to them, even under weak selection. After this point, the spreading of
cheaters is highly enhanced, which increases the risk of cooperation collapse.
On the contrary, the networks of only cheaters at higher qs are well connected
(Figure 4.9). A single cooperator gets embedded in a mass of cheaters, obtaining very
poor fitness. This isolation makes it quite hard for the newcomers to adopt the strategy
of cooperation. Even if the embedding parameter q decreases, the chance of imitating
cooperators does not increase substantially. The restoration of cooperation seeded by
a single cooperative mutant is then doomed to fail.
4.3.3 More Cooperators Promote the Restoration of Cooperation
After adding a single mutant at t0 in the perturbation experiment, the number of mu-
tants will increase. When the mutants reach a certain density ρ in the population, we
can measure the fraction of successful perturbations conditional on ρ as:
φρ =
# transitions
# perturbations reaching ρ
(4.9)
Here, we intend to explore how many mutants are required to bring about a transi-
tion from the original regime to the opposite one. As described in the section above,
we know that most cooperator’s perturbations in a network of only cheaters are un-
successful. It is very difficult to restore the cooperation once the cheaters have fully
invaded the community, unless the population of cooperators is able to reach a certain
size (Figure 4.12).
As shown in Figure 4.12, the density of mutants reaches ρ and the fraction of suc-
cessful perturbations corresponds to φρ. Interestingly, with the increase of the density
of cheaters, the persistence of cooperation doesn’t drop sharply under both weak and
strong selections (left column in Figure 4.12). The max-size of cheaters in the process
of perturbation may reach a big value due to the high fitness in the beginning (Figure
4.11). However, when we start from a community of only cheaters, the restoration
of cooperation is quite different when the density of cooperators is increasing. In the
right column of Figure 4.12, when the density of cooperators increases from ρ = 0 to
ρ = 0.5, it is generally easier for the cooperators to restore from the defective com-
munity. Especially under strong selection, the cooperation can be restored completely
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Figure 4.12: Cooperation persistence (left column) and restoration (right column) as a
function of the embedding parameter q and mutant density ρ. We measure φρ condi-
tional on the density of mutants ρ under weak selection δ = 0.005 and strong selection
δ = 0.1, where the persistence of cooperation is computed by 1−φρ(C→ D) and the
restoration of cooperation is computed by φρ(D→ C). The results are obtained from
20000 perturbations at each q and each perturbation is implemented by updating a
network with N = 100 players for a long time until the addition of a mutant agent at t0.
when cooperators have reached a certain mass. However, despite it is very likely for the
cooperators to restore a network full of cheaters (when the density of cooperators has
already reached a certain value), there is still no critical transition that can be observed
with the increase of q.
4.3.4 The Effects of the Embedding Parameter p
To reveal the effects of another embedding parameter p, which is the probability for
the new-born to connect the role-model (i.e. parent) itself, we plot the persistence of
cooperation as a function of the embedding parameter q in Figure 4.13. Three differ-
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ent parameters are explored at: (a) p = 0.2, (b) p = 0.6 and (c) p = 1.0. Starting from
a network full of cooperators, we have the persistence of cooperation under various
selections, where the dynamics of the system is hardly influenced by the embedding
parameter p. It is the embedding parameter q, the probability to connect each neigh-
bour of the role-model, that affects the resilience of the population.
p = 0.6p = 0.2 p = 1.0
Figure 4.13: At different ps, we have the persistence of cooperation as a function of
the embedding parameter q and selection strength δ. The results are obtained by
considering 20000 perturbations for a given q and δ, and each perturbation is carried
out by updating a network of only cooperators for t0 steps followed by the addition of a
cheater.
In the following, we will fix one embedding parameter p = 0.6 but vary another
embedding parameter q from 0 to 1 to detect the loss of cooperation, where a pertur-
bation of cheaters is introduced in a network of only cooperators at t0.
4.4 Detecting the Loss of Cooperation
The rapidly increasing chance of invasions by cheaters (especially when the embed-
ding parameter q crosses a threshold) indicates that the changes in the persistence of
cooperation are far from linear. With enough detailed knowledge on the embedding
parameter q and selection strength δ, one could estimate the probability that the in-
vading cheaters dominate the community full of cooperators. However, in most cases,
one cannot assume such detailed knowledge and therefore should consider the possi-
bility of alternative ways that could indirectly signal the rising risk for the collapse of
cooperation.
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4.4.1 The Evaluation of the Indicators
Motivated by the generic indicators for critical transitions (Scheffer et al., 2009), we
evaluate two broad classes of indicators: those based on the dynamics of the population
composition (as known as non-structural indicators) and those based on the network
structure (as known as structural indicators). The difference between the two classes
is that non-structural indicators reflect the changes in the numbers of cheaters and co-
operators, whereas structural indicators reflect the changes in the interactions between
the players.
We compute the structural and non-structural indicators for each perturbation ex-
periment, where a single invading cheater is introduced into a network of only coopera-
tors. To remove the transients, the initial network with N players is updated for t0 steps.
After that, the community co-evolves until one of the two outcomes is reached: either
recovery, the cheater fails to invade; or transition, the cheater invades successfully and
the cooperation collapses. For each perturbation, we identify by t0 the beginning of the
perturbation and with tend the end of the perturbation.
4.4.1.1 Non-structural Indicators
In particular, we estimate two non-structural indicators, which are (1) return rate: the
inverse of the time it takes for the system to recover back to its original state of all
cooperators after the addition of a single cheater; and (2) maximum size: the maximal
amount of cheaters reached after a perturbation.





where return time is the number of update steps the system takes to go back to
its original state following a perturbation (Scheffer et al., 2009).
Hence, if the perturbation is unsuccessful, then the return time is calculated as
tend− t0. Otherwise if the perturbation is successful, then the return rate is de-
fined to be 0.
• Max-size (of cheaters) is the maximal number of cheaters recorded during a
perturbation to a network of cooperators.
max-size = max{[D]t | t0 ≤ t ≤ tend} (4.11)
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where [D]t is the number of cheaters at step t. It is the size of the population
max-size = N if the perturbation of cheaters is successful.
4.4.1.2 Structural Indiators
In terms of structural indicators, we estimate (1) average connectivity of the network,
and (2) structural coefficient σ∗, which is the fraction of beneficial interactions between
cooperators over the exploitative interactions between cooperators and cheaters.
• Average connectivity is the average number of links per node recorded during







where 〈k〉t is the average degree of the network at step t.










where [CC]t is the total number of CC links (doesn’t discount as the symmetry),
[CD]t is the total number of CD links in the network at step t.
Intuitively, σ∗ evaluates the ratio between the beneficial payoff (generated by
purely cooperative interactions) and the detrimental payoff (generated by cheaters
connected to cooperators). This coefficient is inspired by the structural parame-
ter introduced in Refs. (Tarnita et al., 2009; Nowak et al., 2010).
4.4.2 The Pattern of the Indicators
We estimate the above four indicators in the perturbation experiments under different
selections and varying embedding parameters (q from 0 to 1). In Figure 4.14, we plot
the median values of those indicators from 20000 perturbations performed at each q.
We find that both non-structural and structural indicators change in perceivable
ways before the persistence of cooperation falls below 0.5, which is defined as a
threshold for the collapse of cooperation. The corresponding embedding parameter
is denoted as q(0.5), as known as the tipping point in critical transitions. Strikingly,
the return rate decreases in a manner that resembles the critical slowing down (CSD)
prior to the tipping point (Figure 4.14 (A) and (C)) supporting the idea that the loss





















Figure 4.14: The pattern of indicators adopted to detect the loss of cooperation. Non-
structural (left column) and structural (right column) indicators are measured in our
perturbation experiments. We plot the trends of indicators in the case of weak selec-
tion δ = 0.005 (upper row), and strong selection δ = 0.1 (lower row). The black curve
denotes the persistence of cooperation. The yellow shaded area identifies the values
of q where the persistence of cooperation is below 0.5. The x-axis represents the em-
bedding parameter q, and the other embedding parameter p is fixed to 0.6. Each point
in the indicators is the median estimated out of the considering 20000 perturbations,
and each perturbation is starting from the addition of a cheater in a network of only
cooperators with N = 100.
of cooperation in dynamical networks might be perceived as a critical transition. In
addition, the changes in the indicators are dependent on the selection strength δ, where
strong selection leads to more pronounced and earlier changes in the indicators when
compared to weak selection. In order to capture the distribution of the indicators at
each q, we present the median of the indicators as well as the range between 25%
percentile and 75% percentile in Figure 4.15.
Although the pattern of the a random sequence from q = 0 to q(0.5) maybe mis-
leading, where the value of a certain indicator at each q is randomly picked from all
20000 perturbations, the overall distributions of these indicators shown in Figure 4.15

































Figure 4.15: The distributions of various indicators with percentiles. The blue solid
curves are the median values obtained by considering 20000 perturbation experiments.
The blue dashed curves denote the 25% and 75% percentiles for the distribution of the
indicators. Yellow area starts from the tipping point where the persistence of coopera-
tion (black curve) falls below 0.5. The rest numerical simulation parameters are same
as before (Figure 4.14).
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still confer a promising pattern. In particular, the return rate and structural coefficient
σ∗ present a wide distribution at smaller qs but converge around their median values
before the collapse of the cooperation. On the contrary, the max-size and average de-
gree diverge before the collapse of the cooperation. These two opposite phenomena
illustrate some early warnings for the loss of cooperation.
To measure the performance of the indicators in detecting the loss of cooperation,
some qualitative and quantitative measurements are required. In the following, we will
analyse the consistency and accuracy of the indicators compared to the persistence of
cooperation.
4.4.3 Consistency of the Indicators through Kendall Correlations
Although we observe conceivable changes in the indicators, these changes are not
always monotonic to the changes in the embedding parameter q. Instead, an indicator is
informative, and thus useful, only if it is changing in a correlated way to the persistence
of cooperation independently of the selection strength.
In this section, we intend to test such informative consistency by computing the
Kendall τ rank correlation coefficient (Abdi, 2007) between the sequence of indicators
and the persistence of cooperation.
4.4.3.1 Kendall τ Rank Correlation
Kendall τ rank coefficient is used to measure the association between two measured
quantities. For any pair of data (xi,yi) and (x j,y j), we can measure them as:
• concordant pair
if xi > x j ∧ yi > y j or xi < x j ∧ yi < y j;
• discordant pair
if xi > x j ∧ yi < y j or xi < x j ∧ yi > y j.
Suppose we have n observations (x1,y1),(x2,y2), · · ·(xn,yn) in a 2-dimensional data
space, and then we can compute the number of concordant pairs defined as cp and
that of discordant pairs defined as dp by comparing any pair of them. The Kendall τ
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where n is the size of data space. As we can see, the Kendall τ rank correlation coef-
ficient follows that −1 ≤ τ ≤ 1. When τ > 0, it indicates that the two sets of data are
positively correlated; otherwise when τ < 0, it indicates that the two sets of data are
negatively correlated. In particular, the correlation is strong when |τ| → 1.
4.4.3.2 The Distribution of Kendall τ Coefficients
In the perturbation experiments, we also have two sets of data for a certain indicator:
one is the sequence of indicators (see Figure 4.15) and the other is the persistence of
cooperation (see Figure 4.10(A)). As shown in Figure 4.16, we illustrate a schematic
diagram to show the computation of Kendall τ coefficient between them, where the
range of qs is from q = 0 to q(0.5) (which indicates the tipping point at which the
persistence of cooperation falls below 0.5).
q1 10 q2

















































Figure 4.16: Detecting the consistency between the persistence of cooperation and
the indicators. A schematic diagram is presented to show how to compute the Kendall
τ coefficient. For any given indicator, we intend to test the data before the collapse
of cooperation, namely q(0.5). We have a sample space at each q, which contains
all indicator values corresponding to 20000 perturbations. Randomly pick an indicator
value at each q, and then we can have a sequence of resampling indicators from q = 0
to q(0.5). In this way, we are able to compute the Kendall τ coefficient by comparing
the persistence of cooperation with that sequence of resampling indicators.
For a given indicator, we compute the Kendall τ rank correlation coefficient by
constructing a sequence of resampling indicator values from q = 0 to q(0.5), and at
each q the indicator value is taken randomly out of the sample space obtained from
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the perturbations. Repeating the above process, a large number of sequences will be
constructed following a bootstrap approach without replacement, so will be as many
as Kendall τ coefficients. In detail, the Kendall τ distribution (Figure 4.17) can be
obtained as follows to depict the consistency of that indicator:
• Construct a sequence of indicator values after randomly picking one from all the
perturbations at each q;
• Compute the Kendall τ coefficient between such a constructed sequence and the
persistence of cooperation up to the decided tipping point q(0.5).
• Repeat the above process to a large number of iterations, and we obtain lots of
Kendall τ values.
• Fit those Kendall τ coefficients as a Gaussian distribution.











































Figure 4.17: Kendall τ distributions of the indicators under weak δ = 0.005 and strong
selection δ = 0.1. As we can see, most of the indicators are consistent with the in-
crease of selection strength except the average degree, which changes the sign from
positive to negative. As before, we conduct 20000 perturbations at each q, and for each
perturbation a random network with N = 100 cooperators is updated until the addition
of an invading cheater at t0. The perturbation stops when either transition or recovery
is obtained.
Intuitively, one indicator is more consistent than another if the range of the obtained
Kendall distribution tends to fall on the same side (either positive or negative) of the
x-axis, independent of the considered selection strength.
Furthermore, the consistency of indicators with varying selections is illustrated in
Figure 4.18. By comparing the mean values and standard deviations of the Kendall τ
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distributions, we can find that the consistency is dependent on the selection strength. In
particular, the max-size and structural coefficient σ∗ perform consistently with the per-
sistence of cooperation. On the other hand, the average degree is the most inconsistent
indicator as the selection increases. Under weak selection, the trends of average degree
are positively correlated with the persistence of cooperation, while when selection is
strong the trends become negatively correlated. This inconsistency presented in some
indicators actually highlights that the reliable interpretation of the trends requires the
knowledge of underlying evolutionary process.


























Figure 4.18: Consistency of the indicators at different selection strengths. Mean values
and standard deviations of the distributions for Kendall τ coefficients are illustrated as
the selection strength δ increases. Non-structural indicators are (1) return rate and (2)
max-size; and the structural indicators are (1) structural coefficient σ∗ and (2) average
degree. It is clearly that the average degree is inconsistent as the mean value of its
Kendall distribution changes sign when the selection strength is increasing, even though
it shows a quite high correlation under some selections. In addition, the correlations of
other indicators generally get stronger with the increase of selection strength. The
parameters used for numerical simulations are same as before (Figure 4.14).
4.4.3.3 The Influences of Tipping Point
The data space used to compute the consistency is ranging from q = 0 to the tipping
point, at which a critical transition from the regime of cooperation to that of defection
is defined. In general, we have the tipping point in the loss of cooperation defined
as q(0.5), namely the point at which the persistence of cooperation falls below 0.5.
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When the defined tipping point is changed to some earlier ones, for example q(0.75)
and q(0.95), the data space is smaller and we have Figure 4.19 to illustrate the respec-
tive Kendall τ distributions under weak (δ = 0.005) and strong selection (δ = 0.1).
Interestingly, an increasing tipping point generally leads to an increase in the correla-




















Figure 4.19: The distributions of Kendall τ coefficients at different tipping points. We
consider the tipping point as the value of q, which corresponds to the persistence of co-
operation is 0.5 (left column), 0.75 (middle column) and 0.95 (right column) respectively.
The parameters used for numerical simulations are same as before (Figure 4.14).
The inconsistency of some indicators for identifying the increasing risks of coop-
eration loss actually highlights the complexity of interpreting such trends in coupled
dynamics of finite population. When the selection strength is small, the population
suffers the risk of invasions by cheaters only when the embedding parameter q be-
comes sufficiently large. As discussed earlier, under weak selection, the persistence
of cooperation follows a non-monotonous curve. Only when the selection is strong,
the risk increases monotonously and the trends in the indicators become consistent.
Nonetheless, these features highlight the following two aspects. First, the search for
consistent indicators at any level of selection may be non-trivial: only indicators that
display a correlated non-monotonous trend can consistently detect the risk of invasions
by cheaters. Secondly, the trends can be more informative of the underlying mecha-
nistic process rather than signalling the risk: they can help to deduce the degree of
selection and to identify an underlying evolutionary mechanism.
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4.4.4 Accuracy of the Indicators through ROC
Next to the consistency, we also need to analyse the accuracy of the indicators in de-
tecting the loss of cooperation. Here, we analyse the accuracy by defining the cases of
false positives (false alarms) and false negatives (no alarms) prior to the collapse of co-
operation at the tipping point. We conduct the detection accuracy by using the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves (Boettiger and Hastings, 2012) in this study. In
general, ROC curves are obtained by plotting the true positive rates (TPR) versus the
false positive rates (FPR) for the indicators at various discrimination levels. Larger
area under the ROC curve (AUC), more accurately an indicator identifies the rising
risk of invasions by cheaters. However, if the area is smaller than 0.5, then it means
that the indicator trend carries no accurate information about the risk of invasions.
4.4.4.1 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, is usually used to describe a binary
classifier system with the change of its discrimination threshold. In a ROC curve, the
true positive rate and false positive rate are presented at various thresholds. Similar to
the diagnostic decision making, we use ROC to detect whether an indicator behaves
correctly corresponding to the persistence of cooperation.
There are two prediction outcomes and two actual results as well: positive and
negative, and then four possible combinations are presented:
• True Positive (TP): if the prediction result is positive and the actual result is
positive as well.
• False Positive (FP): if the prediction result is positive but the actual result is
negative.
• True Negative (TN): if both the prediction result and actual result are negative.
• False Negative (FN): if the prediction result is negative while the actual result is
positive.
Each point in the ROC space is defined by the true positive rate (TPR) and false
positive rate (FPR) under a certain threshold. The TPR shows the fraction of correct
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Similarly, the FPR indicates the fraction of incorrect positive predictions in the





For a given threshold θ, we have a pair of TPR and FPR. When we change the
threshold from very small to very big, we obtain a curve of ROC constituted by those
TPR and FPR pairs (see Figure 4.20). The diagonal in the ROC space from (0,0) to
(1,1), known as random guess line, divides the ROC space into two parts: points above
the random guess line represent good classification results (better than random); on the















































Figure 4.20: A schematic diagram illustrates the mechanism of ROC curve. For a given
threshold θ, one can obtain a pair of TPR and FPR by considering the numbers of TP,
FP, TN, and FN. When more thresholds are taken into account, a curve is formed in
the ROC space. The area under the ROC curve indicates the probability that “positive”
ranks higher than “negative”.
Now, let’s consider the accuracy of an indicator in detecting the loss of cooperation
within a given observational window starting from q = 0 to q′, where q′ ≤ q(0.5).
Given two arbitrary points q1,q2 between q = 0 and q′, with q1 < q2, we randomly
pick two values from the indicator sample space at q1 and at q2 and denote them by
s1 and s2 respectively. Similarly, we denote by c1 and c2 the values of cooperation
persistence at q1 and q2 respectively. In this case, the values of s1 and s2 tuned by θ
will provide the prediction outcomes, while c1 and c2 will provide the actual results.
For a given observational window, we use a discrimination threshold θ to define
the cases of true/false positive/negative. The parameter θ indicates a criterion value
to discriminate the prediction outcomes. Specifically, for each indicator we need to
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constitute two distinct ROC curves, which correspond to two possible discrimination
conditions in judging whether the prediction of that indicator is positive or negative.
Condition (I):
• If (1+θ)s1 < s2 and c1 ≥ c2, then it is a true positive (TP).
• If (1+θ)s1 < s2 and c1 < c2, then it is a false positive (FP).
• If (1+θ)s1 ≥ s2 and c1 < c2, then it is a true negative (TN).
• If (1+θ)s1 ≥ s2 and c1 ≥ c2, then it is a false negative (FN).
Condition (II):
• If (1+θ)s1 ≥ s2 and c1 ≥ c2, then it is a true positive (TP).
• If (1+θ)s1 ≥ s2 and c1 < c2, then it is a false positive (FP).
• If (1+θ)s1 < s2 and c1 < c2, then it is a true negative (TN).
• If (1+θ)s1 < s2 and c1 ≥ c2, then it is a false negative (FN).
As the sample space at each q is large enough, we can produce a large number of
indicator pairs (s1,s2) and cooperation pairs (c1,c2) between q = 0 and q′, which are
used to evaluate, for each indicator, the total number of TP, FP, TN and FN based on
either condition (I) or condition (II). Once these numbers are obtained, we can compute
the sensitivity and specificity for each indicator under that threshold θ:
Sensitivity = true positive rate (TPR)
Specificity = 1-false positive rate (FPR)
The calculated pair (TPR, FPR) constitutes a single point in the ROC curve. Re-
peating the above described process for as many as possible thresholds θs (from very
small to very large), we can obtain a set of (TPR, FPR) pairs, which constitute a full
ROC curve.
Notably, each indicator has two possible symmetric ROC curves - depending on
whether the condition used to determine FP, FN, TP and TN is either (I), or (II). For
convention, we choose the condition that gives the larger area under the curve (AUC)
within the largest observational window (namely q′ = q(0.5)) as the effective discrim-
ination condition. In this study, the indicators of max-size and average degree would
adopt the condition (I), while the indicators of return rate and structural coefficient σ∗
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would adopt the condition (II) to detect the loss of cooperation. For completeness, we
present the ROC curves in Figure 4.21, whose observational window is largest, namely
from q = 0 to q(0.5).






















































Figure 4.21: ROC curves of the indicators within the largest observational window are
obtained by using all data from q = 0 to q(0.5). Based on the condition that gives the
larger AUC, we plot the ROC curves for the indicators under weak (δ = 0.005) and
strong selection (δ = 0.1). The parameters used for numerical simulations are same as
before (Figure 4.14).
4.4.4.2 Varying Observational Windows
The discussions above shed light upon the accuracy of indicators within a certain ob-
servational window, namely the data is picked from the space ranging from q = 0 to
q(0.5). In this section, let’s investigate the influence of data space on the ROC curves,
where we will vary the size of the observational window.
We estimate the area under the ROC curves (AUC) for each indicator through a
range of observational window sizes in Figure 4.22. Intuitively, an observational win-
dow characterizes the distance from the collapse of cooperation: increasing the size of
the window means to estimate the accuracy closer to the transition. Specifically, with
the increase of selection strength and observational window size, most of the indica-
tors work very well in detecting the loss of cooperation. Under weak selection, return
rate, max size and σ∗ are almost inaccurate for small observational windows, where
the AUC is close to 0.5 (Figure 4.22 (A)). However, the indicator of average degree has
a high false positive rate when the observational window is small but outperforms the
rest indicators when the observational window is large, which provides misleading in-
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formation in the detection of collapse. On the other hand, when the selection is strong,
most of the indicators become accurate following the same pattern with the increase
of observational window (Figure 4.22 (B)), where their accuracy is already evident far
from the collapse of cooperation at the tipping point.


















































Figure 4.22: Accuracy of the indicators for varying observational window sizes. We
plot the area under the curve (AUC) for structural and non-structural indicators under
weak (δ = 0.005) and strong selection (δ = 0.1), where each point indicates an obser-
vational window from q = 0 to the corresponding q. An observational window defines
the distance from the transition: a large window corresponds to comparing changes in
the indicators for values close to the collapse of cooperation. An AUC of 1 represents
a perfect test; an area of 0.5 represents a random test. Under weak selection, the av-
erage degree is inconsistent for varying observational windows, and the indicators are
more accurate under strong selection. The parameters used for numerical simulations
are same as before (Figure 4.14).
4.5 Summary
Combining evolutionary mechanism with game theory, the evolution of cooperation
in dynamical networks presents many fascinating properties. How to recognize the
conditions that favour the spreading of cheating behaviour and then the collapse of
cooperation in a community has been a major objective in the study of evolutionary
population (Levin, 1999, 2010; Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Here we approach this is-
sue from a different perspective and look at the dynamics of cheaters, cooperators,
and their interactions to infer the risk of cooperation collapse. Specifically, we argue
that the collapse of cooperation can be approximated to a critical transition: an abrupt
Chapter 4. Detecting the Loss of Cooperation in Evolving Communities 137
change in equilibrium dynamics at the crossing of a bifurcation point. Although, it is
difficult to make analytically a clear link of the dynamics in our model to such a bifur-
cation point, we find that return rate (i.e. inverse of the time necessary for a cheater to
get expelled from the community) gradually decreases prior to the collapse in our nu-
merical experiments (Figure 4.14). Such a slowing down resembles the critical slowing
down effect prior to the bifurcations point (Scheffer et al., 2009; Wissel, 1984) and ap-
pears clearly in our complex adaptive system, even if the transition we study may not
belong to the same dynamical family.
We actually demonstrate that the abrupt loss of cooperation can be detected in ad-
vance by a handful of structural as well as non-structural indicators that are associated
to the critical slowing down. In particular, the few studies on critical transitions on
networks assume fixed topologies and use non-structural indicators to detect dynami-
cal instabilities (Dakos et al., 2015; Suweis and D’Odorico, 2014), and the structural
indicators have not yet been developed for detecting the instabilities in evolutionary
communities. In the considered population, the structure is not static but co-evolving
with the spreading of strategies, which allows us to monitor its dynamics using a suite
of complex network metrics. Among the structural indicators we tested (including
varying links, connectivity, structural coefficients, etc. ), we showed that the decreas-
ing ratio of beneficial interactions (between cooperators) to detrimental ones (between
cheaters and cooperators) could detect the increasing risk of invasions by cheaters ef-
fectively.
In addition, our results also show that the success of early warnings in the evolu-
tionary population is crucially linked to the selection strength, where some indicators
may be effective for a larger range of selection strengths, but some are effective for
a smaller range. In this adaptive situation, the level of selection defines the effective
payoff returned to an agent. Stronger selection increases the chance that a cheating
invader connects to better-off individuals and can benefit more. Not surprisingly, this
difference makes the risk of collapse to increase earlier and more abruptly when the se-
lection is strong (Figure 4.10), driving similar patterns in the indicators. In general, the
reliable detection of the collapse of cooperation in dynamical networks is affected by
the level of selection and the size of observational window, where most of the indica-
tors become more accurate and consistent under stronger selection and bigger window.
Despite our work is based on a specific adaptive network model, where the dy-
namics of state and structure are triggered by the birth-death mechanism, our approach
and indicators can be extended to other models of evolutionary population (Lieberman
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et al., 2005; Tarnita et al., 2009). For example, some structural indicators like con-
nectance, clustering, assortativity, etc. may be useful in other models of structured
populations. The presented results suggest that it is possible to evaluate the resilience
of cooperation by monitoring the interactions and following the behaviour of individ-
uals in a community, in practice such information might be difficult to obtain. Iden-
tifying cheaters from cooperators, or even following their interactions in time seems
a daunting task. Still, the difficulty for evaluating the proposed signals may depend
on the specific application, the type, and the scale of the community in question. Per-
haps the most novel conclusion of this work is that we can identify the progressive
loss of cooperation persistence by combining non-structural and structural indicators.
Although the patterns we reported have high standard errors due to the stochastic com-
ponent in our model, they still confer a promising pattern. As such our study paves the
way for testing and developing similar indicators in a variety of evolutionary subjects,
ranging from biological systems to ecological communities and even socio-economic
networks.
Chapter 5
Distributed Learning in Adaptive
Agents Coordination
The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how a generalised work-learn-adapt
(WLA) framework can lead to high organisation performance in cooperative adap-
tive networks. We ground this WLA framework into the paradigm of adaptive agents
coordination, where a number of cooperative agents need to complete some compli-
cated tasks in a distributed manner. In this situation, the organisation performance is
highly dependent on the functional agents and their interacting relationships. Under
the framework of WLA, all agents work according to their corresponding functionality
without a central control, meanwhile they are able to learn and recognize the environ-
ment by aggregating local and historical information. At a slower rate, the agents will
implement state evolution and structure adaptation rationally based on the knowledge
obtained from distributed learning, such that a favourable organisation configuration
can arise. Notably, the dynamics of state and structure are driven by real-time agent
learning, which contributes to the division of labour. This WLA framework is imple-
mented by agents in a local, distributed and quantitative manner, and can be widely
used in many real-world applications.
5.1 Introduction
Our previous chapters have studied voter models and evolutionary population in adap-
tive networks to reason about the highly connected world. As mentioned before, the
dynamics in adaptive voter model is driven by pairwise imitation (Chapter 3), while the
dynamics in evolutionary population is characterized by natural selection (Chapter 4).
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In this chapter, we intend to incorporate distributed learning into adaptive networks,
where each agent has a local view on its neighbourhood and is able to acquire and ag-
gregate local information to guide state evolution and structure adaptation. In this way,
these individuals can work rationally to achieve desired improvement without external
or central control entities.
How to improve the organisation performance through adaptive dynamics has been
studied for a long time. Considering the cost for communication and synchronization,
it is very difficult to manage a networked system under a centralised mechanism, es-
pecially when the size of the system is quite large. With the increasing technological
complexity in real world, more and more distributed systems are developed to improve
the organisation performance with lower cost.
Effective structures fostered by local interactions are usually characterized by self-
organisation (Kohonen, 1988), which has been widely observed in biology, chemistry,
economy and even sociology (Prehofer and Bettstetter, 2005). In nature, for example,
the flocking behaviour of fish, birds, ants, etc. can self-organise themselves in a local
manner to form a robust structure, which enables them to survive and live in a severe
environment. The term of self-organisation occurs in many different subjects, and with
different definitions, but some of the common principles are: locality, functionality,
emergence, adaptability, robustness and scalability (Prehofer and Bettstetter, 2005).
In addition, modern intelligent systems are required to self-adapt their structures and
states in real time with the changes of external environments, so that there is no overall
collapse under a random disturbance or attack. Many agile organisations have arisen by
means of self-adaptation, which has been widely used to design and manage complex
multi-agent systems.
It is known that local behaviours can facilitate the emergence of global coordina-
tion, but many details still remain for further exploration. In particular, a main chal-
lenge lies in how to give rise to effective individual behaviours.
5.1.1 WLA Framework
Recently, some generic frameworks for adaptive agent organisation have been devel-
oped to tackle the dynamism and complexity in MAS discipline, where the adaptive
pattern follows the procedure of acting, collecting, decision-making and reconfiguring
(Argente et al., 2013; Brun et al., 2009). In this chapter, we consider a simple frame-
work of work-learn-adapt (WLA) in adaptive networks, where distributed learning is
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integrated into the evolution of state and the adaptation of structure. As a result, a net-
work with advantageous topology can be built, which leverages individual behaviours
to achieve global coordination.
From a more generalised perspective, the agents embedded in a structured com-
munity are required to implement tasks according to their corresponding functionality.
Meanwhile, they are able to acquire and aggregate external environment information
in real time, and revise prior knowledge as environment changes. After that, the agents
will adapt their structures and states quantitatively relative to the prior knowledge of
what is a good network. Figure 5.1 illustrates a schematic procedure for the WLA


















Figure 5.1: A schematic diagram is presented to show the WLA framework. In struc-
tured multi-agent systems, agents’ functionality together with network structure will de-
termine the organisation performance, which in turn provides some feedbacks used
in the process of learning. Based on the information aggregated from learning, the
individuals are able to adapt their states and structures in a rational way.
In the following, we will study a model of agents team formation (section 5.2 to
5.5) to elaborate the framework of work-learn-adapt (WLA). In this model, the agents
need to form teams in a decentralized manner to complete some complicated tasks,
which require a variety of skill suppliers. The change of agent’s role is characterized
by state evolution, and the adjustment of interactions corresponds to structure adapta-
tion. In particular, a universal leader-follower mechanism is adopted to promote the
division of labour. Distributed learning is incorporated into this framework to guide
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the coupled dynamics quantitatively and rationally. Analytical and numerical investi-
gations are conducted to show that the learning rates together with task size and skill
set would have a big influence on both team wastefulness and task completion. Fi-
nally, an example of distributed task allocation (section 5.6) is explored to verify the
effectiveness of this WLA framework.
5.2 Agents Team Formation
As mentioned above, it is the effective strategies for state evolution and structure adap-
tation that bring about agents organisations with favourable structures. In real world,
we have already witnessed a large number of successful applications driven by adap-
tive dynamics. Here, we will study agents team formation on top of adaptive networks
to demonstrate how this framework of work-learn-adapt (WLA) can operate as a whole
for the coordination of agents.
5.2.1 Motivation
Agent-organised networks (AONs) (Gaston and desJardins, 2005) are organisations re-
sulting from interdependent and interacting agents, where team formation is one of the
most essential topics for the coordination of agents. Here, a team consists of a number
of cooperative agents which are inter-connected, equipped with some kinds of skills
and have agreed to work together toward a common complex task that none of the
team members can complete independently. The applications of AON in real world
include business alliances (de Weerdt et al., 2012), dynamic supply chains (Thadaka-
maila et al., 2004), robotic team (Vig and Adams, 2007), sensor networks (Glinton
et al., 2008a), etc. AON studies have established that not only does organisational
structure have a direct impact on performance, but also that simple strategies to adjust
the structure dynamically can lead to remarkable improvements in team quality, task
completion, and consequently global performance.
The research on agents team formation mainly focuses on the coordination among
cooperative agents, whose behaviours usually determine the performance of task com-
pletion. Many operational research methods (Shehory and Kraus, 1998; Bulka et al.,
2007; Adams et al., 2011; Dos Santos and Bazzan, 2012; de Weerdt et al., 2012) have
been applied to the optimization of task allocation in a network. However, the blocking
problem caused by insufficient or unreachable skills (especially in a network with an
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unfavourable structure) still is a bottleneck for high-performance team formation. Let’s
see the following examples: task T1 and T2 need to be completed by two teams (red
and blue) with the required skills to do so. Figure 5.2(a) shows the blocking caused
by insufficient skills, where both teams try to compete for a skill ‘S2’, but neither can
successfully grab it. Figure 5.2(b) shows a form of ‘spatial’ blocking caused by un-
reachable skills, where the required skills are separated from one team by the growth
of the other one. Therefore, a universal concept of division of labour is necessary to

























(a) Example 1: Blocking by insufficient skills. If both of the two incomplete teams: red team and blue
team, are initiated to implement their tasks, neither of them will succeed because of the insufficient skills.

























(b) Example 2: Blocking by unreachable skills. When the required skills are enough to form two complete
teams, it is possible that some skills required by the blue (or red) team are blocked by the red (or blue)
team, and then become unreachable because of the unfavourable structure. If the teams are formed by
agents with reasonable structures, then the blocking by unreachable skills will be resolved.
Figure 5.2: Blockings and non-blockings in networked agents team formation.
As the task flow usually follows some distributions in open environments, which
may change over time, a static network is manifestly disadvantageous to effective team
formation. Recently, some people have proposed various adaptation strategies to re-
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shape the network structures (Gaston and desJardins, 2005; Abdallah and Lesser, 2007;
Kota et al., 2012; Ye et al., 2012) so as to achieve better organisation performance. The
effects of network structure on team formation have been investigated by Gaston et al.
(Gaston and desJardins, 2005; Gaston, 2005), and many extensions (Glinton et al.,
2008b,a; Barton and Allan, 2007a,b, 2008) are provided to handle the issues regarding
the organisation performance and network adaptation. However, the question of how
individual behaviours can promote collective benefit still remains for further explo-
ration.
5.2.2 Agent-organised Networks
Based on the work of Gaston (Gaston and desJardins, 2005; Gaston, 2005), we proceed
to a formal description of agents team formation as what follows, where tasks need to
be completed by agents in teams.
Agent-organised networks (AONs) are presented in terms of labelled undirected
graphs, where the nodes correspond to the agents and the labels encode the respective
skill of each agent. The set of networks of a given size correspond to the state space
on which adaptive algorithms are to be defined.
• N = {a1,a2,a3, ...,aN} is a finite set of agents.
• E = (ei j)N×N is a 0− 1 symmetric adjacency matrix s.t. ei j = 1 iff there is an
edge between agents ai and a j.
• NB(ai) = {a j | ei j = 1} is the set of neighbours of ai, and its neighbours’ neigh-
bours are in a set NB2(ai) = {ak | ei je jk > 0∧ eik = 0}.
• S = {S1,S2, ...Sξ} is a finite set of skills with a size of ξ.
• s : N → S maps agent ai to the respective skill s(ai), also noted si for short. In
general, the skills are uniformly distributed among the agents.
At each step, γ tasks are generated, and each task is a multiset of skills with a fixed
size |T |. The contents in the task are drawn from S uniformly at random. To avoid
overload, the requirement of tasks should be smaller than the supply of network, i.e.
γ|T |< N. Each task is associated with a unique team, which is a set of agents supposed
to provide the required skills. A valid team is defined as a set of agents which induces
a connected subgraph and whose skill multiset fulfils the skill requirements for the
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given task (Gaston, 2005). The process of agents team formation in a network can be
described as Figure 5.3.
T1  ...
Ti ={S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}





































Figure 5.3: Agents team formation in a network. At each step, γ tasks are imported to
the network and globally advertised to the agents. If a team Mi can provide all the skills
required by the task Ti, then that task will be completed. Here, we use different colours
to represent different teams.
There are two main performance measurements in agents team formation, which
are solely for the purpose of evaluating the system from outside.
• Task success rate (TSR) is defined by the ratio between the number of com-
pleted tasks (CT) and that of imported tasks (IT) averaged over a long time.





• Team waste rate (TWR) means the average ratio between surplus team size and
actual task size. This measure captures the idea that the skill supply in a team










where mi(u) is the size of a team Mi at the time of u, and the corresponding task
is Ti.
5.2.3 Division of Labour
The division of labour in adaptive networks (Gross and Blasius, 2008) means to differ-
entiate agents according to their functionality. In the most decentralised case, any agent
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can bid for the task, which may lead to the blockings easily. In order to have access to
unreachable skills meanwhile avoid disordered allocation, a universal leader-follower
approach is applied in our study to manage the teams. Reconfiguring the network into
some hub-and-spoke clusters can help to reduce the collisions for resources and then
avoid blockings caused by unreachable skills (Gaston, 2005), thus we ground our par-
ticular AON model on a multi-star structure. The concept of leaders and followers are
explained in what follows.
Concretely, the agent-organised model presented before is extended by a mapping
r to show the roles of the agents in taking the tasks:
• r : N→{leader, follower}maps the agents to their roles, and r(ai) or ri for short
means the functional role played by ai.
The set of leaders is defined by L, whose size shows how many teams (or hubs) are
in the network. Given a leader agent ai ∈ L, the corresponding followers are a group
of neighbours playing the role of follower.
F(ai) = {a j | a j ∈ NB(ai)∧ ri = leader∧ r j = follower}
A leader and its followers form a team to implement the tasks by providing the
equipped skills. For example, a team led by agent ai is a group of agents in Mi =
{ai}∪F(ai). Note that some followers may be attached to more than one leader, from
which they randomly pick a team to join (one can imagine they work part-time). The
effective size of a team Mi led by ai is defined as:
mi = 1+ ∑
a j∈F(ai)
1/d(a j) (5.3)
where d j is the number of leaders connecting a j. The reason we add 1 is because the
leader ai itself provides a skill.
In order to reduce the chances of disordered team formation, it is assumed that
only the leaders are allowed to take tasks and recruit teams. That is to say, at each
step, the tasks are evenly uniformly taken by the leaders, and then implemented by
the corresponding teams. This configuration can stabilize the relationships between
cooperative agents, which conforms to the patterns of modern intelligent systems.
Under the framework of work-learn-adapt (WLA), the above described leader-
follower mechanism is in the module of working, which contains team recruitment
and task implementation. To form an organisation of agents with dynamically chang-
ing topology, we need to provide an intelligent approach (namely learning) to guide
the behaviours of evolution and adaptation (namely adapting).
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5.3 Adaptive Dynamics Based on Distributed Learning
To design an efficient adaptive strategy, we need first to specify what we want. Indeed,
two problems should be addressed further: (1) how many leaders (or teams) are re-
quired for the completion of tasks; (2) how do the leaders adjust their teams to match
the requirements of tasks.
5.3.1 Leader-Follower Flipping
As we can see, the number of leaders should be neither too small nor too large, where
too few leaders may bring about big-size teams and then fragile network, while too
many leaders may lead to numerous small-size teams with insufficient skills and then
unsuccessful teams. There are two extreme solutions for task allocation: one is maxi-
mally decentralised case, where the number of leaders is equal to the number of tasks,
namely one task per team; the other is the most centralised case where only one leader
with a quite large team is in the network to do all tasks.
In practice, the cost (of communication, cognition, management, etc. ) used for
a leader to manage a big-size team will be very high. In addition, the network will
become fragile if the leader agent is under attack. Considering the cost as well as
network resilience, it is necessary to set a limitation on the size of a team (namely
m N), meanwhile we need to make sure that the team can provide enough skills
for the completion of a task (namely m > |T |). Therefore, the most decentralised
leader-follower approach is adopted in our study, where the number of teams is equal
to the number of tasks, namely |L|= γ. In this way, we have enough capable teams to
complete the tasks.
For a leader agent ai ∈ L, an evolving parameter λ : L→R is defined to characterize
the expected number of tasks taken by itself, indicating the load to the corresponding
team. In this model, we adopt a simple weighted moving average method to update the
value of λ recursively:
λi← αλi +(1−α)xt (5.4)
where xt is the number of tasks taken by ai at time t. This method can smooth out
the accidental fluctuations meanwhile highlight the inevitable trends. A smaller α
discounts the older observations faster, and a bigger one discounts them slowly. The λi
obtained through this simple update strategy can be used to show whether the leader is
overloaded (λi > 1, more than one task per team) or underloaded (λi < 1,less than one
task per team).
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The evolution of state means the change of an agent’s role from follower to leader
or the other way around, which will be implemented based on the evolving parameter
λ. In detail, the state flipping (leader  follower) occurs with a small probability pe
(a quite small value) at each step. If the agent ai is a follower, then nothing happens.
Otherwise, if the agent ai is a leader, then we need to either promote a random follower
or demote the leader herself/himself based on the corresponding λi (shown in Figure
5.4).






Figure 5.4: The evolution of state is quantified by the weighted moving average value λ,
which characterizes the average number of tasks taken by the leader. If λi≥ 1, it means
too many tasks are allocated to a team, then more leaders are required; otherwise if
λi ≤ 1, it means the teams are underloaded, then fewer leaders are required.
• if λi≥ 1, then the leader promotes a random follower to a leader with probability
min(λi−1,1).
• if λi ≤ 1, then the leader demotes herself/himself to a follower with probability
1−λi.
The flipping of role is led by agents in a distributed manner, which can react
promptly to the change of the number of tasks γ. At stationary state, we have λi = 1 for
any leader ai ∈ L, so that the number of teams is consistent with the number of tasks.
In this way, task allocation is carried out in the maximally decentralised way.
5.3.2 Risk-averse Learning
Generally speaking, the real division of labour cares not only the number of teams
in the network but also the composition of skills in teams. In other words, the skills
provided by a team should be consistent with the requirements of the imported tasks.
Considering the dynamics of tasks, the leaders need to update some internal targets
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continuously to track the requirements of tasks, and then establish effective teams
based on those internal targets.
In order to characterize the composition of a desired team, for each leader agent,
we define a ξ-vector θ as the leader internal target for various types of skills. Specif-
ically, if ai is a leader, then θi is defined in the following way to represent the desired
team:
θi = [θi(S1),θi(S2), ...θi(Sξ)]
where θi(S j) means the desired number of team members holding skill S j, and ξ is the
size of skill set.
At each step, the tasks taken by a leader ai can be defined in the form of task skill
requirement, namely:
ψi = [ψi(S1),ψi(S2), ...ψi(Sξ)]
where ψi(Si) is the number of skill Si required to be completed. At stationary state,
we have one task for each team and the sum for all skills is equal to the size of a task,
namely ∑Si∈S ψi(Si) = |T |.
When taking a task, the leader agent will update and adjust its internal target θ
to track the requirements of task. Here, we will adopt a heuristic of “Win or Learn
Fast” (WoLF) (Bowling and Veloso, 2002) to learn θ. In detail, we want to track the
task using θ with different sensitivities depending on whether the actual task demand
is below the internal target or above. The learning of θ gives rise to an appropriate
predictor for task size and skill composition, which will be used to guide the formation
of effective teams.
In general, the leaders are usually more sensitive to the case of underestimation
θi(S j) < ψi(S j) than the overestimation θi(S j) ≥ ψi(S j). Therefore, at each step, a
leader agent ai will compare current internal target θi with actual task requirement ψi,
and then update θi as follows:
• if θi(S j)≥ ψi(S j)
θi(S j)← θi(S j)+η−[ψi(S j)−θi(S j)]
• if θi(S j)< ψi(S j)
θi(S j)← θi(S j)+η+[ψi(S j)−θi(S j)]
where j ∈ {1,2,3, ...ξ} is the index of skills, and the learning rates are small real
numbers satisfying that 0 < η− ≤ η+. The idea of η− ≤ η+ is from the risk-averse
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strategy (Holt and Laury, 2002; Gaston, 2005), indicating that if you don’t have enough
skills to meet the requirements, then you will lose everything. The bigger ratio of
η−/η+ will bring a relatively bigger team size and then higher success rate, but the
waste of skills will be higher at the same time.
This learning is distributed and conducted by agents continuously, which can lead
to a rational estimation for the task-flow. Based on the internal target θ, the network
will be adapted to meet the requirements quantitatively.
5.3.3 Energy-based Network Adaptation
Let φi be a ξ-vector to show the team skill supply in a team led by a leader ai, reflecting
how many skills of different types are available in current team:
φi = [φi(S1),φi(S2), ...φi(Sξ)]
where φi(S j) means the number of agents holding skill S j in the team. The difference
between the leader internal target θ and the team skill supply φ tells the agents how to
adapt their structures.
In other words, we need to drive any given network structure to a favourable one
fulfilling the requirements. Specifically, we will modify network structure based on a
thermodynamics approach (Danos et al., 2013), where the energy is defined in a non-
linear form (exponential, quadratic, etc. ) to demonstrate how good a network is. With
the change of network structures, the corresponding energy is going to change as well:
the lower energy, the better structure.
In detail, the energy of a team is used to show the extent whether current team
supply (φ) can match the internal target (θ), where a higher energy means the team






expθi(S j)−φi(S j) (5.5)








expθi(S j)−φi(S j) (5.6)
Using the form of non-linear energy, we can balance the distribution of skills within
the network. The network energy will decrease more when the required skills are
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attached to the more “needy” agents. Without loss of generality, we suppose that 0 <
x1≤ x2, for any given small change δ≤ (x2−x1), we can have the following inequality:
expx2−expx2−δ ≥ expx1−expx1−δ
In addition, this kind of energy also makes it possible that the skills from “rich”
agents can be attached to the “needy” ones as:
expx1 +expx2 ≥ expx1+δ+expx2−δ
Figure 5.5 illustrates an example that the non-linear energy instead of a linear one










Figure 5.5: A simple example is presented to show the difference between non-linear
energy and linear one. For the linear energy, suppose the initial energy of ai is θi−φi =
θi− 3, and the initial energy of a j is θ j− 1, so the total energy is θ j + θ j− 4. After
rewiring, the total energy keeps same, still θ j + θ j − 4. For the exponential energy,
however, the initial energy of ai is eθi−3, and that of a j is eθ j−1, and the total energy is
eθi−3 + eθ j−1. After rewiring, the total energy becomes eθi−2 + eθ j−2, which is smaller
than before.
In the following, let’s consider how to integrate network energy into the adaptation
of network. As we all know, Metropolis et al. (Metropolis et al., 1953) introduced the
successive state transitions using Markov chains, and the detailed balance equation can
be obtained as:
p(G)W (G→ G′) = p(G′)W (G′→ G) (5.7)
where G and G′ are two states in the space of network structures, and p(G) is the
probability at state G, and W (G→ G′) indicates the transition rate from state G to G′.
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where Z = ∑G exp−βE(G) and β is a parameter seen as the inverse of a temperature.
Therefore, the ratio of transition rate between the move G→ G′ and its inverse








In this model, we set the transition probability from state G to G′ as follows:
W (G→ G′) = min(1,exp−β∆E) (5.10)
where ∆E = E(G′)−E(G). As shown in Figure 5.6, the adaptation of network is





Figure 5.6: Graph transformation based on energy. Here, the structure of network are
the states in Markov chains. The transition from state G to state G′ is driven by the
change of network energy, where a decrease of network energy would foster a better
structure and consequently higher organisation performance.
As for the adaptation strategy, we adopt a triangle rewiring (Gaston, 2005) to
guarantee the connectedness in graph transformation, where an agent disconnects one
neighbour and connects to that neighbour’s neighbour. It is possible to transfer any
connected network G to another connected network G′ based on this triangle rewiring
strategy. The only difference between the two networks is that there exists an edge aia j
in G but not in G′, and there is anther edge akal in G′ but not in G.
To conclude, the energy-based network adaptation procedure will run with a small
probability pa at each step: an edge aia j and a random neighbour’s neighbour ak are
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selected, and then ai rewires from a j to ak with probability min(1,exp−β∆E). The
energy difference before and after rewiring is calculated as:
∆E = E(aiaka j)−E(aia jak) (5.11)
5.3.4 Connectedness in Graph Transformation
Now, let’s consider the above mentioned triangle rewiring in an undirected graph,
where a node disconnects one neighbour and connects to that neighbour’s neighbour.
We can write the rule of triangle rewiring as: if euv = euw = 1 and evw = 0 in graph
G, then euw = evw = 1 and euv = 0 in the transformed graph G′. This class of trans-
formations has three interesting properties: (I) it preserves the number of edges; (II)
it preserves connectedness, and (III) it is ergodic in the sense that any two connected
graphs on the same set of vertices can be related by a series of such rewirings.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let G be a connected graph, v and w are connected by a path π, and
all the nodes on the path excluding w are connected with u. The original G can be
transformed to G′ by the rule of triangle rewiring, where euv = 0, euw = 1 and any
other pair is unchanged.
Proof. We need to show we can swap the edge uv with uw, leaving everything else
unchanged. The transformations can be shown as Figure 5.7, and the path from v to w
is:





















km k1 km k1 km k1 km
…...
Figure 5.7: Edge swapping by triangle rewiring. The edge uv can be replaced by the
uw along a series of triangle rewiring along the path from v to w.
To do that, we first forward the edge ukm to uw, and then forward the edges of
ukm−1, · · · uk1, ukv one by one along the path until the edge uv is forwarded to uk1.
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The above lemma tells us that the source edge (i.e. uv) can “jump” over existing
edges along a path to an unoccupied target (i.e. uw).
Let GNE be the set of connected graphs with N nodes and E edges. We can use the
following theorem to show that any two graphs in GNE can be transformed through a
series of triangle rewirings.
First, we consider a situation to transfer an edge from uv to uw.
Theorem 5.3.2. Let G be a connected graph in GNE , and u,v, w are some nodes in G,
where euv = 1, euw = 0. If G′ is a connected graph with euv = 0, euw = 1 and everything
else is same as G, then G′ can be transformed from G under triangle rewiring.
Proof. By the fact that both G and G′ are connected, there must exist a path from v to
w excluding edge uv:
π : v→ k1→ k2→ ··· → km→ w
For any ki (1 ≤ i ≤ m) on the path, if euki = 0, we forward the source edge uv
edge directly; otherwise if euki = 1, we use Lemma 5.3.1 to “jump” over those existing
edges. Finally, we can have the edge uv replaced by uw. The transformations can be






























Figure 5.8: Edge permutation from uv to uw along a path from v to w.
After that, we need to consider the permutation between any two pairs of nodes in
a graph, let’s say they are uv and wx.
Theorem 5.3.3. Let G be a connected graph in GNE , and we have euv = 1 and ewx = 0
in G. Let G′ be a connected graph as well, we have euv = 0 and ewx = 1 in G′, and
everything else is same as G. There exist a sequence of transformations from G to G′
under triangle rewiring.
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Proof. Both G and G′ are connected graphs, and we need to consider the following
two cases in graph transformation:
• Case 1: there exist two paths in G: π1 is starting from u to w, and π2 is starting
from v to x. Neither path includes the edge uv.
π1 : u→ l1→ l2→ ··· → ln→ w
π2 : v→ k1→ k2→ ·· · → km→ x
In this case, we say we have two “parallel” paths: π1 and π2. And then we can
do the transformations in two steps: the first step is to connect u and x with an edge
following the edges transformations on π2; and the second step is to transform xu to


































































Figure 5.9: Case 1: Edge permutation along two “ parallel” paths π1 and π2.
• Case 2: there are two paths in G: π1 is starting from u to w, and π2 is starting v
and x. Both of the two paths include the edge uv.
π1 : u→ v→ l1→ l2→ ·· · → ln→ w
π2 : v→ u→ k1→ k2→ ·· · → km→ x
In this case, we say we have two “cross” paths: π1 and π2. And then we can do the
transformations in two steps as follows. First, we transfer the edge uv along the path
π1 to connect u and w. The second step is to transfer the edge wu along the path π2 to
connect w and x. In this way, the edge uv is replaced by wx. The transformations can
be shown as Figure 5.10.
Notably, if we find a case where the path π1 starting from u to w includes the edge
uv but the path π2 starting from v to x excludes uv, then we must can find another path
































































Figure 5.10: Case 2: Edge permutation along two “cross” paths π1 and π2.
π′1 (dashed curves) which connects u and w (or x) excluding the edge uv, otherwise G
′
won’t be connected (see Figure 5.11). In this way, the above case belongs to either





















































Case 1 Case 2
Figure 5.11: For the case where path π1 connecting u and w includes the edge uv but
the path π2 connecting v and x excludes uv, there must be another path π′1 (dashed
curves) connecting u and w which is equivalent to case 1, or connecting u and x which
is equivalent to case 2. Otherwise, the transformed network will not be connected.
As we can see, for any two connected graphs G and G′ with an edge permutation,
we can transfer from one to the other based on the rule of triangle rewiring. Therefore,
the connectedness in graph transformation is preserved.
5.3.5 Algorithm
We can now summarise our full distributed algorithm. We start from a connected
random network with one arbitrary leader agent, and iterate ad libitum the following
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round. The ‘role change’ and ‘edge rotation’ probabilities are defined above and de-
pend respectively on learned parameters λ and θ.
Algorithm 1 Agents team formation in adaptive networks
Require: initial state N, E, S, γ, r, λ, and θ
1: t← 0
2: while t < tmax do
3: t← t +1
4: tasks are distributed to the leaders evenly uniformly
5: for ai ∈ N do
6: implement the tasks by providing skills
7: if r(ai) =leader then
8: Update λ and θ
9: with probability pe try role change
10: end if
11: end for
12: for ai ∈ N do
13: pick uniformly a redex (if any) to try edge rotation with probability pa
14: end for
15: end while
As explained before, γ tasks are allocated to the leaders uniformly at each time
step, and then the teams will implement the received tasks by providing the required
skills. At the same time, the leaders will update their evolution parameter λ used for
role flipping and the adaptation parameter θ used for triangle rewiring. After that, the
event of state evolution will occur with probability pe, where the leader will promote
a follower or demote herself/himself according to the value of λ. And the event of
structure adaptation will occur with probability pa, where the triangle rewiring is made
based on the energy computed through θ. In particular, both pe and pa are very small
real numbers, indicating the relatively slow module of adapting relative to the modules
of working and learning.
5.4 Analytical Investigations
In this section, we are going to analyse the effects of this work-learn-adapt (WLA)
framework on network structure and organisation performance by some mathemati-
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cal calculations. As described in the agent-organised model, the generation of tasks
follows a multinomial distribution:
T ∼ f (ψ(S1),ψ(S2), ...ψ(Sξ), |T |, p1, p2, ...pξ) (5.12)
where ∑ξi=1 ψ(Si) = |T | and ∑
ξ
i=1 pi = 1.
All the skills are uniformly selected for each task slot, and each skill is selected
with probability pi = 1/ξ. When the size of a task |T | is large enough, according to the
central limit theorem (CLT), the number of skill Si in the task follows a distribution as:
ψ(Si)∼ |T |pi +
√
|T |N (0,σ2i ) (5.13)
where σ2i = pi(1− pi) means the variance of skill number in the task and N indicates
the normal distribution.
We update the leader internal target θ(Si) for skill Si as follows based on the risk-
averse learning:
∆θ(Si)←
η−[ψ(Si)−θ(Si)] if θ(Si)≥ ψ(Si)η+[ψ(Si)−θ(Si)] if θ(Si)< ψ(Si) (5.14)
For a certain skill Si, we define a variable εi as the difference between the actual task
skill requirement ψ(Si) and the leader internal target θ(Si) , namely εi = ψ(Si)−θ(Si),
and then we can have εi at stationary state:
εi ∼
√
|T |N (0,σ2i )+ |T |pi−θ?(Si)
where θ?(Si) is the stationary leader internal target for skill Si.
Rewriting the above equation, we have:
εi ∼N (|T |pi−θ?(Si), |T |σ2i ) (5.15)











Following the “kick-up” adjustment of θ(Si) with η+ and “kick-down” adjustment




εi pεi dεi = η−
∫ 0
−∞
−εi pεi dεi (5.17)
where η− ≤ η+ and both of them are quite small compared to ψ(Si)−θ(Si).
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Using integration by parts, we can obtain the stationary condition for θ?(Si) under





















where Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the normal distribution.






















where it is clear that the intermediate variable a is only dependent on the learning rates
η+ and η−. We say a? is the solution of Eq. 5.20 for a given pair of η+ and η−.
5.4.1 The Effects of Learning Rates
If the two learning rates are equal, namely η+ = η−, then we can obtain a? = 0 by







In this case, the stationary leader internal target is equal to the average number of skill
Si in a task.
θ
?(Si) = |T |pi (5.21)

















where we can see that the solution a? for that equation only depends on η+/(η+−η−),
essentially η−/η+. By solving Eq. 5.22, Figure 5.12 presents the solution of a? as a
decreasing function of η−/η+, which ranges from 0 to 1.
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Figure 5.12: The solution a? changes as η−/η+ goes from 0 to 1, where it is clear that
with the increase of η−/η+, the solution of a? decreases monotonously.
5.4.2 Bigger-size Tasks Bring Smaller Team Waste





, which can be rewritten as:
θ
?(Si)−|T |pi = a?×σi
√
|T | (5.23)
From the above equation, the difference between the stationary leader internal tar-
get θ?(Si) and the average skill number |T |pi can be decomposed into three contrib-
utors: a? (which is only dependent on the ratio of learning rates η−/η+ as shown in
Figure 5.12), σi (standard deviation for the number of skill Si ) and |T | (task size). And







where we can see that with the decrease of a?, or the increase of task size, or the
decrease of skill variance, the ratio between the stationary internal target θ?(Si) and
task size |T | will decrease and converge to pi.
When we consider all the skills in S, we have θ? = ∑i=ξi=1 θ
?(Si), and Eq. 5.24 can
be extended by the following equation:
θ?
|T |
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In particular, when all the skills are uniformly selected to constitute the task, namely







and the sum will be ∑i σi =
√








where a smaller skill set will lead to a smaller difference between the leader internal
target θ? and actual task size |T |. It is clear that θ? ' |T | when ξ = 1, namely there is
only one single skill in the network.
Suppose the team skill supply φ can match the leader internal target θ through
network adaptation at stationary state, namely φ? ' θ?, where φ? = ∑i φ(Si)? is the














5.4.3 A Larger Skill Set Decreases the Task Completion
For a certain skill Si, the number of agents holding Si in a team at stationary state can
be approximated by the corresponding leader internal target, namely:
φ(Si)? ' θ?(Si)' |T |pi +a?σi
√
|T |
Meanwhile, the actual number of skill Si in a task follows the distribution:
ψ(Si)∼ |T |pi +
√
|T |N (0,σ2i )
Given a task T , if its skill Si is fulfilled by a team, then the team should provide enough
number of skill Si such that φ?(Si)≥ ψ(Si), namely
|T |pi +a?σi
√
|T | ≥ |T |pi +
√
|T |N (0,σ2i ) (5.28)
and the probability satisfies the above inequality is:
p(φ?(Si)≥ ψ(Si)) = Φ0,σ2i (a
?
σi) (5.29)
where Φ indicates the cumulative distribution function (CDF).
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Similarly, the task will be completed if all ξ skills are fulfilled, and the probability










As all the skills are uniformly picked to constitute a task, task success rate (TSR)






















where erf(x) is the error function.
As we can see, for a given a?, the probability for task completion decreases expo-
nentially with the increase of the size of skill set, namely ξ, but is independent of the
size of a task.
5.5 Numerical Simulations
This section will present a series of numerical simulations to verify the above analytical
calculations. Under the framework of work-learn-adapt (WLA), we solve agents team
formation by considering the differentiation between leaders and followers. Several
important observables are captured during the process of network evolution and adap-
tation, such as the leader internal target θ, the team skill supply φ and the organisation
performance (including TSR and TWR).
The simulations are undertaken on the synthetic data within a random connected
network with a size N = 500 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4. At each step, γ tasks are
introduced into the network. Role and edge changes both use the same probability
pe = pa = 0.002, which reflects the fact that the adaptation module should have a slow
time scale relative to the learning one. The “kick-up” learning rate is η+ = 0.01 and
the “kick-down” learning rate η− is varying from 0 to η+, so it is clear η−/η+ ∈ [0,1].
The whole simulation lasts 105 steps according to the procedures presented in our
Algorithm 1.
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5.5.1 Baseline
In this part, we have the size of a task |T |= 100 and the number of tasks introduced at
each step is γ = 4, so that γ|T |< N is satisfied. The size of skill set is ξ = 2 and each
skill is selected with same probability pi = 0.5. As the generation of tasks follows
a multinomial distribution, the standard deviation for the number of a single skill is
computed by: σi =
√
pi(1− pi) = 0.5.
Run the WLA framework described above and the ratio of learning rates is η−/η+=
0.1. At stationary state, we have the snapshot of network in Figure 5.13 (left panel),
where 4 evident hubs are obtained (namely the leaders). The red and blue nodes indi-
cate the two different skills, which are uniformly assigned to the agents at random.














Simulation     
Analytical     
Figure 5.13: Given a certain ratio η−/η+ = 0.1, the network structure with N = 500
nodes and average degree 〈k〉 = 4 is illustrated in the left panel. When η−/η+ in-
creases, the numerical and analytical values for θ?/|T | at stationary state are presented
in the right panel. In the simulations, γ= 4 tasks are introduced into the network at each
step, each of which has a size of |T |= 100, and the size of skill set is ξ = 2.
As discussed in Section 5.4, the ratio between the leader internal target θ? and the






where the numerical solution of a? can be obtained in Figure 5.12 as a function of
η−/η+.
Using the same parameters introduced above, the numerical and analytical values
for θ?/|T | under varying η−/η+ are presented in Figure 5.13 (right panel). As we can
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see, the simulation results match the analytical solutions very well, which verifies the
effectiveness of our analytical investigations in Section 5.4.
When the ratio of learning rates varies (namely η−/η+ changes from 0.1 to 0.9),
we have Figure 5.14 to show the evolution of task size |T | and the leader internal target
θ. As we can see, the value of θ is a little bit bigger than actual task size |T |, especially
when the ratio η−/η+ is small, where the leaders are very sensitive to the loss case of






















































































































Figure 5.14: The leader internal target θ and the size of a task |T | change with the
evolution of network at different values of η−/η+. When the ratio η−/η+ is small
e.g. η−/η+ = 0.1, the leader internal target is bigger than the actual task size. With
the increase of η−/η+, the difference between the two curves is smaller and smaller.
Finally, the two curves overlap in the end when η− is close to η+.
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Furthermore, Figure 5.15 presents the evolution of team skill supply φ when the ra-
tio η−/η+ varies. Here, the size of a team reflects the degree of resource wastefulness
in agents team formation. Ideally, the size of a team φ should be equal to the size of
a task |T | at stationary state. Considering the uncertainty in task requirements, some
surplus skill suppliers in the team are necessary in case of skill shortage. In particular,
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Figure 5.15: The size of a team φ and the size of a task |T | change with the evolution
of network at different values of η−/η+. Here, the size of a team can be interpreted
as the skill supply for team formation and bigger team size means higher resource
wastefulness. Similarly, with the increase of η−/η+, the size of a team is smaller due
to the decrease of the leader internal target θ. And the difference between the two
curves of |T | and φ is smaller and smaller when η−/η+ is close to 1.
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In Figure 5.16, we present the dynamics of task success rate (TSR) at different
η−/η+. It is clear that, when the ratio η−/η+ is smaller, team size is bigger than
task size so that task success rate is higher; on the contrary, when the ratio η−/η+ is
bigger, team size is close to task size gradually and task success rate drops to a quite
low level. It is a trade-off between team wastefulness (i.e. TWR) and task completion
(i.e. TSR), where higher completion performance usually comes along with bigger



























































































Figure 5.16: Task success rate (TSR) changes with the evolution of network at different
values of η−/η+. A higher task completion is obtained when η−/η+ is smaller (e.g.
η−/η+ = 0.1), where team size is bigger than task size. With the increase of η−/η+,
TSR drops to a small value, where team size is close to task size.
In the following, we will take the above case as a baseline and change some pa-
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rameters (the size of skill set ξ and the size of a task |T |) to observe their influences on
team wastefulness and task completion.
5.5.2 Increasing the Size of Skill Set
In this part, we intend to check the influence of the size of skill set ξ on network
structure and organisation performance. Keeping task size |T | = 100 and the number
of tasks γ = 4, we increase the size of skill set from ξ = 2 to ξ = 4. As before, the
skills are selected uniformly with probability pi = 1/ξ. The standard deviation for





higher than the previous baseline value where σi = 1/2. Figure 5.17 presents the
comparisons between the case of baseline (left column) and the case of bigger skill set
(right column).
As we can see, there are 4 hubs (corresponding to the team leaders) in both snap-
shots, but the composition of team is diverse in the right column, where different
colours indicate different skills.
At stationary state, the resource wastefulness (i.e. TWR) is bigger when the skill
set is increased to double size, especially when η−/η+ is smaller. This phenomenon
can be explained by Eq. 5.27, where team waste rate is associated with both task size
(inversely proportional to
√
|T |) and skill set size (proportional to
√
ξ−1). Therefore,
when the size of skill set increases from ξ = 2 to ξ = 4, the size of a team at stationary
state becomes bigger.
In addition, the probability for task completion (i.e. TSR) is sharply reduced as the
size of skill set increases, which has been explained in Section 5.4 Eq. 5.31. In this
case, task success rate (TSR) decrease exponentially with the increase of ξ.
5.5.3 Increasing the Size of a Task
In this part, we will check the influence of task size on network structures and or-
ganisation performance. In detail, we increase the size of a task from |T | = 100 to
|T |= 400 and the number of tasks introduced at each step is decreased to γ = 1, so that
the system is not overloaded (γ|T | < N). Meanwhile, we keep the size of skill set as
ξ = 2, and each skill will be selected with same probability pi = 0.5. In this way, the
standard deviation for the number of a single skill will not be affected by increasing
task size.
Figure 5.18 illustrates the case of baseline (|T | = 100) in the left column and the
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Figure 5.17: Network structures and organisation performance change as the size of
skill set increases, where the left column illustrates the case of baseline and the right
column presents the case of increasing skill set. Two snapshots for network structures
are presented at η−/η+= 0.1 (upper row). For a given η−/η+, team waste rate (TWR)
is much higher in the case of increasing skill set (middle row). Task success rate (TSR)
is dramatically decreased when the skill set is increased to double size (lower row).
Parameters settings: task size |T | = 100, task number γ = 4, skill set size ξ = 2 (left
column: baseline), and ξ = 4 (right column: increasing ξ).
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Figure 5.18: Network structures and organisation performance change as task size
increases, where the left column illustrates the case of baseline and the right col-
umn shows the case of increasing task size. Two network snapshots are presented
at η−/η+ = 0.1 (upper row). For a given η−/η+, team waste rate (TWR) becomes
smaller in the case of increasing task size (middle row). Task success rate (TSR) in the
case of increasing task size is similar to the baseline (lower row). Parameters settings:
skill set size ξ = 2, task number γ = 4, task size |T |= 100 (left column: baseline), and
task number γ = 1, task size |T |= 400 (right column: increasing |T |).
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case of bigger task size (|T |= 400) in the right column. As we can see, the number of
teams (or hubs) in the network decreases from 4 to 1, but the size of team is expanding
to a large one. Specifically, team waste rate (TWR) at stationary state is inversely pro-
portional to
√
|T | (see Eq. 5.27), which means that TWR will decrease when task size
is bigger. When it comes to task success rate (TSR), we can find that the organisation
performance is well maintained in both cases, where task completion is independent
of task size as presented in Eq. 5.31.
5.5.4 The Evolution of Teams with Dynamical Tasks
Considering the dynamics of task requirements in real world, an intelligent and robust
distributed algorithm is able to detect those changes and react to them quickly. The
adaptive network mechanism explored in this chapter enables the leader agents to ag-
gregate historical information and adjust the internal targets continuously to keep up
with the task requirements. In this way, we can implement state evolution and structure
adaptation quantitatively when the task requirements are changing. Starting form the
baseline settings with ξ = 2, |T | = 100 and γ = 4, we change the task requirements
during the evolution by varying task size |T | to observe its influence on the size of a
team.
With γ|T | < N, we vary the size of a task in the simulation, and then the number
of tasks generated per round is changed as well. Specifically, the size of a task is
increased from |T |= 100 to |T |= 200 after a certain step, when the teams are adjusted
to attract more followers so as to match those bigger-size tasks. On the other hand, the
size of a team becomes smaller when the size of a task is decreased from |T |= 200 to
|T | = 100. Figure 5.19 illustrates the dynamical process for the evolution of teams as
task size increases or decreases during the simulation.
5.6 Distributed Task Allocation
As mentioned above, how to allocate tasks to the right agents is an important topic
in multi-agent systems, and a large number of researches (Shehory and Kraus, 1998;
de Weerdt et al., 2012; Abdallah and Lesser, 2007; Ye et al., 2012) have been launched
to address this problem based on intelligent allocation algorithms and dynamically
changing structures. In this section, we generalise the leader-follower mechanism in-
troduced before by considering that all agents in the organisation are able to learn
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Figure 5.19: The evolution of team size goes with the changes of task requirements.
The upper row shows the changes of task size, followed by the number of leaders in
the middle row and the lower row is the corresponding changes of team size. The
simulation parameters are: the ratio of learning rates η−/η+ = 0.1 and the size of skill
set ξ = 2.
and adapt. A simple case study of distributed task allocation is present to illustrate the
framework of work-learn-adapt (WLA). Our model is adapted from the self-organisation
for load balance (Abdallah and Lesser, 2007) and task solving (Kota et al., 2009),
where the agents are able to learn from environment (task flow, neighbourhood con-
figuration, interactive information, etc. ) and then adjust the network. Notably, the
nodes in our model are heterogeneous with different abilities, and the edges are het-
erogeneous as well indicating various affinities between the connecting nodes. We are
interested in how an agent reorganises its neighbourhood in a distributed way in order
to accomplish the task effectively, when only local information is available.
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5.6.1 Model Description
We ground the model of distributed task allocation on a weighted directed network.
Agents are in a set N = {a1,a2, · · · ,aN}. In our model, each agent can solve the
task with a certain service rate µ : N→ R. A real number q : N→ R indicates the size
of tasks in an agent’s queue, which need to be solved by the agent.
The agents are interacting in a weighted directed network denoted by W , where Wi j
indicates the link strength from ai to a j. In this model, we define 0 ≤Wi j ≤ 1, and a
bigger weight means closer relationship. If Wi j = 0, then ai has no access to a j.
In detail, we divide the agents in the neighbourhood into n layers (Figure 5.20), so
that the weights are discrete. For an agent ai, we set the weight of an edge connecting
to a neighbour a j on the k-th layer (1≤ k ≤ n−1) as:
Wi j = 1/k (5.32)
Figure 5.20: Neighbourhood diversity with tiered structure.
Those agents on the n-th layer are disconnected from ai, and the corresponding
weight is set to be 0. The tiered structures have been found in many realistic networks
Kota et al. (2009); Saramäki et al. (2014); Dunbar (2016), indicating the heterogeneity
in interactions, namely how easy an agent has access to its neighbours.
Tasks arrive at the agents locally with a certain arrival rate λ : N→ R. In general,
it is supposed that the task can be decomposable continuously, and it is completed by
different agents in the neighbourhood.
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• Allocation
At step t, a task with a size of λi (i.e. arrival rate) arrives at agent ai, and then that
agent will allocate the task to its neighbours according to the affinity (Figure 5.21 ).
We define f ti j as the task flow from ai to a j at that step, and it is proportional to Wi j,
which indicates that a closer neighbour helps to do more work.


















Figure 5.21: Task allocation in weighted networks.
Notably, agents will not re-distribute the tasks received from their neighbours. In
the case of ∑i λi = ∑i µi, the optimal allocation strategy should be ∑i f ti j = µ j for any
agent a j.
We measure the organisation performance using the utilization rate (UR), which is
defined as the ratio between the total size of served tasks and the system service ability.






where sti is the size of served tasks by ai and µi is the corresponding service ability. If
there are some underloaded agents, then there must be some overloaded agents, and
the utilization rate is less than 1.
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5.6.2 Work, Learn and Adapt
Given the distributed task allocation model described above, we adopt the work-learn-
adapt framework to solve the tasks in adaptive networks. In this model, we incorporate
state evolution and structure adaptation into the changes of W , where the state of an
agent ai can be represented by the weight vector [W1i,W2i, · · · ,WNi].
• Work
At the beginning of a certain step t, agent ai pushes all the received tasks from neigh-




Afterwards, the tasks in the queue will be implemented with a rate µi. At the end of
that step, the size of queue changes to qi← qi−sti, where sti indicates the size of served
tasks during t.
sti =
µi, if qi ≥ µiqi, if qi < µi (5.36)















Figure 5.22: Task solving in weighted networks.
• Learn
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At each step, the agent will track the size of received tasks, based on which to figure
out whether current neighbourhood configuration can balance the load-input and load-
output. Under this learning method that is implemented by agents locally, we don’t
need to consider too large state space. We define l : N → R as the average size of
received tasks per step, which is updated in real time to characterize the information of




where α is the learning rate, and a smaller value discounts the older observations faster.
• Adapt
The adapting actions are implemented at a slower rate compared to the working and
learning processes. At each step, each agent ai will adapt the link to a random neigh-
bour (or potential neighbour) a j with probability
• pa, if Wi j > 0;
• paβ, if Wi j = 0.
We have the adaptation rate pa 1 and β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) is defined as an exploration
rate. In this way, some unreachable agents (Wi j = 0) can be upgraded and inserted into
the neighbourhood.
We change the weight of an edge based on the estimated task input l and actual
service ability µ. For a given directed edge i→ j, the weight Wi j will more likely to be
increased when l j < µ j, namely the agent a j is underloaded. On the contrary, Wi j will
more likely to be decreased when l j > µ j, namely the agent a j is overloaded.
In general, if an agent a j is on the k-th layer, then the link weight is Wi j = 1/k.
When the adaptation occurs, we will update the weight of an edge through three types
of actions: upgrading (Wi j← 1/(k−1)), unchanging (Wi j← 1/k) ), and downgrading
(Wi j← 1/(k+1) ). The corresponding willingness (p+i j ,p=i j and p
−
i j) to implement those
actions can be calculated by:
• if l j ≥ µ j
p+i j = 0
p=i j = exp
(µ j−l j)
p−i j = 1− exp
(µ j−l j)
• if l j < µ j
p+i j = 1− exp
(l j−µ j)
p=i j = exp
(l j−µ j)
p−i j = 0
Chapter 5. Distributed Learning in Adaptive Agents Coordination 176
5.6.3 Numerical Simulations
Starting from an ER random network with N = 100 and average out-degree 〈kout〉= 4,
we have agents uniformly distrusted with different service rates, where half of them
are fast in a set F with µF = 4 and half of them are slow in a set S with µS = 2. Tasks
arrive at a certain agent ai with an arrival rate λi. When ∑i λi = ∑i µi, the utilization
rate is UR = 1 under the centralised allocation, where ∑i fi j = µ j. The agents are
differentiated into n layers, and the weight of agent on the layer of k (1≤ k ≤ n−1) is
Wi j = 1/k. For neighbours of Wi j > 0, they are assigned to different layers uniformly
at random in the beginning. The adaptation rate is pα = 0.01.
5.6.3.1 Static Networks
When λi = λ for any agent, we have a uniform task input distribution. If pα = 0, then
the network is static. In an ER random network, the fast agent ai ∈ F receives same
amount of tasks as the slow one a j ∈ S on average, namely 〈∑k fki〉 = 〈∑k fk j〉 = λ.
As 〈∑k fki〉 < µF while 〈∑k fk j〉 > µS, the fast ones are always underloaded but the









In the neighbourhood of ai, we have the inputting load to fast agents proportional to
∑a j∈F Wi j, similarly the inputting load to slow agents is proportional to ∑a j∈SWi j. The
optimal structure should satisfy that:









where we define W (F) = 〈∑a j∈F Wi j〉 as the average weighted number of fast neigh-
bours, and W (S) = 〈∑a j∈SWi j〉 means the average weighted number of slow neigh-
bours.
In the following, we take a specific case n = 3 and λ = 3 as an example to im-
plement the framework of work-learn-adapt. When the exploration rate is β = 0, the
access to the disconnected agents with Wi j = 0 is impossible while some overloaded
agents may be “pushed” out from the neighbourhood, so the network gets sparse grad-
ually as shown in Figure 5.23. When the exploration rate gets bigger, it is possible to
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“pull” some disconnected agents into the neighbourhood. As a result, the favourable
configuration with W (F)/W (S) ' µF/µS can be achieved and the utilization rate is
close to 1.
time (# 102)

















































































































Figure 5.23: Neighbourhood configurations and utilization rate are illustrated when the
exploration rate is β = 0,0.5 and 1 respectively, where “Fast-1” means the fast agents
on the first layer. The simulation runs up to tmax = 105.
At the end of simulation, we obtain the stationary neighbourhood configurations
by varying exploration rate β in Figure 5.24. With the increase of β, the density of
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neighbours on the second layer is increasing, but slow neighbours are still around the
agent to balance the system load.
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Figure 5.24: Neighbourhood configurations and percentages at stationary state are
shown by varying exploration rate β from 0 to 1. The left panel illustrates how many fast
and slow neighbours are on the first and second layers, and the right panel presents
the percentages of various types of neighbours.
5.6.3.3 The Activities of Agents
We also explore the activities of agents in the adaptation of neighbourhood in the case
of n = 3 and λ = 3. Let’s define In(F) as the average number of coming-in fast neigh-
bours and Out(F) as the average number of going-out fast neighbours. Similarly, we
have In(S) and Out(S) for the activities of slow neighbours. Figure 5.25 illustrates
the dynamical processes resulting from individual upgrading/downgrading. With the
increase of the exploration rate β, more and more agents come into the neighbourhood,
but the number of going-out neighbours changes rarely. Interestingly, the fast agents
are more likely to be inserted into the neighbourhood than the slow ones.
5.6.3.4 The Effects of the Number of Layers
When the number of layers is bigger, the neighbourhood is more diverse. Figure 5.26
displays the average number of slow/fast neighbours, as well as the average weighted
number of slow/fast neighbours under different tiered networks. As we can see, the
weighted number of neighbours gets smaller when the number of layers (namely n) is
bigger, but the average number of neighbours is invariant.
In real world, more cost usually comes along with the closer neighbours as we need
to maintain them at the expense of time, energy and even money. Through this tiered
Chapter 5. Distributed Learning in Adaptive Agents Coordination 179
-





































Figure 5.25: Neighbourhood is updated by varying exploration rate β from 0 to 1. Here,
we use In(S) to show the average number of slow agents coming in the neighbourhood,
while Out(S) is the average number of slow agents going out from the neighbourhood.
The right panel illustrates the ratio between the number of coming-in neighbours and
that of going-out neighbours (namely In(S)/Out(S) and In(F)/Out(F)), where we can
find that the fast agents are more likely to be inserted into the neighbourhood.
structure, tasks can be accomplished with less cost (namely, smaller weighted number
of neighbours).
5.7 Summary
This chapter incorporates state evolution, structure adaptation and distributed learn-
ing into adaptive networks, for high-performance and resilient agent coordination.
Through continuous learning, a series of local adjustments reshape the roles of agents
and their connectivity.
Key to the overall performance, is a dynamic division of labour between leaders
and followers. This local form of order avoid locks caused by insufficient or unreach-
able resources. To reach an efficient configuration, a risk-averse learning mechanism
is strapped on the leaders so that they continuously refresh the picture of the local
structure they are targetting, and seek to attain by rewiring their neighbourhoods. For
radical changes in patterns of demand, leaders also track their loads and are able to
demote themselves or promote neighbours as the case may appear. The ratio of tar-
get learning rates η−/η+, the probabilities of adaptation, together with the task size,
and the number of different skill types, have an influence on both team wastefulness
(over-accumulation of followers) and task completion rates.
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Figure 5.26: Neighbourhood configuration in weighted networks. Five different net-
works (whose number of layers is n = 2,3,4,5,6 respectively) are used to implement
the framework of work-learn-adapt. Note that the number of neighbours (slow or fast) is
independent on the number of layers, while the weighted number of neighbours (W (S)
or W (F)) gets smaller when the neighbourhood diversity is strong (namely bigger num-
ber of layers n).
Increasing the number of skill types decreases the organisation performance. A
diverse demand in skills seem to require larger assemblies to be dealt with well. A
situation familiar to people living in small groups. In contrast, increasing the typical
size of a task will lead to more efficient teams with smaller resource waste rate. Our
self-organizing decentralised method, where no one exerts global control, does not
know a priori about the type of skill demand it is going to face. As result, it works
well in a dynamical environment while incurring a relatively low loss of performance
compared to a centralised solution.
In the real world, more and more systems are open to new incoming agents and
built by largely interdependent components, who are supposed to manage and adapt
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their relationships with others intelligently based on local and historical information.
Elaborations of our simple distributed work-learn-adapt model might be useful in these
more complicated settings. One limitation, is that our agents are cooperative (espe-
cially in the example of distributed task allocation, where some overloaded agents get
upgraded to take more tasks). There are many situations in organisations where this
is not the case. A line of research we feel would be worth pursuing, would be to take
self-interested agents (Miyashita et al., 2015) into consideration, and integrate to the
design of the learn-and-adapt model elements of game theory and incentives to handle
these more realistic situations.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
In the dynamical world, many complex adaptive systems consist of a large number
agents interacting with each other, where macroscopic phenomena emerge out of mi-
croscopic interactions. In the fields of sociology, biology and economics, a variety
of investigations (Gross and Blasius, 2008; Blasius and Gross, 2009; Sayama et al.,
2013) have been conducted to shed light upon the interplay between global properties
and local behaviours, that we are just in the beginning to understand. As the dynamics
of complex systems lies in both temporal and spatial aspects, it is a quite promising
direction to study the coupled dynamics between states and structures, and then reveal
the emergent order from chaos. Two core questions are: (1) where do the dynamics of
state and structure originate; (2) how do the collective patterns emerge out of individual
behaviours.
6.1 Thesis Summary
In this thesis, we have studied the collective dynamics on top of complex adaptive net-
works, which are entangled by state evolution and structure adaptation. Three adaptive
network models based on various levels of learning are discussed in our work, namely
adaptive voter model, evolutionary population model and adaptive agents coordina-
tion. All these models are characterized by the interplay between the dynamics of
networks and the dynamics on networks, but the origins of their respective dynamics
are different.
Firstly, we focus on an adaptive voter model, whose dynamics originates from a
form of social learning by a series of pairwise imitation and link rewiring. When the
rewiring force gets stronger, the adaptive system transforms from consensus to frag-
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mentation. In Chapter 3, we have explored some interesting directions to study the
influences of various evolution and adaptation strategies on the collective patterns.
Specifically, a strategy of rewire-to-foaf can lead to an early fragmentation by form-
ing numerous smaller monochrome communities. When a neutral state is introduced,
network consensus is enhanced based on the method of approximate majority. Consid-
ering the heterogeneity of the nodes, a weighted voter model is proposed to illustrate
the influences of biased imitation on collective dynamics. In addition, the adaptive dy-
namics can be derived by approximate differential equations, which may be inaccurate
due to the emergent correlations. To address this difficulty, we have explored interface
approximation (IA) and double stars approximation (DSA) to truncate bigger moments
using smaller ones. A series of numerical simulations have shown that the accuracy is
highly improved through these approximation methods.
Secondly, we study the evolution of cooperation in a group of structured popula-
tion in Chapter 4, where the dynamics originates from natural selection. Based on the
framework of evolutionary game theory, the players are provided with the strategy of
either cooperation or defection, where cooperators are those paying cost for the success
of population, but defectors (or cheaters) avoid the cost of contributing to the commu-
nity. The state and structure co-evolve under natural selection and social inheritance.
A critical phase transition from the regime of cooperation to that of defection is ob-
tained with the change of a certain structure adaptation parameter (i.e. the embedding
parameter q). To detect the loss of cooperation, some indicators are proposed as early-
warning signals for the critical slowing down. Furthermore, Kendall τ correlation and
ROC curves are adopted to measure the consistency and accuracy of the indicators in
detecting the collapse of cooperation. Our results highlight that it is possible to detect
the community fragility even in such a complex adaptive system. This work is quite
promising nowadays in the fields of financial market, economics and ecology, where
the risk of collapse is a fatal problem like Achilles’ heel.
Finally, the adaptive dynamics is incorporated by state evolution, structure adap-
tation and distributed learning in Chapter 5. We have explored the adaptive agents
coordination under the framework of work-learn-adapt (WLA), where the interacting
agents need to complete the coming tasks cooperatively. Considering the uncertainty
of tasks, the agents are able to adapt their states and structure in real time. In the case of
agents team formation, the division of labour is achieved by the differentiation between
leaders and followers. Importantly, the agents implement state evolution and structure
adaptation based on quantitative information obtained from learning. This mechanism
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extends the state-structure dynamics by allowing distributed learning, which can give
rise to better organisation performance in a more natural and rational way. This WLA
framework is decentralised, robust and sustainable in many real-world applications.
The above models are embedded into complex adaptive networks coupled by dy-
namical states and structures, but the endogenous dynamics are driven by different
levels of learning. In the adaptive voter model, the dynamics originates from pair-
wise imitation. When it comes to the evolutionary population, natural selection is the
main power for the evolution of cooperation. As for the dynamics in adaptive agents
coordination, distributed learning guides the co-evolution of state and structure ratio-
nally. Through these models, we have gained much deeper insights into the adaptive
dynamics from different perspectives.
6.2 Future Work
Even though many amazing fruits have been obtained at present in modelling and
analysing complex adaptive systems, there are still many obstacles on the way ahead.
In the following, we will point out some future challenges in this field.
• Extracting rules form data
The models adopted to study the adaptive dynamics are mostly conceptual, and
how to combine theoretical work with real-world applications is always an important
subject. As we all know, the models usually trade realism for generality. When we
come to some realistic applications, the rules are almost unknown and we need to
uncover the hidden information from real data. Therefore, the mechanisms for adaptive
networks should be extracted from large-scale temporal and structured data.
Let’s first suppose the state of a node is one-dimensional (namely a scalar), which
means si ∈ S1. At a certain step t, the whole network data defined by Gt will be
the states of all nodes N and the topology information N×N. The situation will be
more complicated if some nodes (edges) are created or removed. When the time is
advancing, we can have access to all network information Gt at each step. After that,
the problem will be how to extract the dynamical mechanisms from the big data. Some
machine learning methods (neural networks, deep learning, linear regression, etc. )
will be helpful in dealing with this kind of regression problems.
Furthermore, when the state of a node is multi-dimensional (namely a vector), for
example si ∈ S1× S2× ·· · × Sm, the problem becomes more complicated, where we
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need to consider the interdependence among the attributes as well as the interactions
among the nodes.
• Strategic learning
When we are modelling adaptive agents coordination, all the agents are cooperative
and make contributions to collective benefit. It will be a quite interesting problem to
incorporate the self-interested agents into adaptive networks, where the learning will
be strategic. This family of models should consider the trade-off between individual
interest and global benefit, just like the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) discussed in Chapter
4. Therefore, the model combining strategic agents with distributed learning will be a
promising direction in the future.
• Inference and decision-making
Adaptive dynamics based on learning provides us a robust technology to build sys-
tems. In reality, the dynamics is far from linear one, and may follow some distributions.
How to do the inference and make decisions under stochastic dynamics is another key
problem for future research.
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